



INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES

**Building a CATR Research Agenda,
Proceedings of the Third Bi-Annual
International Symposium of the Center
for Asian Terrorism Research (CATR)
March 1-3, 2006, Colombo, Sri Lanka**

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PREFACE

The Council for Asian Terrorism Research (CATR) held its second biannual international symposium in Colombo, Sri Lanka, on March 1–3, 2006. The Symposium, entitled “Building a Counterterrorism Research Plan,” was organized and hosted by the International Centre for Terrorism Research and Conflict Studies (ICTRCS) in Sri Lanka and the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) under the auspices of the CATR Board of Governors. IDA’s work to organize the symposium and publish the proceedings was in partial fulfillment of a task entitled “Analytical Support for DPAO” for the Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence).

The IDA research team wishes to express its gratitude to Mr. Ranga Kalansooriya, Mr. Vipula Wanigasekera, and their local support staff who worked tirelessly with the IDA team in making the arrangements for the conference and ensuring that it ran smoothly. We also thank Aundra Campbell and Toni Crow of the IDA support staff, without whom we could not have cleared all the administrative hurdles on the US side. We are also grateful for the editorial support of Ms. Shelley Smith and Ms. Barbara Varvaglione in producing this document. Finally, we thank Mr. Mark Stout and Mr. Robert Zirkle for reviewing and commenting on the draft. Caroline Ziemke drafted the Introductions and Summaries presented in this report with input and oversight from the rest of the IDA/DPAO team. We have taken care to accurately reflect the opinions expressed by the participants and have done minimal editing on the papers individual authors submitted. The IDA team accepts sole responsibility for any misstatements, errors, or omissions.

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INTRODUCTION

The second biannual international symposium of the Council for Asian Terrorism Research (CATR) was held at the Mount Lavinia Hotel, Colombo, Sri Lanka. The aim of the conference was to define and prioritize the most pressing issues confronting the counterterrorism community in South and Southeast Asia. This was the first of two CATR biannual meetings to be devoted to drafting a comprehensive research agenda as a blueprint for bringing the combined expertise in the region together to forge cooperative analytical and policy approaches. The meeting is the third in a series that began with a symposium on “The Dynamics and Structures of Terrorist Threats in Southeast Asia” held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in April 2005.¹ The CATR is an outgrowth of the desire, expressed by the participants in that earlier symposium, to build on the foundation of information sharing and frank discussion built during that meeting by creating a permanent organization that would meet on a regular basis. A Steering Committee was formed that met in Jakarta, Indonesia, in July 2005 to draft a charter for a permanent council dedicated to promoting and sharing cooperative and comparative research on subjects related to the causes and responses to terrorism and political violence in South and Southeast Asia. The CATR came into being later in the autumn of 2005 and sponsored its first international symposium in Bali a few months later.²

The Council for Asian Terrorism Research is a consortium of government, academic, and research institutions dedicated to providing systematic ways of promoting and sharing regional research on terrorism and counterterrorism. Its goal is to draw on the unique strengths and perspectives of each of its member institutions and countries to enhance both understanding of and responses to the rise of terrorism and political violence. The CATR is founded upon the principle that by promoting and sharing

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- 1 See John T. Hanley, Jr., Kongdan Oh Hassig, and Caroline F. Ziemke, *Proceedings of the International Symposium on the Dynamics and Structures of Terrorist Threats in Southeast Asia Held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia*, IDA P-4026 (Alexandria, Virginia: Institute for Defense Analyses, September 2005).
 - 2 See John T. Hanley, Jr., Kongdan Oh Hassig, and Caroline F. Ziemke, *Proceeding of the First Bi-Annual Symposium of the Council on Terrorism Research: The Anatomy of Terrorism and Political Violence in South Asia Held in Bali, Indonesia*, IDA P-4096 (Alexandria, Virginia: Institute for Defense Analyses, May 2006).

research, it is possible to draw upon the diverse expertise and perspectives that exist across the region to develop new approaches, enhance existing capabilities, and build integrated and cooperative efforts to counter terrorism in the Asia-Pacific region and other regions that directly affect its security. The Council fulfills a number of important functions:

- It provides formal and informal mechanisms for promoting an open dialogue among scholars, officials, and law enforcement professionals.
- It encourages information sharing as a means to improve the effectiveness of both national and international counter-terrorism activities.
- It promotes research on topics relating to terrorism and counterterrorism for use in policymaking, planning, and training.
- It establishes links with institutions and organizations in other regions for the purpose of information exchange and scholarly dialogue.

This proceedings document includes three products: the formal papers presented at the Colombo symposium, Power Point presentations, and a summary of the first round of working groups designed to create a comprehensive CATR research agenda. With the exception of the formal papers, all the discussions at the symposium were conducted according to strict Chatham House rules of non-attribution. For this reason, no one is quoted directly in the summaries, although all the ideas expressed were advanced by one or more of the participants. While IDA was responsible for drafting the summaries, they reflect as far as possible the opinions and observations of the experts in attendance. They do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editors, the Institute for Defense Analyses, the US Department of Defense, or any of the other participating organizations.

PART I

HOW DO TERRORIST MOVEMENTS START?

OVERVIEW: HOW DO TERRORIST MOVEMENTS START?

SUMMARY OF DISCUSSIONS

The goal of the opening session of the symposium was to initiate a discourse on potential analytical approaches to understanding the roots and motivations underlying the rise of new terrorist movements in South and Southeast Asia. In opening the discussion, Dr. Fuad Jabali posed the question that would frame the discussion: What is the daughter of the terrorists? That is, in getting at the root causes of terrorism, we must understand what things the terrorists value most deeply, so deeply that they will undertake acts of savage—even suicidal—violence to defend them. He then charged the assembly to tackle the question of how the targets of terrorist violence—governments, other ethnic and religious groups, the West—are perceived as posing a threat to those cherished values. “If we don’t want to stir up the terrorists,” Jabali suggested, “don’t kidnap their daughter.” Beyond these root causes, however, Jabali further urged the assembled experts to consider the degree to which local groups and international movements are connected: Does a local resistance group only become a terrorist movement when it links up with outside groups? And to what extent do international terrorist movements use, and perhaps inflame, local grievances to increase their own support and recruiting base?

Jabali went on to outline a series of factors that he identified as important in answering the question “how do terrorist movements start?” First, terrorism arises out of long and complicated historical and social contexts. This makes it extremely difficult to pinpoint the historical moment when a particular terrorist movement starts, when a series of individual acts of terrorism constitutes a movement, or when a legitimate political opposition or separatist movement makes the transition into terrorism. It may turn out that the best we can do is to draw a general distinction between the pre-terrorist and terrorist phases in the development of a particular political or ideological movement. It is important to understand these contexts in order to grasp why some societies that share apparent “root causes,” such as poverty and inequality, never produced terrorist movements while others do. Second, terrorist movements are, by their very nature, underground operations that, in their early stages, do not carry out their actions by the light of day or leave extensive administrative paper trails. This can make their histories

extremely difficult to trace and empirical data hard to come by. Third, much can be learned about ideological movements through the careful study of the statements of terrorist leaders and the literature of their movements. Fortunately, the exception to the dearth of data can be the existence of a wealth of such ideological manifestos, sermons, and other indoctrination materials. The writings of key leaders and ideological influences of groups like al-Qaida can often be traced back at least several decades. While such a survey of texts does not necessarily pinpoint when and why a particular group might cross the line from peaceful resistance to violent terrorism or insurgency, it can provide insight into the various stages of ideological development. Ultimately, Jabali argued, if we make the effort to put ourselves in the mindset of the terrorists and trace the evolution of that mindset from its initiation to the present, we might better understand, and perhaps take steps to solve, the problems that propel groups down the path to terrorism.

The discussion focused predominantly on the need to find ways to get into the minds of the terrorists and, in so doing, break out of the intellectual trap of what analysts think they already know. Most of the academic research on terrorism is based on empirical data from the Arab Middle East and Western Europe; and while it may point to some useful general principles, it may also have limited applicability in the South and Southeast Asian environment. Each terrorist movement is, in its early stages, the product of its unique historical, cultural, and socio-economic contexts. To understand those contexts, it will be necessary to dig below the internationalist rhetoric of global and regional movements like Jemaah Islamiya (JI) and al-Qaida to isolate the core local issues. It will also be necessary to expand research on the roots of terrorism beyond empirical data and find ways to understand the more subjective perceptions, passions, and “senses” of injustice, inequality, and intolerance that can motivate terrorists and their supporters.

So, understanding the terrorist mindset from the inside is a vital first step. But this led the group to raise an equally important question: once we understand the terrorist mindset, how do we put that knowledge to work? It is clear that other, more prosaic concerns are also part of the calculus of terrorist movements and are catalysts for solidifying local support. It is, thus, important that we develop a better understanding of the links between attitudes, identities, and more concrete political issues. This link is especially important in understanding why, if two regions suffer under similar deprivation, one will produce a terrorist movement and another will not. It may also point to steps governments can take to prevent local unrest, say, in Southern Thailand, from blossoming into a full-fledged terrorist movement with regional or global operational and

ideological links. While the ideal is to prevent *all* politically motivated violence, by understanding the links and balances between attitudes and concrete political demands it may be possible to forestall localized political violence from escalating and spreading to become a broader and more deeply entrenched terrorist movement. Terrorists tap into local and group passions and insecurities, often building support by fulfilling material needs such as education and disaster relief. If governments can step in first to fill these and other material and psychological needs, they may well succeed in robbing nascent terrorist movements of the crucial social support base they need to operate and expand their ideological and operational reach.

Finally, the discussion turned to the important issue of the psychological factors that spur individuals and groups to resort to terrorist violence to advance their political and ideological concerns. As numerous cases—including those of the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines and the Tamal Tigers in Sri Lanka—show, the personality of a single terrorist group leader can prove decisive in turning a group toward terrorism and in defining the style and focus of violence. Understanding the psychology and personal history of terrorist leaders may, then, provide some insight into the direction in which they may lead their movements in the future. Many societies in the South and Southeast Asian regions suffer under deprivation and unfulfilled expectations, but not all will produce terrorist or insurgent movements. A charismatic leader can, however, tap into the insecurities and psychological needs of such a society when its government fails to fulfill them. Terrorism research must develop a better understanding of the personalities and techniques of such charismatic leaders in order to track their rise, follow their “career development,” anticipate their future actions and, ideally, preempt their success by answering the needs and insecurities of vulnerable populations.

THE PAPERS

Hekmat Karzai, in “The Emergence of Terrorism in South Asia,” traces the origins of Islamist extremism in the region back to Western efforts to prevent Soviet expansion during the Cold War, first by backing the regime of the Shah in Iran and later by supporting the mujahideen fighting the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan. According to Karzai, the backlash against Iranian efforts to export its Shi’a radical ideology led to the establishment of Sunni extremist movements in Pakistan and Afghanistan that later gained political and religious legitimacy in the wider Muslim world as a result of the anti-Soviet Afghan resistance. The model has since been expanded in the form of the Lashkar-I-Toiba, which seeks to liberate Kashmir and create a unified Islamist regime in

Pakistan, and Jamaat ul-Mujahideen in Bangladesh. In the years since the destruction of the Taliban regime in 2003, the model has come full circle, being re-imported into Afghanistan in the form of al-Qaida support to the Taliban's insurgency against the new democratically elected government in Kabul. Karzai calls for the establishment of a network to defeat extremism in the region that should include tougher laws against extremism; greater focus on political, economic, social, and religious rather than military solutions; and a comprehensive, forward-looking strategy with clear goals.

In "The Roots and Evolution of Terrorist Movements in the Philippines: The Abu Sayyaf Experience," Rommel Banlaoi traces the origins and organizational development of al-Harakatul al-Islamiyya (Islamic Movement), better known as the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). Banlaoi argues that, despite its early links to the Afghan jihad against the Soviet occupation, ASG's ideological and political roots lay firmly in the soil of Philippine history. The resentment that fuels ASG and its supporters is the product, he shows, of 400 years of oppression of the Muslim minority, first by the Spanish and later by the Christian Philippine majority and the government. The Moro people continue to struggle under poverty and low economic development despite the natural wealth of their territories. Using a structure-agency analysis, Banlaoi argues that while structural factors account for the rise of Moro resistance movements, agential factors, particularly the personalities and leadership styles of the ASG's top leadership, explain the success and evolving style and focus of the group from resistance fighters, to bandits engaged largely in kidnappings for ransom, and since 2001, into a jihadist organization dedicated, in part, to re-Islamizing the Philippines.

Suwit Mangkhala's essay, "The Making of Modern Terrorism," proposes an alternative research framework for understanding how terrorist movements start that combines elements of Positivist and Post-Positivist Constructivist theory. The author argues that the key to understanding the roots of terrorism comes in understanding the broader processes by which social and cultural identities are formed. Terrorist groups and movements are the products of conflicts between identities that lead one group to turn to violence against a perceived, or sensed, threat from a hostile "other"—often the government or ethnic majority. By analyzing the origins of terrorist movements from this perspective, it might be possible to develop a typology of terrorist groups based on their identity construction by looking both at empirical factors, such as poverty, and more subjective factors such as the senses of injustice or inequality that shape group identity. Such analysis seems to point to a conclusion that modern terrorism arises from perceptions of injustice, inequality, and intolerance. More importantly, these perceptions are not restricted to any

specific political systems, economies, societies, cultures, or religions but are often shared across political boundaries through the spread of ideas related to identity construction.

Zaffar Abbas looks at the Pakistani role in the escalation of insurgent violence in Afghanistan since early 2005 in “Pakistan, Tribal Pashtuns, and the Afghan Insurgency.” The year 2005 was the bloodiest since the overthrow of the Taliban in early 2003 and saw the emergence of terrorist tactics previously unheard of in Afghanistan, particularly the appearance of suicide bombers and the widespread and increasingly sophisticated use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). Abbas focuses on two dimensions of the problem: the inability of the Pakistani military to curb the involvement of Pashtun tribesmen from Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in the ongoing Afghan insurgency, and the historical and cultural factors that drive tribesmen in the FATA toward religious extremism. He concludes that how Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf handles religious extremism in the FATA will help determine the long-term success of attempts to build a stable Afghanistan. Outstanding disputes over the Durand Line (which constitutes the current, but disputed Afghan-Pakistani border) must be resolved, and the Pakistani government must find non-military means of gaining the cooperation of tribal leaders, preferably through economic development incentives and interaction with traditional Pashtun tribal jirgas in the FATA. It is likely that the future stability of Pakistan, as well as Afghanistan, is at stake: the longer tensions between Islamabad and the FATA tribes drag out, the more likely Islamist political forces are to establish a permanent foothold in the Pakistani political system.

THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN TERRORISM IN SOUTH ASIA

Hekmat Karzai



INTRODUCTION

South Asia, which has been a volatile region for decades, consists of Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. It covers only about 10 per cent of the total land mass of the Asian continent, but contains more than a billion people and between 45 and 50 per cent of Asia's Muslim population. Most importantly, there are two nuclear-armed states and several dozen active terrorist groups that are not only anti-Western but also against their own governments. Even though many of the countries share similar religious, political, cultural and historical heritages, mutual suspicion is the norm. In particular, Pakistan and India, which were both part of the British occupation, have fought three brutal wars. During the course of their drawn out conflict, the idea of using a nuclear bomb has even been explored, especially by Pakistan, which is at the disadvantage in both strategic depth and military manpower.

The region is also influenced by 'great powers' and their politics. The United States is currently waging its war against terrorism in Afghanistan and certain parts of Pakistan, with encouraging preliminary results. The US is also using its strategic

influence in the areas of regional cooperation, trade and nuclear energy. China has been active as well in strengthening its strategic presence in the South Asian region through trade, and supplying military capabilities to various states, particularly Pakistan.

The greatest threat to the South Asian region comes from the extremism and radicalism of Sunni militant groups that were formed during the course of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Many of these militant groups enjoy popular support in certain areas and, in the case of Pakistan, even hold seats in parliament. The future of the region truly depends on two factors: how it deals with the rise of modern terrorism and its degree of success in continuing to nurture the roots of democracy.

This chapter is divided into two sections: firstly, it looks at historic factors that have shaped the rise of terrorism in the region; secondly, it analyzes three of the most active groups in the South Asia region namely Lashkar-i-Toiba, Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen and Taliban.

HISTORICAL FACTORS

The Iranian Revolution

Through much of the Cold War, Iran enjoyed very good relations with the West, especially the United States. Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, the Shah of Iran, was seen as a reformer and a beacon of stability in an otherwise turbulent Middle East. Through his policies of modernization the Shah became closely allied to the US. “The Shah's increased ties with the United States and his agreement with a western oil consortium was resented by the ultra-conservatives, and they and other Iranians were annoyed by the presence of the many foreigners from the United States who accompanied U.S. aid to Iran.”¹ The Iranian conservative agenda was to ban tobacco, alcohol, gambling, and Western movies and influence; to institute draconian Islamic punishments (such as cutting off the hands of criminals); and, most importantly, to establish Sharia law throughout Iran.




Iran also had a communist party, the Tudeh Party, which also stood in staunch opposition to the monarchy. Believing that the communist opposition would win popular

¹ The Iranian Revolution: King Pahlavi (the Shah) against Dissent: Accessed on <http://www.fsmitha.com/h2/ch29ir.html>

support by exploiting the country's impoverished peasantry, the Shah undertook his own land redistribution program. "In the early 1960 this program, known as the 'White Revolution,' gave land to the landless by taking it away from the larger holders – which included the property of Iran's Shiite clergy."²

The modernization and reform policies of the Shah were supposed to set the country on a course of prosperity, but in practice it had the opposite effect. The most effective opposition did not come from the communist Tudeh party but from religious clerics, led by the charismatic Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. In his sermons and interviews, Khomeini gave voice to popular grievances and resentments against the ruling regime. He attacked the Shah as a corrupt and ungodly puppet of the United States, and decried the negative influence of Western culture on the youth of Iran. He also condemned the brutality of the secret police of Iran, SAVAK, who were responsible for the detention and killing of thousands of people, as well as the negative effect that competition with foreign companies had on Iran's traditional small businessmen, the *bazaaris*.



Khomeini was forced into exile, settling first in Iraq. From there, he continued to provide guidance and lift the morale of his followers through taped sermons and statements that stressed that the "monarchy was one of the most shameful and disgraceful reactionary manifestations."³ Forced out of Iraq in 1975, Khomeini took refuge in France, from where he continued to foment rebellion in Iran. "By mid-summer 1978, all sectors of society had joined in: the students, intellectuals and *bazaaris* who began things; the construction workers hurt by the economic slow down; the factory workers, incensed by embezzlement of the pension funds and demanding higher wages; the civil servants who had suffered wage freeze for three years under soaring inflation; the urban slum dwellers, many of them squeezed off the land; and the *bazaaris* who had been the objective of punitive price campaigns."⁴

In early 1979 the Shah along, with his family, left Iran for a vacation, leaving a caretaker government in place. Within a month, Khomeini had returned from France to

2 Gary Sick, *All Fall Down*, New York and London: Penguin Books, 1985, pp. 3-24.

3 Ruh Allah Khumayni, *Islam and Revolution*, California: Mizan Press, 1981, p.176.

4 Dilip Hiro, *The Iranian Labyrinth: Journeys through Theocratic Iran and its Furies*, New York: Nation Books, 2005, p. 124.

Iran, where he was greeted by an ecstatic crowd of over a million Iranians. Immediately thereafter, he established the Islamic republic of Iran with himself as the '*marja-e taqlid*' (source of emulation), the highest religious title in Shia Islam, and the Leader of the Islamic Republic.

Most crucially, in the years following the Islamic Revolution and the creation of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Imam Khomeini undertook an extensive program to export his revolution to other parts of the Muslim world, particularly where Shi'ites made up a significant percentage of the population. Anticipating potential unrest, many Sunni-dominated countries, especially, the ones in the Persian Gulf and South Asia, countered the Shia radical ideology of Khomeini by teaching their own conservative, Sunni-based doctrines. Thousands of *Madrassas* (religions schools) were established with financial assistance from the Middle East, especially Saudi Arabia. These *Madrassas* eventually became responsible for the emergence of various militant groups and the radicalization of a particular segment of the population in all of South Asia.

The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December, 1979 had a major impact not only by destabilizing South Asia but also by creating the conditions that gave rise, first, to the predominantly Sunni *mujahedin* resistance movement that, in turn, led to the new terrorism. The monarchy of Afghanistan, traditionally a moderate Muslim country, was overthrown by a communist regime closely affiliated with and supported by the former Soviet Union. After coming to power, the new Communist regime embarked on a policy of Marxist-Leninist social and economic reforms. Massive protest and rebellions broke out in various parts of Afghanistan, led by religious and tribal leaders who saw atheist-communism a threat to their Islamic beliefs and traditions. When it became apparent that the collapse of the communist regime in Kabul was a real possibility, the Soviet Union sent the Red Army south. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan began on 24 December 1979.

Calls for a *Jihad* (holy war) to expel the Russians from the territory of Islam immediately arose across the Muslim world. In the Middle East, the Muslim Brotherhood, the Saudi-based World Muslim League, and various Palestinian Islamic radical groups organized recruits and put them in contact with organizations in Pakistan that were overseeing the resistance movement. General Zia Ul-Haq, who had come to power through a military coup in Pakistan, embraced the anti-Soviet cause and gave

instructions to all of Pakistan's embassies to provide visas to anyone seeking to enter Pakistan in order to join the fight against the communists. Muslims from around the world were encouraged to come to Pakistan to fight alongside the Afghan *Mujaheedin* (holy warriors), who were, in turn, receiving substantial financial and material support from both the United States and Saudi Arabia.

The United States' interests were clearly articulated at the time by National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski: "the Soviet Union in Afghanistan poses for us an extremely grave challenge, both internationally and domestically. While it could become a Soviet Vietnam, the initial effects of the intervention are likely to be adverse for us."⁵ It was time, he said, "to finally sow shit in their backyard."⁶ Brzezinski suggested that the United States should support the Afghan resistance against the Russians by providing arms and technical assistance. The U.S. should also, he said, support Pakistan with new military and security assistance guarantees. Brzezinski also urged greater involvement of Muslim world in this conflict, so as to promote the appearance that this was a war between the Russians and the Muslim world.

Ahmad Rashid, a world-renowned journalist, is reputed to be one of the most astute observers of the Afghan conflict. He writes: "some 35,000 Muslim radicals from 43 Islamic countries in the Middle East, North and East Africa, Central Asia and the Far East would pass their baptism under fire with the Afghan *Mujaheedin*." ⁷ Thousands came to study in the *Madrasahs* that were supported by the Pakistani military and funded by the Saudis.

Many training camps were established along the Afghan-Pakistani border for the thousands of young Muslims that were arriving. Radicals met one another, and studied, trained and fought together. It was the first opportunity for most of them to learn about Islamic movements in other countries and regions and they forged tactical and ideological links. These camps become the universities for the future generation of radicals, one of whom happened to be a young Saudi millionaire named Osama Bin Laden.

5 Barry Rubin and Judith Colp Rubin, *Anti-American Terrorism and the Middle East – Understanding the Violence*, Memo to President Jimmy Carter on Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2002, p. 108.

6 Ibid.

7 Ahmad Rashid, *Taliban*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002, p. 130.

The Afghan resistance proved successful and the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989. It appeared that the *Mujaheedin* had compelled one of the world's two nuclear superpowers to retreat and suffer a humiliating defeat. However, this achievement has had unexpected consequences for the West and South Asia, in what became known to many as a 'blowback' effect:⁸ Thousands of radical veterans, so-called "Afghan Arabs" returned to their homes in Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and elsewhere imbued with a sense of mission and intent on continuing their *Jihad* on behalf of Muslims suffering throughout the world.⁹ To this day, South Asia faces the challenge of dealing with the aftermath of the jihadist war against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the radical Muslim groups that arose from it; it is those groups that we now turn.

Lashkar-i-Toiba (Army of the Pure)

Co-founded by Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, Zafar Iqbal and Abdullah Azam, this Pakistan-based Lashkar-i-Toiba (LET) originated as the armed wing of *Markaz Dawa al-Irshad* (MDI), or the Centre for Preaching, in 1993.¹⁰ Following *Ahl-e Hadith* teachings, an ultra-conservative branch of radical Sunni thought, the objectives of LET include recruiting volunteers to fight as *Mujaheedin* -- against Soviet occupation during the 1980s and currently against India on behalf of the liberation of Jammu and Kashmir.¹¹ LET aims to eventually create three Muslim homelands -- one by merging Kashmir with Pakistan, the second and the third by liberating Muslim majority areas in North and South India respectively.¹² Its role in fulfilling this mission was to recruit and train people to wage *Jihad* wherever there was an un-Islamic government (i.e. where Sharia law was not enforced in a majority Muslim country) in power. Its first leader Saeed declared that "the need for *jihad* has always existed and present conditions demand it more than ever."¹³ On 26 December 2001 MDI and LET divided.¹⁴ Saeed announced his resignation from LET to head MDI -- subsequently renamed *Jammat al-Daawa* (JD) --

8 Robin Wright, *Sacred Rage*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001, pp. 69-110.

9 Leonard Weinberg, *Global Terrorism*, Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2005.

10 Government of India, *Pakistan's Involvement in Terrorism Against India*, p. 57.

11 India's most wanted, Front Line, Volume 19 - Issue 02, Jan. 19 - Feb. 01, 2002, <http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl1902/19020180.htm>

12 Saeed's address to the Lahore Press Club on 18 February 1996.

13 Allah's Army, <http://www.sabrang.com/cc/comold/march98/neighbor.htm>

14 Masood Hussain, "Lashkar-e-Toiba shifts shop", *Tehelka.com*, 27 December 2001.

saying that he would now only devote his time to preaching religion.¹⁵ Even then he remained a strong proponent of *Jihad*, issuing a warning to all Muslims that “the US bombing of Afghanistan and Iraq is an attack on the Muslim fraternity. You will go to hell if you do not wage *jihad* against the US.”¹⁶

Since Saeed’s resignation, Abdul Wahid Kashmiri, a Kashmiri from the Poonch district in Jammu, has held the reins of LET. By shifting the LET headquarters from Muridke in the Pakistani Punjab to Muzaffarabad in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), and by reconstituting its highest decision making body with new persons coming mostly from the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir and PoK, LET has shed its image as a Pakistani group.¹⁷ LET’s links with the Pakistani government have always caused controversy, leading to charges that they constitute a form of “state sanctioned terrorism”, especially in relation to India and Kashmir. LET and other militant groups were reportedly sent in advance by the Pakistan Army to occupy the ridges in the Kargil sector of Kashmir before regular Pakistani troops moved in and replaced them.¹⁸ The ensuing retreat by Pakistani troops from Kargil caused LET to turn against the Pakistani establishment. Eventually, international pressure on Pakistan led the government to ban LET on 15 January 2002 and in November 2003 it placed JD on a watch list. The US designated LET as a foreign terrorist organization on October 2, 2003.

The LET has been associated with other militant groups such as the Jemmah Islamiyah (JI)¹⁹, Jamaat-i Ulema-i Islam (JUI-F), Al Barq, and the Students' Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) through its provision of cadres, operatives, and strategic guidance. LET’s most important affiliation, however, has been with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and Osama bin Laden’s *al-Qaeda* (AQ) network. The relationship between LET and AQ can be traced back to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a point reiterated by Zafar Iqbal who commented that “Osama is our erstwhile colleague and we had

15 BBC News, *Pakistan freezes militant funds*, 24 December 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/1726813.stm

16 OneWorld.net, *Young Terrorists Signing Up By Thousands*, <http://www.fourwinds10.com/news/05-government/H-war/03-terrorism-war/2003/05H3-08-08-03-young-terrorists-sign-up-by-thousands.html>.

17 Tehelka.com, *Lashkar-e-Toiba shifts shop*, 27 December 2001, <http://www.tehelka.com/channels/currentaffairs/2001/dec/27/printable/ca122701lashpr.htm>

18 Badamibagh & After, South Asia Analysis Group, <http://www.saag.org/notes/note46.html>. Indian army assessed that 123 militants/mercenaries from various Tanzeems were killed and 50 are reported missing. The Tanzeems these militants belong to are Lashkar-e-Toiba, Harkat Ul Mujahideen and Harkat Ul Jihad-e-Islam. See Army Update. 27 June 1999, <http://meaindia.nic.in/warterror/kargil/upd2706-army.htm>

fought jointly against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan.”²⁰ *Al-Qaeda*-funded LET guest houses have provided sanctuary to fugitives like Ramzi Yousef, convicted in the United States for his role in 1993 World Trade Center bombing, and Mir Aimal Kansi, from Baluchistan, convicted and sentenced to death for murdering two CIA employees outside the CIA’s headquarters in Langley, Virginia in January 1993. The group -- which boasts several Afghan nationals among its cadre ranks – has claimed that it assisted the Taliban militia and AQ (as part of the latter’s International Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders) against the US-backed Northern Alliance in November and December 2001.²¹ To aid in its objectives, the LET had also invited Osama bin Laden, to join the “freedom struggle” against the Indian army in Kashmir.²² Most recently, India has accused LET of having a hand in the 11 July, 2006 Mumbai train bombings, which left 182 people dead and led to further tensions in Indo-Pakistani relations²³.

Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen

The objective of Jamaat ul-Mujahideen (JM) is to impose a rigid, extremist interpretation of the *Sharia* Law on Bangladesh. In pursuing that goal, it has undertaken terrorist activities to undermine the authority of Prime Minister Begum Khaleda Zia’s government (which has been in power in Dhaka since 2001). The JM rose to prominence with its alleged involvement in the bombing in Dinajpur on 13 February 2005. Its most infamous act of terror was carried out on 17 August 2005 when 350 Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) were detonated within a span of 30 minutes in 63 out of 64 of the country’s districts, killing 2 persons and injuring 115 others.²⁴

20 The Age, *JI arrests have 'dismantled' cell: minister*, 18 December 2003; Jamaat Al Dawa, Rantburg, The organizations, <http://www.rantburg.com/thugburg/dOrg.asp?ID=77>; Funding Terror in *The Lost Rebellion: Kashmir in the Nineties* by Manoj Joshi, Penguin Books India, 1999. Accessed at <http://iref.homestead.com/FundTerror.html>. Praveen Swami, *Lethal Remittance, The Front Line*, Volume 21, Issue 01, January 3-16, 2004. Accessed at <http://www.flonnet.com/fl2101/stories/20040116003202600.htm>; and General Pervez Musharraf, *Nawaz Sharif and the Kargil Conflict*, Sapra India, 2 May 1999, http://www.subcontinent.com/sapra/military/img_1999_06_001.html

21 General History of the Dispute, *The Truth about Kashmir*, <http://www.armyinkashmir.org/history/history4.html>; Lashkar-e-Toiba, South Asia Terrorism Portal, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/lashkar_e_toiba.htm

22 Musharraf, *Nawaz Sharif and the Kargil Conflict*.

23 Musharraf’s crisis on all front: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/5190244.stm July 21, 2006

24 Ajai Sahni, “Bangladesh: Behind the Smokescreen, the Terror Proliferates”, *South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR)*, 22 August 2005, Vol. 4, No. 6; “Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen in Bangladesh: A Growing Threat”, *Stratfor Terrorism Brief*, 23 November 2005.

Led by Sheikh Abdur Rahman, one of the chief architects of the 17 August bombings, JM has established training centers in 57 districts of Bangladesh and is closely affiliated with Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB or the Awaken Muslim Masses of Bangladesh), which itself has been classified as a terrorist organization by the Government of Pakistan.²⁵ The JM and Shahadat-e-Al-Hikma (another Bangladeshi-based Islamist extremist organization) also are believed to be linked since similar papers and leaflets have been found from the hideouts of both the organizations.²⁶ Moreover, JM is suspected to be linked to the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), which is one of the two Islamist political parties that make up the four-party ruling coalition in Bangladesh's government. Several JM operatives in detention have admitted that they have close links with JI leaders. JM reportedly received financial support from wealthy Islamic extremists in Saudi Arabia as well as funding from a number of international NGOs working in Bangladesh, including the Al-Falah Aam Development Organisation.²⁷ JM operatives have reportedly received training from Al-Qaeda at *Jihad* camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan.²⁸

Even though it has been banned by the Bangladeshi government, JM has been able to continue its reign of violence. On 22 November 2005 JM's policymaking body, the Majlis-e-Shura, ordered its bomb and suicide squad members to fight the Bangladeshi authorities to the death and to continue striking government offices and courts.²⁹ JM also appears to have a broader target group that includes non-governmental organizations (NGOs) operating in Bangladesh – pamphlets found near many of the detonating devices used in the 17 August bombings demanded the expulsion of NGOs “engaged in anti-Islamic activities in Muslim countries.”³⁰ JM appeals to the ‘vulnerable’ group of thousands of young Muslim men studying in the dozens of *madrassahs* across the country who have received an education solely in “religious” subjects, rather than those that might assist them in finding secular vocations.

25 Email correspondence with Jamal Hasan (forwarded by Rohan Gunaratna), 19 August 2005.

26 Jamal Hasan, “Background of Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen”, email correspondence with profile’s author, 19 August 2005

27 Email correspondence with Jamal Hasan (forwarded by Rohan Gunaratna), 19 August 2005.

28 “Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen in Bangladesh: A Growing Threat”, *Stratfor Terrorism Brief*.

29 “Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen in Bangladesh: A Growing Threat”, *Stratfor Terrorism Brief*, 23 November 2005, accessed online from <http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/print.php?storyId=258900>

30 Ibid.

The Bangladeshi government's response to the JM and JMJB has so far been lacking in both resolve and expediency. Some scholars have criticized the government for being too soft on countering the actions of JM (and other Islamist extremist groups). They explain the rationale for adopting a 'soft' approach as politically expedient – though the ruling Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) is by no means a fundamentalist party, it wants to use the jihadi groups to keep India destabilised externally and to weaken the opposition Awami League and its allies domestically.³¹

Despite banning both JM and JMJB on 23 February 2005, the government has continually found it difficult to trace all of JM's operatives and leaders and has resorted to asking Interpol for assistance.³² Success against JM arrived in the form of Abdur Rahman's capture by Bangladeshi authorities on 2 March 2006.³³

Taliban

Perhaps the most well known group among the three presented thus far, the Taliban (derived from Arabic word *Talib* which means a student or one who seeks) was thrust into the international limelight when it refused to surrender Osama bin Laden in the wake of the September 11 attacks.

Led by Supreme Leader Mullah Mohamed Omar, the Taliban came to power after occupying Kabul in 1996. After the withdrawal of the Soviet Union in 1989, Mullah Omar became disappointed with the *Mujaheedin* leaders following the re-occupation of Kabul. Instead of uniting themselves and striving towards the reconstruction of the country, they were engaging in internal armed conflicts over power and wealth. The country fell into a state of lawlessness, bringing much suffering to the general population. Mullah Omar participated in various meetings with his fellow *mullahs* (religious teachers) and friends, to discuss the state of the country, society and come up with ways to improve the situation leading eventually to the formation of the Taliban militia.

The Taliban's initial victories included the capture of an arms depot at Spin Boldak (owned by Hekmatyar's Hizb Islami group) in October 1994. The seizure of the

31 B. Raman. "Bangladesh & Jihadi Terrorism – An Update", *South Asia Analysis Group, Paper No. 887*, 7 Jan 2004, accessed online on 10 Mar 2005 from <http://www.saag.org/papers9/paper887.html>

32 "Bangladesh asks Interpol help to hunt bomb fugitives", *Reuters*, 1 September 2005.

33 "Bangladesh nets top militant chief", *The Straits Times Interactive*, 3 March 2006, accessed on 6 March 2006 from <http://straitstimes.asia1.com.sg/sub/asia/story/0,5562,375088-1141423140,00.html?>

large weapons cache was the beginning of its territorial conquests.³⁴ Subsequently, the Taliban captured Kandahar (November 1994), Herat (March 1995), Jalalabad (September 1996) and finally Kabul (October 1996).³⁵ The latter made the Taliban the de facto rulers of Afghanistan. By 1998, the Taliban effectively governed 95 percent of the country, with the remaining 5 percent under the control of the rival Northern Alliance.³⁶

There were no clear official documents outlining the foreign policy objectives of the Taliban-ruled Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, but they can be distilled from statements and behavior of the government, including its campaign for international recognition and accreditation by the United Nations as the legitimate government of Afghanistan (only Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE recognized the Taliban regime), efforts to secure revenue from international sources in the form of aid and investment for the reconstruction and development of Afghanistan, and its stated goal of establishing fair and friendly relations with all countries based on mutual respect and non-interference.³⁷

The Taliban's most important relationship is the one with AQ. Shortly after 9/11, the Taliban followed *Pasthunwali* (customary law), which establishes the obligation for an Afghan or a tribe to protect someone whom he or they have agreed to accept as their guest and shield them from any hostility, making it a disgrace to hand over such a guest to someone who means him harm.³⁸ In this case, the guest was bin Laden, to whom the Taliban was beholden for his significant contributions to road construction and other

34 Michael Rubin, Who is responsible for the Taliban, in *MERIA*, available at <http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2002/issue1/jv6n1a1.html> (25 June 2004).

35 *Taliban*, in *Encyclopedia of World Terrorism: 1996-2002*, p. 222; Ahmad Rashid, *Taliban: The Story of the Afghan Warlords*, p. 28.

36 See transcript of speech by Sayyid Rahmatullah Hashemi, roving ambassador of Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, available at http://sydney.indymedia.org/front.php3?article_id=8468 (21 June 2004); Profile: The taliban's recelusive leader, in *CNN*, 20 September 2001, available at <http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/central/09/18/omar.profile/index.html> (7 July 2004).

37 William Maley, The Foreign Policy of the Taliban, in *Council for Foreign Relations*, available at <http://www.cfr.org/ForeignPolicy/Taliban/Paper.html> (21 June 2004); see *Position Paper Regarding IEA's Recognition at the United Nations* presented by Abdul Hakeem Mujahid, Permanent Representative/designate Of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan to UN, available at <http://web.archive.org/web/20001004171504/www.taleban.com/statement1.htm> (21 June 2004), http://web.archive.org/web/20010217102820/www.taleban.com/statement_2.htm (21 June 2004) and <http://web.archive.org/web/20010216174708/www.taleban.com/taleb.htm> (21 June 2004).

38 Mullah Omar in his own word, in *the Guardian*, 26 September 2001, available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/g2/story/0,3604,558076,00.html> (9 July 2004); Interview with Amirul-Mukmineen, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20010215023415/www.taleban.com/amarat-ul-Islamia_english_version_vol_2_Amir_interview.htm (14 July 2004).

infrastructure development. It was reported that Osama gave his *bai`ah* to Mullah Omar, requiring Osama to give his allegiance, loyalty and support to Omar and the Taliban.³⁹ Currently, the Taliban collaborates very closely with AQ against the coalition forces and the Afghan government, and the two groups conduct attacks in support of one another. For its part, AQ has appointed very talented commanders including Abdul Hadi al-Iraqi and Khalid Habib to the Afghan front.

Prior to its overthrow, the Taliban are also known to have forged ties with various other jihadi groups, offering them training facilities and safe haven. Such groups included Harakatul Mujahidin, LET, Jaish-e-Muhammad, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Al-Gamaah Al-Islamiah Al-Masriyah, various Chechen fighters, and many others who are known to have operated and run training camps either by themselves or in collaboration with AQ or the Taliban on Afghan soil.⁴⁰

On 7 October 2001, US and British forces initiated aerial bombing against Taliban and AQ targets marking the commencement of Operation Enduring Freedom. The absence of air defences caused the Taliban to retreat and abandon their territories – Mazar e-Sharif (9 November 2001), Kabul (12 November 2001), Konduz (25 November 2001). Mullah Omar slipped out from Kandahar with his followers on 7 December 2001 and remains at large.⁴¹

CONCLUSION

It is evident that South Asia will remain, for the foreseeable future, a fertile ground for radicalism and extremism. The three groups discussed here will continue to conduct operations to challenge the will of their governments. The 11 July 2006 Mumbai bombing in India and the various other operations are a stark reminder of the battle the region continues to face.

Various measures can and must be adopted to deal with the ongoing struggle against terrorism. Specifically, all governments in the region must take extremism

39 Al-Qaeda background, in globalsecurity.org, available at <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/al-qaida-background.htm> (14 July 2004); see also <http://usgovinfo.about.com/library/blattack0916.htm> (14 July 2004)

40 Taliban, in *South Asia Terrorism Portal*, available at <http://www.satp.org/satporgetp/usa/Taliban.htm> (7 July 2004); Ahmad Rashid, *Taliban: The Story of the Afghan Warlords*, pp. 128-40, 130.

41 US invasion of Afghanistan, freedictionary.com, <http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/U.S.%20invasion%20of%20Afghanistan> (7 July 2004); Taliban, in *Encyclopedia of World Terrorism: 1996-2002*, p. 224.

seriously. It is understood that terrorism is a by-product of extremism and if we continue to let radical clerics preach their message of hate, there will not be a shortage of individuals ready for Jihad.

Thousands of madrassas still exist in the region for the purposes of religious education. Only a few hundreds of these, however, teach their students to be violent and take up arms against the infidels. These madrassas must be monitored and kept under close watch.

The international community's engagement in the region is also crucial. The region itself does not have developed institutions to deal with the local problems of security and governance. Countries like Afghanistan and Bangladesh must be supported internationally in order for them to be able to develop their own governing capacity. In addition, the West must pressure regimes that are not democratic. For example, Pakistan is the only nation in the region other than Burma that is governed by military officers. The objective should be nurturing the pillars of democracy and enhancing local governance. The West must also provide aid to countries that are facing serious obstacles in providing for the well-being of their populations. Through various modalities such aid can be coupled to the performance of these governments.

ROOTS AND EVOLUTION OF TERRORIST MOVEMENTS IN THE PHILIPPINES: THE ABU SAYYAF EXPERIENCE

Rommel C. Banlaoi

ABSTRACT

Though the threat of terrorism in the Philippines became more apparent in the aftermath of 9/11, it traces its roots far beyond that event. Thus, the contemporary issue of terrorism in the Philippines can only be fully understood in its proper historical context. The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), the most feared terrorist group in the Philippines, even has its own historical narrative that runs counter to the mainstream view of the government and the media. The root causes of terrorism in the Philippines also have structural and agential origins. Understanding these origins is important for a more informed analysis of terrorism in the Philippines.

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INTRODUCTION

Despite its persistent effort, the Philippine government has been struggling to defeat the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG),¹ the smallest but most terrifying armed Muslim revivalist group in the Philippines. Prior to September 11, 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks on the United States (US), the Philippine government dismissed the ASG as merely a bunch of bandits.² After 9/11, the US Department of State, among other official agencies, has listed the ASG as a foreign terrorist organization. The US has extended financial and technical assistance to the Philippine government in its effort to defeat the ASG. The ASG's commitment to employ terrorism to advance its political agenda makes it a menace to Philippine internal security. Its established link with Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and Al-Qaeda also makes the ASG a threat to broader regional and global security.³ The view is spreading that the ASG has, in fact, "reemerged as one of the more important terrorist groups confronting the Philippine government, the United States and its allies in Southeast Asia."⁴ But what are the ASG's roots as a terrorist movement?

One interpretation is structural.⁵ According to this view, the ASG started as terrorist movement in response to the failure of the Philippine government to address the structural causes of internal armed conflicts in the Philippines. Defeating the ASG,

1 For an account of the anti-terrorism efforts of the Philippine government, see Eusaquito P. Manalo, *Philippine Response to Terrorism: The Abu Sayyaf Group* (MA Thesis: Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey, California, December 2004).

2 For an elaboration of this point, see Rommel C. Banlaoi, "The Abu Sayyaf Group: From Mere Banditry to Genuine Terrorism?", *Southeast Asian Affairs 2006* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006).

3 For ASG-JI-Al Qaeda link, see Rommel C. Banlaoi, *War on Terrorism in Southeast Asia* (Quezon City: Rex Book Store International, 2004); Maria Ressa, *Seeds of Terror: An Eyewitness Account of Al-Qaeda's Newest Center of Operations in Southeast Asia* (New York: Free Press, 2003); Zachary Abuza, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: The Crucible of Terror* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2003); and Dirk J. Barreveld, *Terrorism in the Philippines: The Bloody Trail of Abu Sayyaf, Bin Laden's East Asian Connection* (New York: Writers Club Press, 2001). For a critical appraisal of these linkages, see Clive Williams M.G., "The Question of Links Between Al Qaeda and Southeast Asia" in *After Bali: The Threat of Terrorism in Southeast Asia*, Kumar Ramakrishna and See Seng Tan, eds., (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2003), pp. 83-96.

4 Zachary Abuza, *Balik-Terrorism: The Return of the Abu Sayyaf* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College, 2005), p. vii.

5 To get an structural perspective on the origin of terrorism see Erica Chenoweth, "Terrorism and Instability: A Structural Study on the Origins of Terror" (Unpublished paper, Department of Political Science at the University of Colorado, October 2004), p. 3.

therefore, would require resolution of domestic conflicts that continue to breed terrorism in the Philippines.

Another interpretation focuses on the role of specific individuals. The ASG, according to this view, started as a terrorism movement under the influence of people who believed that terrorism could result in immediate actions and results. For these leaders, terrorism and violence were seen as a useful tool for forcing the issue of political change onto the public agenda.⁶

This paper examines the roots and evolution of terrorist movements in the Philippines through both structural and agential approaches and argues that they have structural and agential origins. This paper contends, moreover, that the problem of terrorism in the Philippines can only be fully understood in its proper historical context. Finally, in describing how terrorist movements start, this paper demonstrates how the colonial past informs the present struggle of the ASG.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF TERRORISM IN THE PHILIPPINES: THE EVOLUTION OF THE ABU SAYYAF STRUGGLE

The comprehensive history of terrorism in the Philippine has yet to be written. But military historian Cesar Pobre states that the Philippines experienced its first terrorist attack in 1949 when Huk⁷ leader Alexander Viernes and 200-armed followers ambushed former First Lady Aurora Quezon and her entourage en route to Baler, now part of the Quezon Province of Luzon.⁸ But if terrorism means “the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change”,⁹ the true origins of terrorism in the Philippines may be traced to the Spanish colonial period (16th to 19th centuries) when groups called *tulisanes* (outlaws) would plunder and ransack rich Spaniards in the cities and towns. In the town of Pila in Southern Luzon, for example, *tulisanes* would “swoop down from the mountains in the

6 For elaboration of this perspective, see Martha Crenshaw, “The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Strategic Choice” in Walter Reich (ed), *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind* (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998). Also in Russell D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer (eds), *Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment* (Connecticut: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2004), pp. 54-66.

7 Huk refers to *Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan* (People’s Liberation Army), originally known as *Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon* (People’s Anti-Japanese Armed Forces) during the Japanese Occupation of the Philippines.

8 Cesar Pobre, “Terrorism: A Historical Perspective”, *Historical Bulletin*, Vol. 35, (2001-2003), p. 5.

9 Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), p. 43.

dead of night to terrorize the inhabitants, loot their houses and kill those who resisted them.”¹⁰

Among the *tulisanes* during the Spanish era, there were those who were undoubtedly a mere bunch of bandits and criminals. But there were also some genuine revolutionary groups that were arbitrarily dubbed *tulisanes* by Spanish colonial officials. The Spanish colonial authorities demonized these rebel groups to suppress dissent and resistance.¹¹ American colonial officials during the Philippine-American War followed suit, using the label *tulisanes* to refer to Filipino resistance groups and branding, among others, Filipino General Macario, as a *tulisan* or bandit.¹² By contrast, Jose Rizal, a Philippine national hero, described the *tulisanes* as “the most respectable men in the country.”¹³ In the case of Muslim resistance groups, Spanish colonial officials added the moniker *Moros* to mean “cunning, ruthless, cruel, treacherous savage; a pirate; a raider; and slaver.”¹⁴

According to US terrorism analyst Bruce Hoffman, in its original context terrorism was “closely associated with the ideals of virtue and democracy”, particularly during the French Revolution.¹⁵ Terrorism retained its revolutionary connotations during the First World War and during the late 1960s and 1970s.¹⁶ In the 1980s, however, terrorism took on a pejorative connotation, referring to the use of a calculated means to destabilize the West.¹⁷ Because the meaning and usage of the term has changed in the context of changing times, terrorism has become increasingly difficult to define.¹⁸

10 Luciano P.R. Santiago, “The Roots of Pila, Laguna: A Secular and Spiritual History of the Town (900 AD to the Present)”, *Philippine Quarterly of Culture and Society*, No. 25 (1997), pp. 125-155. See particular section on “The Menace of Tulisanes”.

11 See Renato Constantino, *The Philippines: A Past Revisited* (Quezon City: Foundation for Nationalist Studies, 1975).

12 See Antonio K. Abad, *General Macario L. Sakay: Was he a bandit or a patriot?* (Manila: J.B. Feliciano & Sons, 1955) and Reynaldo C. Ileto, *Pasyon and revolution: Popular movements in the Philippines, 1840-1910* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1979).

13 Floro Quibuyen “The Noli-Fili: Towards A Post-Enlightenment Concept of the Nation” (Paper read in a panel at the 1st National Conference on Literature “Localities of Nationhood: The Nation in Philippine Literature.” English Department, Ateneo de Manila University. 11 February 2000). Also at <http://www.univie.ac.at/Voelkerkunde/apsis/aufi/history/nolifili.htm> <accessed on 21 February 2006>.

14 Peter Gowing, *Muslim Filipinos – Heritage and Horizon* (Quezon City: New Day, 1979), p. 41.

15 Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, p. 15.

16 Ibid., pp. 20-26.

17 Ibid., p. 27.

18 Ibid., p. 28.

Alex Schmidt counts 109 definitions of terrorism, but admits that the “search for an adequate definition of terrorism is still on.”¹⁹ Despite being a buzzword after 9/11, there has been no precise or widely accepted definition of terrorism, and terrorism means many things to many observers.²⁰ For some, terrorism is a political strategy. For others, terrorism is a form of political violence that approximates insurrection, rebellion, anarchy, political protest or revolution.²¹ Other writers still simply dismiss terrorism as a product of psychological abnormality.²² At the furthest extreme, Robin Morgan has described terrorists as demon lovers.²³ The lack of a common definition of terrorism makes analyzing the roots and evolution of terrorism in the Philippines very difficult. The rise of international terrorism has only compounded the challenge.

According to the intelligence records of the Department of National Defense (DND), the Philippines first felt the impact of international terrorism in 1985 when the leaders of a Muslim secessionist movement in the Southern Philippines reportedly established linkages with “foreign terrorist groups” like the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).²⁴ On 2 December 1987, Philippine national police operatives uncovered an ANO cell in Manila and arrested five alleged Palestinian terrorists carrying Jordanian passports. On 19 May 1995, combined police and military forces arrested nine LTTE members, including the group’s infamous leader *Selvarajah Balasingan*.²⁵

The Philippine government’s Anti-Terrorism Task Force (ATTF) has identified various terrorist groups presently operating in the country. These groups include Al-Qaeda, JI, the ASG, the Rajah Solaiman Movement (RSM), and even the New People’s Army (NPA). The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) has been labeled a terrorist group in the past, but the Philippine government has officially ceased using this label because of the on-going peace-talks. Similarly, since the signing of the peace agreement

19 Alex P. Schmid and Albert J. Longman, *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories and Literature* (New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1988), p. 1.

20 Kevin Jack Riley and Bruce Hoffman, *Domestic Terrorism: A National Assessment of State and Local Preparedness* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995), p. 2.

21 Juliet Lodge (ed), *The Threat of Terrorism* (Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books Ltd, 1988), p. 1.

22 Walter Reich (ed), *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind* (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998).

23 Robin Morgan, *The Demon Lover: The Roots of Terrorism* (New York: Washington Square Press, 1989).

24 Department of National Defense, *The Philippine Campaign Against Terrorism* (Quezon City: Department of National Defense, 2002), p. 3.

25 Ibid

in 1996, the Philippine government ceased the use of this label to refer to the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). Some within military and security forces continue to label the Nur Misuari Break Away Group (MBG) of the MNLF a terrorist group. Rodolfo “Boogie” Mendoza of the Philippine National Police (PNP) has also identified the following as terrorist groups: the Pentagon Gang, the Abu Sofia and the Markazzo Shabab Al-Islamiya.²⁶ This paper focuses only on the ASG.

Rohan Gunaratna, Glenda Gloria and Mark Turner have each provided good historical accounts of the ASG.²⁷ Zachary Abuza has compiled the most comprehensive and updated analysis of the ASG’s origins.²⁸ Only Samuel K. Tan of the University of the Philippines, however, has described the ASG’s own account of its birth.²⁹

Jovenal Bruno, one of the ASG’s original leaders, wrote an unpublished manuscript documenting the establishment of the group. In it, he gives a very useful insider’s account of the origins of the ASG. This manuscript remains classified by the Philippine government, but it is important to note that Bruno traces the history of the ASG to the world Islamic movement. Bruno also expresses admiration for Saudi Arabia, Iran and the Taliban state of Afghanistan. Bruno was one of the most trusted associates of ASG-founder Abdurajak Janjalani because of his commitment to Islam.³⁰

Abu Abdu Said, who was the former Secretary General of the ASG, released an official statement on 18 November 1994 describing the ASG’s account of its origin. Amidst heavy speculation that the ASG was created by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Said issued a document called *Surat Kasabunnal*” or “A Voice of Truth”. This document vehemently denounced the view that the AFP or the CIA created the ASG. The ASG, it said, started as a movement called *Juma’a Abu Sayyaf*, the establishment of which was greatly influenced by the arrival in August 1991 of the *Motor Vessel (M/V) Doulos* carrying Christian

26 Rodolfo Mendoza, Jr., *Philippine Jihad, Inc.* (Quezon City: No identified publisher, 2002).

27 Rohan Gunaratna, “The Evolution and Tactics of the Abu Sayyaf Group”, *Janes Intelligence Review* (July 2001); Glenda Gloria, “Bearer of the Sword: The Abu Sayyaf Has Nebulous Beginnings and Incoherent Aims”, *Mindanao Updates* (6 June 2000); and, Mark Turner, “Terrorism and Secession in the Southern Philippines: The Rise of the Abu Sayyaf”, *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (June 1995), pp. 1-19.

28 Abuza, *Balik-Terrorism: The Return of the Abu Sayyaf*, op. cit., , pp. 2-11.

29 Samuel K. Tan, *Internationalization of the Bangsamoro Struggle* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Center for Integrative and Development Studies, 1995), p. 94.

30 An interview with Senior Police Superintendent Rodolfo Bauzon Mendoza, Jr. of the Philippine National Police at Camp Aguinaldo Golf Club on 7 January 2006.

missionaries to preach in Zamboanga City. These Christian missionaries, it charged, “spoke against Islam and called Allah a false God, Prophet Muhammad a liar, and the Qu’ran a man-made book.”³¹ According to Samuel K. Tan, “The desire to avenge the insult against the sacred values of Islam started the motive force of the Abu Sayyaf.”³²

Intelligence records tell a different story, tracing the ASG to disgruntled members of the MNLF, including Janjalani, who joined the International Islamic Brigade fighting Soviet forces in Afghanistan from 1980-1988.³³ After the Afghan War, Janjalani and his followers formed a still unnamed group in 1988 to advance the idea of an Iranian-inspired Islamic State in the Southern Philippines. In 1989, Janjalani called this group the Mujahidden Commando Freedom Fighters (MCFF), which became the forerunner of the ASG. With the creation of MCFF, Janjalani officially broke away from the MNLF in 1991.

In August 1991, Janjalani first publicly used the name ASG in connection with the bombing of the *M/V Doulos*. After the *M/V Doulos* incident, the ASG conducted intensified recruitment activities in Zamboanga City, Basilan Province and Jolo Province using mosques as venues of agitation and propaganda.³⁴ Recruits from these places trained in guerilla warfare and demolition tactics in the *Kapayawan* Peak of Isabela, on the southern island of Basilan with Janjalani himself as their training supervisor.

In 1992, the ASG officially established its headquarters in Isabela, Basilan and called it Camp *Al-Madinah Mujahidden*. The Philippine Marines raided and captured this camp in May 1993, forcing the ASG to transfer its base to Patikul, on the island of Sulu. While in Patikul, Janjalani and his followers took temporary shelter at the home of Nurban Hayudini. Shortly thereafter, the ASG merged with the MNLF forces under Commander Radullan Sahiron in Taglibi, Patikul to establish a new camp.

In Patikul, Abdurajak Janjalani was able to recruit more people, including Ghalib Andang (a.k.a. Commander Robot) who would eventually head the Sulu-based unit of the ASG. With the assistance of Commander Robot, the ASG embarked on aggressive programs of recruiting, arms acquisition, and fund-raising activities that involved

31 Tan, *Internationalization of the Bangsamoro Struggle*, op. cit., p. 94.

32 Ibid.

33 Department of National Defense, *Info Kit on the Abu Sayyaf Group* (Presented before the hearing of the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security at the Philippine Senate, Pasay City on 30 August 2001).

34 Armed Forces of the Philippines, “Special Report on the Abou Sayaff” (Briefing of MIG9 during the Command Conference of Southern Command on 19 January 1994).

primarily kidnapping for ransom. On 14 November 1993, the ASG kidnapped Charles Walton, an American national working in the Philippines. The Sulu-based unit was primarily responsible for a series of kidnapping for ransom activities of the ASG.

In 1994, Abdurajak Janjalani renamed the ASG, calling it *Al-Harakatul Al-Islamiya* (AHAI) or Islamic Movement to demonstrate its Islamist agenda and attract foreign funding. In the same year, the ASG reached a membership of almost 1,000 fighters, increasing to around 1,150 by 1998. From 1991 to 2000, the ASG reportedly launched 378 terrorist attacks, in the form of bombings, ambushes, and raids. Altogether, these resulted in the death of 288 civilians.³⁵ During the same period, the ASG committed 640 kidnappings involving a total of 2,076 victims.³⁶

In its founding years from 1988-1991, Abuza describes the ASG as primarily an anti-Christian group of Muslim radicals.³⁷ But the ASG's own account of its genesis denies this, arguing that their group has always respected freedom of religion.³⁸ They even asserted that in an Islamic state "the rights of Christian will be protected for as long they abide by the laws of the Islamic state."³⁹ But Abuza is clearly correct in observing that the ASG became a more "Islamic terrorist group" once it deepened its ties with Al-Qaeda between 1991 and 1995.⁴⁰ He is also correct in observing that the ASG degenerated into a bandit group between 1995 and 2001. After the death of Abdurajak Janjalani in 1998, the ASG entered into a kidnapping spree. In 2000-2001 alone, the ASG carried out 140 kidnapping for ransom incidents that resulted in the death of 16 victims.⁴¹ Abuza observes that at the height of the global campaign against terrorism from 2001-2003, the Philippine government was in hot pursuit of the ASG.⁴² While on the run, Khadafy Janjalani (Abdurajak's younger brother and successor) revived the ASG's radical Islamist agenda and has transformed the organization once again into a genuine Islamist terrorist group since 2003.

35 Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, *Knowing the Terrorists: The Abu Sayyaf Study* (Quezon City: General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, 2002.), p. 1.

36 Ibid.

37 Abuza, *Balik-Terrorism: The Return of the Abu Sayyaf*, op. cit., , pp. 2-11.

38 Nathan G. Quimpo, "Dealing with the MILF and Abu Sayyaf: Who's Afraid of an Islamic State?", *Public Policy*, Vol. 3, No. 4 (October/December 1999), pp. 38-63.

39 Ibid.

40 Abuza, *Balik-Terrorism: The Return of the Abu Sayyaf*, op. cit., , pp. 2-11.

41 Ibid., p. 8.

42 Ibid.

The ASG has rapidly mutated from being a mere bandit group into a genuine terrorist organization with a strong Islamist agenda. Since the capture and subsequent death of Galib Andang (aka Commander Robot) in 2004, the ASG has conducted no kidnappings for ransom.⁴³ Instead, it has waged a series of high profile terrorist attacks, the most devastating of which, so far, was the bombing of the Superferry 14 that killed 116 people and wounded 300 others. On the eve of Valentines Day 2005, the ASG orchestrated three simultaneous bombings in Makati City, Davao City and General Santos City killing at least 10 persons and wounding 136 others.

According to the Philippines' Anti-Terrorism Task Force (ATTF), ASG strength as of the last quarter of 2005 was no more than 350 members, a very small number compared to the strength of the NPA (8,000) and the MILF (10,000). But this explains why the ASG resorts to terrorism—it is the weapon of the weak—a very powerful weapon, indeed.⁴⁴

The ASG has already developed the ability to wage maritime terrorism as was clearly demonstrated by the Superferry 14 bombing in February 2004.⁴⁵ In July 2005, Philippine intelligence reports revealed that ASG and JI fighters received underwater attack training in Sandakan, Malaysia.

The ASG has also demonstrated its willingness to engage in suicide terrorism. The Superferry 14 and Valentines Day bombings were originally planned as suicide missions. Though there has been no recorded incident of suicide attacks in the Philippines, the ASG recognizes the ideological value of suicide terrorism. In fact, Abdurajak Janjalani appealed for martyrdom, in effect endorsing suicide terrorism. Dulmatin and Umar Patek, key suspects in 2002 Bali bombings that killed more than 200 people, reportedly established their base in the Philippines to prepare ASG members for future suicide missions. Philippine National Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales has

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ J.Bowyer Bell, *A Time of Terror: How Democratic Societies Respond to Revolutionary Violence* (New York: Basic Books, 1978). Also cited in Schmid and Longman, *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories and Literature*, op. cit., p. 69.

⁴⁵ For more discussions on the maritime terrorist capability of the ASG, see Rommel C. Banlaoi, "Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Abu Sayyaf Threat", *Naval War College Review*, Vol. 58, No. 4 (Autumn 2005), pp. 63-80. Also see Rommel C. Banlaoi, "The Abu Sayyaf Group: Threat of Maritime Piracy and Terrorism" in Peter Lehr (ed), *Violence at Sea: Piracy at the Age of Terrorism* (London: Routledge, forthcoming 2006).

been quoted as saying, “What we are looking for now is suicide terrorists, not (only) suicide bombers.”⁴⁶

The ASG also has plans to wage urban terrorism as demonstrated by the Valentine’s Day bombings and its coordination with the RSM, a group of Muslim converts based primarily in Metro Manila and some provinces in Luzon Island.⁴⁷ Ahmad Santos, who is presently in jail, founded the RSM with the financial and ideological support of the ASG.⁴⁸

ROOT CAUSES OF TERRORISM IN THE PHILIPPINES: A STRUCTURE-AGENCY ANALYSIS

This section examines the root causes of terrorism in the Philippines through structure-agency analysis. The relative importance of structure versus agency has “troubled, concerned and occupied the attentions of very many social scientists over the years,” but “it is only relatively recently that it has been taken up by political scientists and international relations scholars.”⁴⁹

Structural Analysis

Structural analysis focuses on the political context, setting, or environment in explaining political phenomena. Viewed from the structural perspective, terrorism is a by-product of various cultural, social, economic and political structures that breed and encourage it.⁵⁰ Among the structural conditions commonly cited as providing fertile ground for the growth of terrorism are poverty, injustice, political oppression, cultural marginalization, economic deprivation and social exclusion.⁵¹ Each of these structural

46 Michael Punongbayan, “DOJ to Expose Terrorists’ Financiers, Media Handlers”, *The Philippine Star*, 7 November 2005.

47 For detailed analysis of the RSM, see Rommel C. Banlaoi, *Urban Terrorism in the Philippines: The Rajah Solaiman Movement* (Quezon City, , forthcoming, 2006).

48 International Crisis Group, *Philippines Terrorism: The Role of Militant Islamic Converts*, Asia Report No. 110 (19 December 2005).

49 Colin Hay, *Political Analysis: A Critical Introduction* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002), p. 93..

50 For an excellent literature, see Martha Crenshaw, *Terrorism in Context* (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania University Press, 1995).

51 See for example Fathali M. Moghaddam, “Cultural Preconditions for Potential Terrorist Groups: Terrorism and Societal Change” in Fathali M. Moghaddam and Anthony J. Marsella (eds), *Understanding Terrorism: Psychosocial Roots, Consequences, and Interventions* (Washington DC: American Psychological Association, 2004), pp. 103-117. Also see Paul Shirivastava, “The Blind War on Terrorism” at http://www.bucknell.edu/About_Bucknell/Offices_Resources/Communications/OpEd/shrivastava-10-12-04.html <accessed on 8 February 2006>.

conditions exacerbates long-standing grievances that fuel further terrorism.⁵² Addressing the root of terrorism, therefore, requires altering the structures that perpetuate it.

The structural roots of conflict in the Philippines include the ethnic make-up of society, the mal-distribution of wealth, and inadequate political representation for minorities, to name a few.⁵³ In one of his public proclamations, Abdurajak Janjalani argued that the ASG was born of “oppression, injustice, capricious ambitions and arbitrary claims imposed on the Muslims,” stressing that the “clutches of oppression, tyranny and injustice” would continue to justify its existence.⁵⁴ Janjalani was telling his audience that the ASG was a product of conditions that could be rectified by establishing “a purely Islamic government whose nature, meaning, emblem and objective are basic to peace.”⁵⁵ The late MILF founder Hashim Salamat commented, along the same line, that the creation of the ASG was not a product of Janjalani’s “evil plan” but was “caused by the oppression and the continuous usurpation of the powers within our homeland.”⁵⁶ When Janjalani died in a police encounter in Basilan in 1998, Salamat proclaimed the ASG founder a “martyr,” adding that “[a]s long as the region and the *Bangsamoro* people are still under the control of the Philippine government, and oppression continues, we should expect more Abu Sayyaf style of groups to come to existence.”⁵⁷

From a structural perspective, the root causes of terrorism in the Philippines can only be fully understood in the context of the *Bangsamoro* problem. Soliman M. Santos provides an excellent summary of the *Bangsamoro* problem:

This problem is the historical and systematic marginalization and minoritization of the Islamized ethno-linguistic groups, collectively called *Moros*, in their own homeland in the Mindanao islands, first by colonial powers Spain

52 Kristopher K. Robison, *Challenges of Political Conflict: A Cross-National Analysis of the Downward Spiral of International Terrorist Violence and Socio-Political Crisis* (Dissertation Abstract: The Ohio State University, nd) at <http://www.sociology.ohio-state.edu/people/kkr/jobmarket/disabstract.pdf> <accessed on 8 February 2006>.

53 See International Alert, “Towards a Better Practice Framework in Security Sector Reform: Broadening the Debate”, Occasional SSR Paper, No. 1 (August 2002), p. 2.

54 Abdurajak Janjalani, “In the Name of Allah the Rahman the Raheem” (A public proclamation distributed in the Basilan Island and Zamboanga City, undated). It is believed that the proclamation was written between 1993 and 1994. See Tan, *Internationalization of the Bangsamoro Struggle*, op. cit., p. 94.

55 Ibid.

56 Salamat Hashim, *The Bangsamoro People’s Struggle Against Oppression and Colonialism* (Camp Abubakre: Agency for Youth Affairs – MILF, 2001), p. 36.

57 Ibid.

from the 16th to the 19th Century, then the U.S. during the first half of the 20th Century, and more recently by successor Philippine governments dominated by an elite with a Christian-Western orientation since formal independence in 1946. This marked full-fledged Filipino nation-statehood but ironically Philippine independence also sealed the loss of Moro independence because *Moroland* was incorporated (*Moro* nationalists would say annexed) into Philippine territory.⁵⁸

Filipino scholar Macapado A. Muslim identifies ten foundational causes of the *Bangsamoro* problem:

1. Forcible/illegal annexation of *Moroland* to the Philippines under the Treaty of Paris in 1898;
2. Military pacification;
3. Imposition of confiscatory land laws;
4. Indioization (or Filipinization) of public administration in *Moroland* and the destruction of traditional political institutions;
5. Government-financed/induced land settlement and migration to *Moroland*;
6. Land grabbing/conflicts;
7. Cultural inroads against the *Moros*;
8. The Jabidah Massacre in 1968 (during the first Marcos administration);
9. Ilaga (Christian vigilante) and military atrocities in 1970-72 (during the second Marcos administration); and,
10. Government neglect and inaction in regards to *Moro* protests and grievances.⁵⁹

From these ten foundational issues, Muslim distills six key elements of the Moro problem, which are:

1. Economic marginalization and destitution;

58 Soliman M. Santos, Jr., "Evolution of the Armed Conflict on the Moro Front" (A Background paper submitted to the Human Development Network Foundation, Inc. for the Philippine Human Development Report, 2005), p. 1.

59 Macapado Abaton Muslim, *The Moro Armed Struggle in the Philippines: The Nonviolent Autonomy Alternative* (Marawi City, Philippines: Office of the President and College of Public Affairs, Mindanao State University, 1994) 52-133. Also cited in *Ibid.*, p. 2.

2. Political domination and inferiorization;
3. Physical insecurity;
4. Threatened *Moro* and Islamic identity;
5. Perception that government is the principal party to blame; and,
6. Perception of hopelessness under the present set-up.⁶⁰

All Muslim radical groups in the Philippines, regardless of political persuasion and theological inclination, identify with the *Bangsamoro* struggle. The Malay term *Bangsa* means “nation.” Spanish colonizers introduced the term *Mor* to conflate the Muslim people of Mindanao with the “moors” of North of Africa.⁶¹ Though the use of the term *Bangsamoro* to describe the “national identity” of *Muslims* in the Philippines is controversial, most Muslim leaders regard the *Bangsamoro* struggle as the oldest “national liberation movement” in the country, spanning almost 400 years of violent resistance against Spanish, American, Japanese and even Filipino rule.⁶² This 400-year history of Moro resistance informs the ASG’s current struggle to establish a separate Islamic state.⁶³ This historical context of confrontation and inequity provides the foundation of the ASG’s present advocacy and explains how the group has survived the death of its key founders.⁶⁴

From a structural perspective, the ASG is just one expression of a broader *Bangsamoro* movement “spanning several centuries which refuses to acknowledge the authority of the Philippine state, whether independent or colonial.”⁶⁵ In fact, many

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ See Peter Gowing, *Mosque and Moro: A Study of Muslims in the Philippines* (Manila: Federation of Christian Churches, 1964). Also see Rommel C. Banlaoi, “Globalization and Nation-Building in the Philippines: State Predicaments in Managing Society in the Midst of Diversity”, in Yoichiro Sato (ed), *Growth and Governance in Asia* (Honolulu: Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2004) p. 208.

⁶² Samuel K. Tan, “History of the Mindanao Problem” in Amina Rasul, (ed), *The Road to Peace and Reconciliation: Muslim Perspective on the Mindanao Conflict* (Makati City: Asian Institute of Management, 2003) p. 4.

⁶³ For elaborate discussion, see Rommel C. Banlaoi, “The Past in Understanding Contemporary Armed Conflicts in the Philippines: The Abu Sayyaf Story” (Paper to be presented to the 19th Conference of International Association of Historians of Asia which will be held in Manila, Philippines, on 22-25 November 2006).

⁶⁴ Charles Donnelly, “Terrorism in the Southern Philippines: Contextualizing the Abu Sayyaf Group as an Islamist Secessionist Organization” (Paper presented to the 15th Biennial Conference of the Asian Studies Association of Australia in Canberra on 29 June to 2 July 2004; Mark Turner, “The Management of Violence in a Conflict Organization: The Case of the Abu Sayyaf”, *Public Organization Review*, Vol. 3, No. 4 (December 2003), p. 390.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

believe that the *Bangsamoro* people will never succumb to Filipino rule.⁶⁶ Thus, when the MNLF entered into a peace agreement with the Philippine government in 1996, the ASG condemned it as a betrayal of four centuries of struggle of the *Bangsamoro* people.⁶⁷ In fact, the original ASG membership consisted of disgruntled MNLF members who expressed frustration with the pace at which the latter was pursuing the *Moro* revolutionary cause. A study by a Philippine military official once assigned to operate against the ASG underscores this point:

Abdurajak Janjalani organized the ASG in the early 1990s with the main thrust to establish an Islamic state in Southern Philippines, breaking away from the traditional struggle fought by the Moro National Liberation Front under Nur Misuari. The inadequacy of Muslim socio-economic reforms under Misuari increased the social grievances of Muslims, which became a source of violence and strife.⁶⁸

The ASG continues to criticize the on-going peace talks between the Philippine government and the MILF, arguing that “If this sell-out succeeds, more blood will flow because the young are more determined *jihadis*. We will soon find out there are more Osama bin Ladens in our midst.”⁶⁹

Structural analysis points to other socio-economic and political conditions that contributed to the rise of the ASG. Brig. General Orlando Buenaventura, who also wrote a study on the ASG,⁷⁰ has stated that “the ASG problem was initially an offshoot of political, economic, socio-cultural and psychosocial conflicts prevailing in Mindanao.”⁷¹ Members of the ASG are viewed as the unwitting products of the historical, socio-economic and political contexts in which they find themselves—helpless individuals with

66 Vic Hurley, *Swish of the Kriss: The Story of the Moros* (Mandaluyong: Catcho Hermanos, 1985), p. 273. Also cited in *Ibid.*, p. 399.

67 For a detailed discussion of the author’s view on this topic, see Rommel C. Banlaoi, “Radical Muslim Terrorism in the Philippines” in Andrew Tan (ed), *Handbook on Terrorism and Insurgency in Southeast Asia*. London: Edward Elgar Publishing, Limited, 2006).

68 Lt. Colonel Benhur C. Paderes, *Perceptions on the Abu Sayyaf: Their Implications for National Security* (Master in National Security Administration Thesis: National Defense College of the Philippines, 2003), p. 61.

69 Simon Elegant, “The Return of the Abu Sayyaf,” *Time Asia* (30 August 2004).

70 Orlando G. Buenaventura, *The Abu Sayyaf Problem in Mindanao: A Policy Option Paper* (Master in National Security Administration Policy Option Paper: National Defense College of the Philippines, 1995).

71 Paderes, *Perceptions on the Abu Sayyaf: Their Implications for National Security*, op. cit., p. 67.

minimal control over their destiny, floundering around in a maelstrom of turbulent currents of the four centuries of *Bangsamoro* struggle.⁷² The socio-economic environment that gave rise to the ASG is characterized by poverty, poor government services, inadequate infrastructure, and a general lack of economic opportunity.⁷³ This situation is aggravated by the fact that the Philippine state has a poor record in the ASG heartland of Mindanao.⁷⁴ The *Moro*, which account for only 5% of the total Philippine population, suffer the lowest poverty and highest mortality rates, the least developed economy, and the lowest rate of institutional government support in the country.⁷⁵ In Basilan Province alone, which is the ASG's bailiwick, Muslims own only 25% of the land; the Christian population controls the rest. This perpetuates the feeling of animosity between Muslims and Christians in the area.⁷⁶ *Moros* also experience silent discrimination because their Islamic beliefs and distinctive ways of life place them outside the mainstream of Filipino society. For centuries, *Moros* also developed the feeling of dispossession because of the expropriation of their ancestral domains. Thus, they fight not only for self-determination but also to regain their homeland through *Moro* separatism.⁷⁷

The confluence of silent discrimination, *Moro* territorial dispossession, and four centuries of struggle for sovereignty provide impetus for the ASG's militant activities in pursuit of an independent Islamic state.⁷⁸ The ASG is cognizant of the structural inequity, injustices and economic deprivation of the *Bangsamoro* people. In a public statement issued in November 1994, the ASG declared its struggle for *kaadilan* (justice) for the *Bangsamoro* people. In one of his ideological discourses or *Khutbahs*, Janjalani further stressed that "the initial objectives for redress of grievances or attainment of justice ultimately ends in the demand for a purely Islamic state as a surest guarantee of

72 This is a paraphrase of Colin Hay, "Structure and Agency" in David Marsh and Gerry Stoker (eds), *Theory and Methods in Political Science* (Hamshire and London: MacMillan Press Ltd., 1995), p. 189.

73 Turner, "The Management of Violence in a Conflict Organization: The Case of the Abu Sayyaf", op. cit., p. 399.

74 Ibid.

75 Maelin Shipman, "Abu Sayyaf: Analysis of Open Source Information" (Paper presented to College of Health Sciences, Touro University International, 2003). Also available at <http://www.terrorismcentral.com/Library/terroristgroups/AbuSayyafGroup/ABUSAYYAFAnalysis.html> [accessed on 22 February 2006].

76 Ibid.

77 For an excellent reader, see Kristina Gaerlan and Mara Stankovitch (eds), *Rebels, Warlords and Ulama: A Reader on Muslim Separatism and the War in Southern Philippines* (Quezon City: Institute for Popular Democracy, 2000).

78 Shipman, "Abu Sayyaf: Analysis of Open Source Information", op. cit., p. 4.

justice and prosperity for Muslims.”⁷⁹ The ASG urged Muslims in the Philippines “to unite and lay aside their differences and feuds.”⁸⁰ In his undated public proclamation entitled “In the Name of Allah the Rahman the Raheem”, Janjalani reiterated the need for unity, asserting that the ASG was founded “not to create another faction in the Muslim struggle which is against the teaching of Islam, especially the Qu’ran, but to serve as a bridge and balance between the MILF and the MNLF whose revolutionary roles and leadership cannot be ignored or usurped.”⁸¹

Agential Analysis

A second approach that is useful in explaining the roots of terrorism in the Philippines is the agential analysis. Agential analysis argues that terrorism is the product of purposeful intent on the part of specific individuals rather than of the structural environment in which broader social groups find themselves: terrorism exists because certain individuals opt to become terrorists.⁸² Thus, to understand terrorism requires an examination of the psychosocial profile of terrorists and the ideology, tactics and weaponry of terrorist organizations.⁸³ The agential approach focuses on terrorist behavior, motives and intentions to understand the broader issue of terrorism. It regards terrorism as the product of a person’s or a group’s free will – of intention, choice, and conduct. Terrorism, in short, is the result of conscious deliberation on the part of particular individuals.

Viewed from an agential perspective, terrorism in the Philippines may be rooted in Janjalani’s personal profile and ideology. A son of a fisherman, Janjalani emerged from a very humble beginning. Born on 8 November 1953, he grew and was socialized in an environment “where the laws set by men are flouted daily.”⁸⁴ Though, ironically, he went to the Catholic-run Claret College (high school) on the island of Basilan, he never graduated. Glenda Gloria, a journalist following the ASG, wrote that despite

⁷⁹ Tan, *Internationalization of the Bangsamoro Struggle*, op. cit., p. 99

⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 95.

⁸¹ Abdurajak Janjalani, “In the Name of Allah the Rahman the Raheem”, op. cit.

⁸² For an earlier work on this view, see Christopher Dobson and Ronald Payne, *The Terrorists: Their Weapons, Leaders and Tactics* (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1982).

⁸³ For an excellent collection of recent studies, see Fathali M. Moghaddam and Anthony J. Marsella (eds), *Understanding Terrorism: Psychosocial Roots, Consequences, and Interventions* (Washington DC: American Psychological Association, 2004).

⁸⁴ Glenda Gloria, “Bearer of the Sword: The Abu Sayyaf Has Nebulous Beginnings and Incoherent Aims”, *Mindanao Updates* (6 June 2000).

Janjalani's failure to finish secondary school, he "wrangled a scholarship from the Saudi Arabian government in 1981. Abdurajak was sent to Ummu I-Qura in Mecca where he studied Islamic jurisprudence for three years."⁸⁵ There, he was attracted deeply to the concept of *jihad*, which would eventually inform the ideology of the ASG. In 1984, he returned to Basilan to preach in the mosques. In 1988, Janjalani went to Peshawar, Pakistan where he engaged in intense indoctrination in Iranian Islamic revolutionary ideology. It was also in Peshawar where Janjalani reportedly met and befriended Osama bin Laden, who eventually helped Janjalani to finance the formation of the ASG.

When Janjalani formed the ASG, his original intention was to create a group of Muslim *Mujahidden* committed to *Jihad Fi-Sabil-lillah*, a "struggle in the cause of Allah" or "fighting and dying for the cause of Islam".⁸⁶ Before Janjalani died in December 1998, he delivered eight radical ideological discourses called *Khutbahs*, which are considered primary sources for understanding Janjalani's radical Islamic thoughts. These discourses explained Janjalani's Quranic perspective on *Jihad Fi-Sabil-lillah* which, he lamented, was misinterpreted by many Muslims. He denounced the *ulama* (Muslim scholars) for their scant knowledge of the Quran and lamented that most of those in the Philippines calling themselves *Moros* were not practicing the true meaning of Islam according to the standards he observed in West Asia. These eight discourses also revealed Janjalani's embrace of Wahabist Islam, which considered other Muslims heretical. The Islamic theology of Wahabism further influenced Janjalani's radical ideology for the ASG.

Agential analysis suggests that the ASG would not have emerged were it not for the persistent efforts of Abdurajak Janjalani. A second critical, agential-related factor in the formation of the ASG was the support extended by Bin Laden through his brother-in-law, Mohammad Jamal Khalifa who married a Filipina. Bin Laden had instructed Khalifa to go to the Philippines in 1988 to recruit fighters in the Afghan war. Khalifa's direct contact in the Philippines was the MILF; so, it was Ramzi Yousef who played the key role in deepening the ASG's ties with Al Qaeda.

Yousef received international notoriety for masterminding the bombing of World Trade Center in 1993. He was also known for planning the *Bojinka* plots in the Philippines, which aimed to bomb eleven U.S. jetliners and assassinate Pope John Paul II

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ This particular paragraph is based on Banlaoi, "The Abu Sayyaf Group: From Mere Banditry to Genuine Terrorism?", op. cit.

during his 1995 visit to Manila. These were believed to be the most ambitious terrorist plots in the country's history. During his travel to the Philippines via Malaysia, Yousef reportedly stayed on the island of Basilan and trained around 20 ASG fighters, under the supervision of Janjalani, to mount terrorist attacks in the Philippines. As early as 1994, in fact, then police Colonel Rodolfo "Boogie" Mendoza, who pioneered the research on Al-Qaeda's network in Southeast Asia and its funding of the ASG, released a 175-page report on the infiltration of the Philippines by international terrorists linked to Al-Qaeda.⁸⁷ Mendoza stressed that the conscious determination of these personalities were responsible for perpetuating terrorism in the Philippines. Terrorism can, therefore, be traced to a few knowledgeable and intentional individuals like Janjalani, Bin Laden, Khalifa and Yousef, among others. To eliminate the roots of terrorism requires the relentless pursuit of these people.

But if Janjalani's influence was so crucial, why does the ASG persist after his death? Why does terrorism continue to wreak havoc in the Philippines despite the reduction of the strength of the ASG? The agential answer lies in the resilience of the remaining ASG members.

After the death of Abdurajak Janjalani, his younger brother, Khadafy took command of the ASG but lacked his older brother's charismatic and assertive leadership style. As a result, the ASG splintered following Khadafy's rise to leadership.⁸⁸ The two major factions were based on the islands of Basilan and Sulu, and acted independently of one another. As of 2002, the Basilan-based faction was composed of ten armed groups while the Sulu-based faction was composed of 16-armed groups, each of which also operated independently. As the over-all leader of the ASG, Khadafy failed to establish full control and supervision of the two major factions and the several armed groups associated with each. The Sulu-based faction headed by Commander Robot (Galib Andang) ventured into banditry and kidnapping for profit and the Basilan-based faction, which Khadafy was nominally heading, fell under the effective domination of Abu

87 Ressa, *Seeds of Terror: An Eyewitness Account of Al-Qaeda's Newest Center of Operations in Southeast Asia*, op. cit., p. 131.

88 For detailed discussion, see Rommel C. Banlaoi, "Leadership Dynamics in Terrorist Organizations in Southeast Asia: The Abu Sayyaf Case" (Paper presented to the international symposium, "The Dynamics and Structures of Terrorist Threats in Southeast Asia" organized by the Institute of Defense Analyses in cooperation with the Southeast Asia Regional Center for Counter-Terrorism and the U.S. Pacific Command held at Palace of Golden Horses Hotel, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, on 18-20 April 2005). Also in John T. Hanley, Kongdan Oh Hassig and Caroline F. Ziemke, eds., *Proceedings of the International Symposium on the Dynamics and Structures of Terrorist Threats in Southeast Asia* (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, 2005).

Sabaya (Aldam Tilao) who also shifted into banditry and kidnapping activities. When At this point, as mentioned previously, the ASG degenerated from a genuine Muslim terrorist organization into what Eric Gutierrez called “entrepreneur[s] of violence.”⁸⁹

Factionalization and leadership struggles weakened the ASG, presenting the armed forces of the Philippines with a golden opportunity to pursue ASG members. Through intensive police and military operations, the Philippine government reduced the ASG’s strength by almost 70%. From its peak of 1,269 operatives in 2000, the strength of the ASG fell to no more than 350 by mid-2005. Because of its small size, the Office of the President declared the ASG a spent force -- prematurely as it turned out.

The death of Abu Sabaya in 2002 and Commander Robot in 2005 provided Khadafy the opportunity to reassert the Islamist agenda and focus of the ASG. Terrorist threats posed by the ASG persist because Khadafy Janjalani has renewed the commitment to the original objective of the ASG -- to establish an independent Islamic state. Admittedly smaller, the ASG was nonetheless able to win strong local support – initially through its “Robin Hood” strategy, and, when that failed, through fear and extortion.⁹⁰

Though the membership of the ASG remains small, the group has ventured into vigorous recruitment activities to recover the manpower lost (killed, neutralized and arrested) after 9/11. Among the ASG’s various recruiting techniques are religious propaganda and agitation, and financial rewards. For example, it pays local recruits to serve as second and third layers of security at their makeshift camps, befriends potential recruits through ball games or pot (marijuana) smoking sessions, and utilizes deception to recruit members. ASG leaders allow young Muslims to bring their firearms to meetings, take pictures of these people with their weapons, and then later use these photos to blackmail them into joining the group.⁹¹ The ASG also uses marriages to expand its membership.

At present, the ASG is focusing recruitment efforts on younger and more idealistic MILF members who regard the on-going peace process with the Philippine

89 Eric Gutierrez, “From Ilaga to Abu Sayyaf: New Entrepreneurs in Violence and their Impact on Local Politics in Mindanao” (Unpublished Manuscript: Institute for Popular Democracy, 2001). Also see his “New Faces of Violence in Mindanao” in Gaerlan and Stankovitch (eds), *Rebels, Warlords and Ulama: A Reader on Muslim Separatism and the War in Southern Philippines*, op. cit., pp. 349-362.

90 Shipman, “Abu Sayyaf: Analysis of Open Source Information”, op. cit., p. 6.

91 Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, *Knowing the Terrorists: The Abu Sayyaf Study*, op. cit. p. 41.

government as a sham and betrayal. ASG leaders hope that if the MILF makes peace with the government, the ASG will inherit its hardliners in the Southern Philippines. MILF leader Al-Haj Murad Ebrahim has warned that the government must move quickly to ameliorate the large number of problems in the region “before younger Muslims in the region succumb to the greater radicalism of the Abu Sayyaf.”⁹²

In short, what agential analysis suggests is that terrorism in the Philippines persists because there are people who continue to believe that terrorism is powerful weapon to influence an audience.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This paper analyzed the roots and evolution of terrorist movements in the Philippines by focusing on the ASG and employing a combination of structural and agential analyses. This approach suggests a number of preliminary insights:

- Terrorism in the Philippines can only be fully understood in its proper historical and socio-economic context.
- The emergence of terrorist groups in the Philippines are in part rooted in the cultural, social, economic and political structures in which Filipino Muslims find themselves. In other words, there are clear structural factors present in Muslim communities in the Philippines that breed terrorist groups like the ASG. So, to address the roots of terrorism in the Philippines requires analysts and policymakers to pay attention to its structural origins.
- Aside from structural causes, important agential factors have contributed to terrorism in the country. Because specific activities are rooted to the conscious determination of knowledgeable and intentional individuals like Janjalani, Bin Laden, Khalifa and Yousef, among others, addressing the roots of terrorism will require the elimination of these individuals.

Academic studies of terrorism tend to highlight the empirical debate and theoretical differences between structural and agential approaches (the structure-agency debate), with some scholars preferring a structural explanation of the roots, causes and emergence of terrorism, while others prefer an agential explanation. A recent approach in political analysis, called the strategic-relational approach (SRA), attempts to integrate

92 Elegant, “The Return of the Abu Sayyaf,” op. cit.

the structural and agential explanations and integrate the structure-agency debate to examine political phenomena.

The SRA aims to marry or reconcile the structural and agential explanations of political phenomena like terrorism. Instead of viewing structure and agents as two, mutually exclusive and opposite poles, SRA seeks to demonstrate that structure and agency logically work in tandem.⁹³ This approach offers a dynamic understanding of the important relationship of structure and agency, which refuses to privilege either moment (structure or agency).⁹⁴

Over time, the SRA may offer us a better way to analyze the roots of terrorism and develop more effective counter-terrorism approaches, strategies, and policies.

⁹³ Hay, "Structure and Agency", op. cit., p. 189.

⁹⁴ Hay, *Political Analysis: A Critical Introduction*, op. cit., p. 134.

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THE MAKING OF MODERN TERRORISM

Suwit Mangkhala

INTRODUCTION: TOWARDS AN ANALYSIS OF TERRORISM

The objective of this paper is to propose an alternative research approach to terrorism, in particular to address the question: *‘How do terrorist movements start?’*

Some of the basic concepts will be introduced at the outset. The paper will 1) introduce the theoretical frameworks – under the rubric of ‘Constructivism’ – as an alternative approach to the study of contemporary terrorism in the context of inter-identity relations, and 2) present a brief analysis on the ‘Making of Modern Terrorism’.

The main arguments of this paper are:

- Modern terrorism and its related concepts are perpetually debatable.
- An alternative approach applies the theoretical tool called ‘Constructivism’ to analyzing terrorism. This approach focuses on the construction of identity
- And finally, the paper’s investigation of the so-called ‘root causes’ of terrorism and brief discussion of the roles of ideas and discourses will suggest a research emphasis in focusing on the question of ‘why’ terrorists are terrorists?

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CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: AN ON-GOING DEBATE

When one thinks about terrorism, some as yet unsolved questions arise in relation to the following list of concepts.

- First, how do we define key terms: terrorism, terrorists, and terrorist movements?
- Second, is it possible to characterize those words according to their different components and the contexts in which they reside?
- Third, how is terrorism conducted? What are the tactics? What are terrorists' objectives?
- The last, but perhaps most important, question is: *why* does terrorism occur at all? *Why* do terrorists conduct terrorism or, *why* do others characterize the acts they commit as acts of terrorism?

Definitions: Terrorism, Terrorists, and Terrorist Movements

It is a fact of life that there have been numerous attempts to define terrorism through its history, yet none has prevailed over the others. Generally speaking, reaching an agreement on a single definition of terrorism, as on many politically controversial concepts, life is much more complicated than one might expect!

Nevertheless, it is worth attempting to highlight some key points that may be more or less valid as commonly acceptable descriptors. Crudely, 'a form of political violence' is one way to describe terrorism in short and general terms that are fairly broadly acceptable. Some add an element of objectives to its definition, describing terrorism as the use of violence to influence political events and outcomes.

It seems tautological to define terrorism as associated with terrorists and terrorist movements. Yet, in an attempt to define terrorism, part of the unmet challenge is to understand who terrorists are. Politically, we often find it useful to see terrorists as criminals. Many terrorist acts nowadays, however, increasingly resemble acts of war; terrorists are fighting fairly coherent campaigns on the basis of their value systems, values that are viewed as in conflict with those of their enemies in the political mainstream.

In addition, today's terrorists hardly fight their wars alone. They form groups and networks of like-minded individuals and groups within and across national borders. So

we can now say that a terrorist movement is the result of a well thought-out organization of people and resources as part of a planned campaign to achieve specific objectives.

So what exactly *is* terrorism? A pattern of a terrorist acts is easy to recognize. That is, intuitively, we know what is and is not terrorism. For example, we would not call peaceful protests or acts of nonviolent civil disobedience terrorism. National laws and international conventions have sought to put terrorist-related crimes like hijacking, hostage taking, and the murder of diplomats into a broader legal context. At the same time, most governments have established their own lists of things terrorists do that, based on their experiences, they recognize as criminal acts.

However, *how exactly* do we know what is and what is not terrorism or when random criminal acts cross the line and become terrorism? This leads to the next line of reasoning here: terrorism is a subjective term. Its definition is very much in the eye of the beholder; or in the identity of the group to which it refers and in that group's relation to the speaker. Terrorism involves negative identification, and such identification is often controversial. Currently, a highly relevant but lingering question is whether terrorism can ever be justified?

Because of its fundamental subjectivity, a universal definition of terrorism seems unachievable. That said, one might want to search for common characteristics of terrorists to help find some universal characteristics. Even that task is not easy, but may also not be impossible.

Typologies: Contexts and Elements

As a classification system, a typology provides a broad scope over which to cover a range of terrorist activities while avoiding the controversies that surround the definitions of terrorism. In short, typologies could be a valuable analytical alternative to definitions. Related to this, typologies help distinguish kinds or levels of terrorism. Historically, various types of terrorist groups have been identified with specific ethnicity, religious, and political agendas. Terrorism can also be categorized as local, national, or international in its scope.

Yet, typologies are unlikely to break the definitional deadlocks surrounding the study of "terrorism." They are merely generalizations that can help map the dynamic courses of terrorism. Nor are typologies mutually exclusive; they usually overlap and, often, terrorist groups fall into more than one category.

Despite those limitations, typologies may help us to better understand terrorism as a phenomenon, provided we keep in mind that each individual terrorist act or movement must still be explained in its own specific context. Moreover, typologies as means of generalization tend to obscure specific details, so elements of individual terrorist incidents need to be taken into account in order to prevent researchers from distorting reality. One must bear in mind the risk of typologies misrepresenting reality especially in those cases in which researchers - whether knowingly or not - view particular terrorist incidents through the lenses of the typologies that they themselves invent.

Strategies: Ends and Means

Strategies are an extremely useful approach to analyzing the threats of modern terrorism and developing strategies to counter them. It is necessary to learn about terrorists' objectives and methods in order to understand terrorism. Few, if any, terrorist attacks are strictly arbitrary. Rather, they are products of a rational thought process and careful calculation.

Terrorists' strategies vary according to their objectives, innovative methods, and capabilities: all are key to how they think of their strategies and the means towards the ends. Tactics and modes of attacks, including types of weapons employed, also depend upon the degree of training and technical sophistication of the terrorists.

It is worth noting here that the application of terrorist strategies, whatever they might be, is neither consistent nor, importantly, unchanging. Traditional terrorist tactics such as bombings, assaults, hijacking, kidnapping, and hostage-taking have changed to include potential threats from misapplication of technology, weapons of mass destruction, financial and economic disruption, and even propaganda. Suicide and car bombings have become increasingly prevalent. Strategies of modern terrorism therefore vary according to a number of factors, including, *inter alia*, objectives, technological awareness, and capabilities.

Motivations: The 'Why' Questions?

In order to understand terrorism, key questions concerning terrorists' motivations must be addressed. 'Why have terrorists become terrorists?' 'Why do individuals join terrorist groups?' 'Why do terrorists commit horrible atrocities?' 'Why do most people not become terrorists even in the face of deprivation, alienation, and resentment?' These questions are the focus of this paper.

So far, there have been a number of available approaches to understanding terrorist motivations. For example, a physiological approach sees human beings (like most animals) as capable of aggression, with their behavior chemically determined: i.e., terrorist aggression as a result of human hormones. Alternatively, a psychological approach might examine whether individual terrorists display symptoms of mental illness. However, throughout the history of terrorism, the majority of terrorists have been zealous but mentally stable. A related question is whether terrorism is a result of conscious rational choices or irrational behaviors driven by subconscious psychological forces; the answer is complex and multi-faceted.

This paper contends that all of these approaches have their own strengths and weaknesses. To develop the best possible understanding, it is vital that analysts avoid simplistic generalizations or methodological rigidity and aim, instead, at multi-disciplinary research drawing on the strengths of various approaches.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: A CONSTRUCTIVIST ANALYSIS

This paper focuses on how the processes of identity construction frame the nature of the politics of terrorism. The Constructivist argument is twofold:

- Terrorists' identities are politically, socio-economically, and culturally constructed; and
- Terrorism involves collective identity formation; that is, it is a phenomenon that stems from the sense of belonging to a group.

Most importantly, this paper argues that any research on the origins of terrorist movements (*'How do terrorist movements start?'*) should develop a degree of empathy that enables researchers to take into account the perspectives of the terrorists themselves (*'Why are terrorists terrorists?'*).

The Construction of Identity

A constructivist approach suggests that terrorism is a phenomenon that grows out of conflicts between identities. Accordingly, any attempt to understand and explain terrorism, must begin with an investigation of this theoretical question: how are identities constructed?

Identity is a difficult concept, both abstract and elusive. Yet, conceptualizing identity is not impossible provided one starts from the premise that identity concerns differentiation. In short, identity is an expression of individuation, designating a 'self'

and thereby differentiating it from ‘others’. Identity can be conceptualized in a way that refers to the basic ontology of social space in which there are individual entities – either personal or collective – each of which has specific origins and oppositional relations: “us” versus “them.”

Identities are the result of interaction between actors – whether individuals or groups – on the one hand, and structures on the other. By “structures” we mean inter-subjective understandings (rules and norms) among actors. In brief, identities are socially constructed: actors’ identities are affected by the structures within which they operate. Structures, in turn, consist of the collective meanings shared among the actors themselves. So, we have a classic “chicken and egg” paradox: actors and structures (identities and collective meanings) help constitute each other.

Objectivity vs. Subjectivity

Constructivism contends that it is useful to conceive of identities as social constructs and do not have meanings outside the context in which they are created. Constructivism further addresses the dynamics of identity formation. It is therefore deemed appropriate to consider identities in the light of social relations and hence the “self versus other” conception.

A variety of approaches fall under the general rubric of Constructivism. While recognizing the lack of agreement on the meaning of the term itself, Constructivism in this paper refers to the whole spectrum of approaches that focus on identity formation as a vital aspect of the analysis of the roots of terrorism.

It is *not* the purpose of this paper to propose a particular definition of Constructivism or to develop a catch-all concept that blurs the distinct schools of Constructivist thought regarding identity. Instead, it introduces some useful theoretical aspects of Constructivism that could contribute to future research on a variety of questions related to the origins of terrorism. It then presents two examples of how specific Constructivist approaches might be applied.

The Analytical Frameworks: Constructivism

Positivism i.e. Knowledge of 'reality' out there ⇒ observation of causality	Post-Positivism i.e. knowledge of 'reality' within discourse ⇒ interpretation of discourses
Logic of Explanation ⇒ objective evidence of behavioral practices	Logic of Interpretation ⇒ subjective interpretation of discursive practices
Inter-subjectivity ⇒ 'role' structure	Inter-subjectivity ⇒ 'narrative' structure
Role Identity ⇒ identifying role relationship	Narrative Identity ⇒ analyzing discourse

The two approaches represent two distinct frameworks for analysis: Positivist and Post-Positivist Constructivism. Theoretically speaking, 'Positivist Constructivism' argues that objective reality exists and that knowledge of reality can be obtained through empirical observation. In other words, this approach follows a causal logic of explanation, focuses analysis on collection and interpretation of observable behavioral practices, and emphasizes the importance of objective facts about terrorism. Positivist Constructivism, in short, focuses on the objective, observable, and measurable aspects of terrorist behavior.

Positivist Constructivism focuses on the effects of strategic behavior and its effect on identity construction. Strategic interaction prompts actors to adopt behavior patterns that, in turn, produce images of self and other. Strategic behavior, thus, causally affects the 'role' structure. With such a structure in place, the self predicts the behavior of the other and vice versa, and both sides will then behave according to their mutual expectations. Repetition of behavior patterns becomes habitual and leads to the process of identity construction. Role identity is, in this way, defined by role relationships with friends, associates, rivals, and enemies.

The other approach, "Post-positivist Constructivism," assumes that the knowledge of reality is to be derived from the interpretation of discourses and discursive practices within which reality is experienced and interpreted by specific groups. Identity construction emerges through discussion and interpretation. It is through interpretations of discourses that we can know about a group's identity. Understanding identity formation is, therefore, an inherently subjective undertaking.

In constructing a group identity, narratives are created to describe the connections between individuals – as friends, rivals, enemies. This refers to the narrative structure, under which the process of narrative identity construction takes place.

Despite the metaphysical and epistemological differences inherent in these two approaches, this paper encourages empirical analysts to appreciate the potential to learn from different perspectives by searching for common theoretical values. An understanding of identity politics involved with the issues of terrorism may be derived from several explicitly or implicitly shared assumptions of Positivist and Post-Positivist analyses, particularly their focus on the process of identity construction within the different conceptions of the structure of self-other relations and the concept of subjectivity and inter-subjectivity. Both approaches also emphasize the importance of change and continuity. In this respect, the two approaches can strengthen each other by providing a basis for making explicit what is implicit in both. This may set out a promising start for further theoretical and research development in the field.

In sum, the shared assumptions and overlaps between these two analytical frameworks suggest the potential for a richer research program that capitalizes on the advantages of each approach, develops a division of labor, and provides two comparative approaches to the same case study. By looking from two different angles and by means of comparison, a fuller picture can be seen.

The Power of Ideas: Perception vs. Discourse

The two Constructivist frameworks could be especially valuable in analyzing the politics of terrorism with reference to the intersubjectivity of ideas within the social context of international relations described as inter-identity relations. In the positivist light, intersubjectivity of ideas is in terms of ‘role’ structures, which are related to different role relationships and are causally linked with identity which is evident through perception. Post-positivist Constructivism, on the other hand, stresses discourse such that we cannot know the world outside it. The knowledge of reality resides within discourse. Discourse essentially concerns the intersubjectivity of ideas as ideas can only be conveyed through discursive or rhetorical practices.

A BRIEF ANALYSIS: ‘THE MAKING OF MODERN TERRORISM’

So far, the paper has suggested the conceptual and theoretical grounds for future research on terrorism. This section will elaborate on these frameworks with reference to a brief empirical account of what may be called ‘modern’ terrorism.

Terrorism is, of course, not new. But what this paper calls ‘modern’ terrorism has a few distinct features that mark a departure from previous forms:

- Fewer incidents with higher casualties;
- Emphasis on new methods, especially suicide terrorism and the employment of new technologies;
- Strong identification with religious ideologies; and
- A transnational networked structure that makes it more and more global.

Our understanding of the “Making of Modern Terrorism” can be expanded by exploring it through the two Constructivist lenses - one arguing for objectivity, and the other for subjectivity; one focusing on the roles of sensual perceptions of identity and the other on the roles of discourses of and subjective interpretations on identity.

‘Root Causes’ of Terrorism

The exploration of the so-called ‘root causes’ of modern terrorism stresses three dimensions:

- Political - modern terrorism is caused by the sense of injustice.
- Socio-politically - modern terrorism is caused by the sense of inequality, and
- Cultural - modern terrorism is caused by the sense of intolerance.

The important phrase in all three dimensions is “the sense of . . . ,” which points to the important roles of ‘ideas’. And according to the two theoretical frameworks set out earlier, ideas are represented or conveyed either by perceptions or discourses.

It is important to note that ideas about terrorism may also be influenced by other more intrinsic factors (what may be called X-factors here). Examples of the ‘X’ values in the identity formation diagram include religions, ethnicity, nationality and civilization. These X-factors – or what might be referred as ‘extra’ factors – facilitate the perceptions mentioned above. In this regard, the so-called ‘root causes’ in this analysis are *not* the set of X-factors. Rather, the root causes lie in identity politics and the role of ideas in the context of those X-factors.

Political: The Sense of Injustice

Political X-factors are generally listed in typologies of terrorism as nationalist, irredentist, leftist or revolutionary, rightist or reactionary, religio-political, and separatist.

Each represents a different context in which the sense of injustice, the political root causes of modern terrorism, might emerge.

The sense of injustice among opposition movements against what they believe to be illegitimate or corrupt governments can easily lead to the acceptance of terrorism as an effective and legitimate means to undermine the government. Similarly, failure or unwillingness by the government to integrate dissident groups into the national political dialogue can also lead to the groups' alienation from the political system. Some of these groups, who either exclude themselves or are excluded from the political landscape, may see terrorism as the most credible option in search for alternative channels through which they can express their discontent and promote political change.

In the realm of international politics, the sense of injustice often emerges from the perception that external support to corrupt governments amounts to foreign domination through puppet regimes that serve the interests of external actors. Repression under foreign or colonial occupation has also given rise to national liberation movements that have, in some cases, resorted to terrorist tactics and other violent means.

Some states have capitalized on pre-existing terrorist groups as instruments of their foreign policies. Even though state sponsors rarely create new terrorist groups out of whole cloth, state sponsorship is clearly an enabling factor of terrorism, giving local terrorist groups a far greater capacity and lethality than they would have had on their own.

Socio-Economic: The Sense of Inequality

The socio-economic 'root causes' of modern terrorism stem from the sense of inequality facilitated or influenced by factors such as feelings of socio-economic disadvantages; lack of economic well-being; absence of social and economic opportunity; social cleavages; economic disparity; and, last but not least, anxiety over the effects of capitalism and globalization.

Individuals or groups become more likely to resort to terrorism when they feel deprived of their rights to equal social and economic opportunities. The sense of inequality resulting from *relative* (rather than absolute) deprivation (common in societies with great differences in income distribution), has been identified as an important motivation for the rise of modern terrorist movements. This implies that there is only a weak and indirect relationship between terrorism and poverty per se.

For instance, at the individual level, terrorists are generally not drawn from the poorest segments of their societies and often are from average or above-average educational and socio-economic backgrounds. The occurrence of terrorism, moreover, is not particularly high in the poorest countries of the world. Rather, terrorism is more common in countries with medium to high levels of economic development, often emerging in societies characterized by rapid modernization and transition. For instance, rapid urbanization may threaten or undermine traditional norms, making new radical ideologies based on anti-capitalist sentiments, conventional religious practices, and nostalgia for a glorious past more attractive to certain segments of society. Modernization also facilitates terrorism by providing access to rapid transportation and communication, media, and even military technology.

Cultural: The Sense of Intolerance

Cultural aspects associated with the sense of intolerance include another set of factors. Intolerance is often fueled by an intensified awareness of cultural diversity and an often growing sense of collective membership in a cultural community that perceives itself to be threatened by a dominant or majority cultural identity. It is when individuals or groups feel obstructed from expressing their cultural identities – using their language or observing their religion – that intolerance can bring about terrorism. Cultural elements such as shared trauma and triumph in the history of the community along with images connected specifically to group identity can reinforce the sense of alienation.

Today, the role of religion in creating the sense of communal alienation has been of particular interest; many cases of modern terrorism demonstrate the pattern of religious elements being exploited to breed intolerance.

Religion as such is by no means a ‘root cause’ of modern terrorism. Many suicide terrorists, for example, are motivated mainly by political goals – the ending of foreign occupation or domestic domination by a different ethnic group. Reference to religious ideas and values, however, is frequently used to legitimize and glorify their ‘martyrdom’.

To sum up the main arguments of this analysis, the following characteristics of modern terrorism as a global phenomenon have emerged as leading root causes:

- First, modern terrorism is associated with political factors both in both the domestic and international contexts. These political factors give rise to the sense of political injustice not only in particular states but around the globe;

- Second, in contemporary international relations, the rise of urbanization and globalization have intensified the sense of socio-economic inequality and unfairness; and
- Third, the sense of intolerance within culturally diverse societies is caused by misunderstanding between different cultural identities living in close proximity and without clear territorial boundaries.

It has thus been argued that modern terrorism arises from senses of injustice, inequality and intolerance. And perhaps more importantly, these senses are not restricted to any specific political systems, economies, societies, cultures or religions but are often shared across political boundaries through the spread of ideas related to identity construction.

There exists no common or exhaustive list of the X-factors that serve to complicate the process of understanding the roots of terrorism. Terrorism occurs in democracies as well as in authoritarian states, in wealthy countries as well as in poor countries, and in the 'West' as well as the 'East'. The notion of terrorism is applied to a great diversity of groups with different origins and goals.

These X-factors help to explain the emergence of so many local variations of modern terrorism. While identifying these general conditions that give rise to terrorism is useful, it is more important to understand terrorists through their unique identities in order to grasp how terrorism emerges through a process of interaction and tension between different identities. Identity politics, with emphasis on the role of ideas, can help explain terrorism.

The Battle of Ideas

The 'senses' earlier identified as the real 'root causes' of modern terrorism, point to the central role of ideas about injustice, inequality, and intolerance. Through the two constructivist lenses, these ideas are either propagated through perceptions or discourses. In either case, they are viewed in this analysis as the points from where today's terrorist movements start. The making of modern terrorism is a process by which these ideas are internalized through a negative identification process. Groups identify themselves in oppositional dichotomies: 'I' *against* 'you', or 'us' *against* 'them'. The real battles we face today in the war against terrorism are the battles of ideas and group perceptions.

We are witnessing the battle of ideas through rival discourses on the West versus the East, on the West versus Islam and on globalization versus global jihad. Rhetoric

shapes the ideas that are the name of the game in modern terrorism. Whether the rhetoric is intended to define identities or represent conflicting ideas, how these ideas are interpreted and translated into discourses of reality are crucial. In other words, a reality of modern terrorism exists and modern terrorism is made real within discourses.

The Spread of Ideas: An Identity of Terrorism

This analysis argues that contemporary international politics treats the process of collective identity construction as the source of resistance to powerful global trends in various forms, including hegemony and inequality of power, globalization and rapid modernization, and cultural diversity and ethno-cultural conflicts. Ideas of resistance spread among groups, from local to regional and global movements, driven by senses of political injustice, socio-economic inequality, and cultural and religious intolerance. These ideas of resistance, conveyed through perceptions or discourses, have in some cases been translated into collective identity that expresses itself through acts of terrorism. This applies, in particular, to the group identities that stem from radical fundamentalism, in whose discourse terrorism often represents a means and end in itself.

The rise of religio-political identity of radical fundamentalism is one of the dominant features of modern terrorism. Since 9/11, which marked the beginning of the new era of modern terrorism, religio-political terrorist groups, such as al Qaeda and the more regional groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), have dominated our ideas about terrorism in Southeast Asia.

Deploying the concepts of identity politics in the analysis of perceptions and discourses, it becomes clear that the terrorists in the region have been subject to the process of self-identification. On the one hand, their identities are constructed as forms of resistance *against* what they see as threats (negative identification)- whether at local, regional or global level. On the other hand, they identify themselves *with* the elements of radical fundamentalism across the boundaries (positive identification). In other words, the process of collective identity construction is not necessarily territorially bound.

None of this implies that local elements have been entirely superseded by global ones. Multiple identities mean that terrorists have retained their local vested interests while, at the same time, the more global radical ideology has played an important role in the process of identity construction.

Radical fundamentalist ideas have spread across the Southeast Asian region by perceptive and discursive means. These ideas have united like-minded religio-political

groups of terrorists into a collective identity of terrorist movements. These groups, in other words, have shared their perceptions and narratives on collective resistance against common enemies. After all, the phenomenon of modern terrorism duly reflects the ongoing politics of identity, which entails both positive and negative identification process.

Al Qaeda

Al Qaeda, indeed, started from the more local Afghan resistance, then went through the process of linking senses of frustration and often humiliation felt by Muslim communities around the World, and became a more global struggle with the ideas of global jihad.

The local conflicts in Afghanistan were catalyzed by three-dimensional X-factors, including religio-political movements, socio-economic disadvantages, and the ideas of Muslim liberation. Al Qaeda, led by Osama bin Laden, exploited the sense of local grievances that formed a collective identity against the Soviet occupation forces, what the Afghan resistance perceived or narrated as its common threat. Al Qaeda had however evolved from a local resistance movement known as Maktab al Khidmat lil Mujahidin al Arab (MAK) to become an international terrorist movement, with a new collective identity that bin Laden invented.

Bin Laden's discourse on global strategic revolution has focused on turning radicals away from the local struggles by calling for the establishment of a pan-Islamic Caliphate through a global jihad against the West. The discourse of economic globalization was rejected outright by al Qaeda in favor of one focused on linking the lands of jihad in the global struggle in the name of Islam. To al Qaeda, its call to jihad has been an order to all Muslims. The 9/11 incident has to a significant degree recast the Islamist challenge along the lines of bin Laden's vision of a global conflict between Islam (the 'Self') and the West (the 'Other' as enemy).

Many local movements share the canonical view of radical fundamentalists that much of the blame for their dismal situations at home lies with the West, which props up repressive regimes. Although their primary motivation seems to be rooted in discontent with the situations in their countries of origin, the risk of modern terrorism is that local factors are being replaced by international inspirations, especially the ideas associated with the global jihad. Put differently, there is the real possibility that local identities can be surpassed by wider collective identities of international fundamentalist movements of such groups as al Qaeda. Salafism as a form of contemporary fundamentalist Islam

inculcates a sense of solidarity among geographically disparate believers through a sense of internationalized humiliation and denial of dignity and recognition.

Despite al Qaeda's intention to encourage other terrorist groups throughout the Muslim world and the likelihood that local extremists may make common cause with al Qaeda, they nevertheless do not necessarily have the same visions or goals. There are many local grievances shared between moderates and radicals in the local political context. The hope lies with efforts to resolve local conflicts and engage with the Muslim world through an appropriate and constructive understanding of the senses that underlie particular local grievances. Identifying the politics of identity in each particular local area may indeed help prevent the process of collective identity formation at the international or global level at large.

Jemaah Islamiyah

Similarly, in Southeast Asia, modern terrorism has been characterized by a patchwork of conflicts in which local and global anxieties are inextricably linked. The best known of the regional groups, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), is a group that grew out of longstanding local grievances. JI movements started to form informal regional alliances through recruitment networks in pesantren and madrasas in the local areas throughout the regions. Different points of origin were mostly local separatist movements that claimed to have been marginalized economically, socially, and/or culturally.

Yet, JI movements have been driven by the idea of a Pan-Regional Islamic State through jihad strategy. There have indeed been cases of training exchange, manpower and supply networks, fund-raising, joint operations carried out in the region. Ties that bind the JI network are varied, and this helps to reinforce its strength; in spite of the fact that many JI leaders have already been arrested and a looser more autonomous structure was left as a consequence. Beyond the ideological affinity, moreover, JI dispersed 'cells' are united under the collective identity characterized by an intricate web of inter-marriage and reinforced by extensive financial networks.

Influenced by al Qaeda, JI movements also see themselves part of a global Muslim uprising. In fact, JI had close ties with al Qaeda long before 9/11. The leadership and senior members of JI trained in Afghanistan in the late 1980s. JI has been at the core of an extensive and complex terrorist network of several radical Islamic groups, which have overcome national and geographical boundaries and maintained deep and long-running ties with one another toward a shared religio-political fundamentalist goal, a pan-regional caliphate in Southeast Asia.

JI collaborated extensively with other radical fundamentalist groups in the region. These ‘friends’ of JI include Kumpulan Mujahidee Malaysia (KMM) which is also linked to bin Laden’s global terrorist network through their members and subordinates. JI is closely affiliated with KMM, sharing its founders and leaders, namely Abubakar Baasyir and Riduan Isamuddin, better known as Hambali. Moreover, KMM has been linked to Indonesia’s militant group Laskar Jihad and to the Philippines’ Abu Sayyaf. Evidence also links JI to Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), an Islamic separatist group in Mindanao.

After all, the international terrorist networks in Southeast Asia are well-grounded, well-supported, far-reaching and threatening. The case of JI movements is the classic case of collective identity construction made possible by empowerment of ideas, either through perceptions or discourses, associated with the religious X-factor.

CONCLUDING REMARK: THE IMPORTANCE OF THE Y-FACTORS

In “building a research plan” on the making of modern terrorism, this paper proposes some initial thinking about the analysis of ideas and identity, using constructivist tools. Two sets of factors are to be addressed towards a conclusion of the analysis.

First, new research must capture the dynamic and evolutionary characteristics of modern terrorism. The X-factors are what might be called the ‘shapers’ of identity and reality like religion and ethnicity that shape terrorist movements. They are not the ‘root causes’ of contemporary terrorism as such. Instead, they facilitate the senses of injustice, inequality, and intolerance, and thereby represent the preconditions under which modern terrorism is more or less likely to emerge.

The second set of factors is what may be called the ‘Y’ factors on the terrorism-identity diagram: the questions of ‘why’ modern terrorism at all. How terrorist movements start involve not only the extra or outside factors but also the ideas within. The ‘Y’ axis represents the factors directly related to the process of identity construction. It reflects the question of ‘why’ through the hearts and minds of terrorists themselves. The question refers directly to the identity context of “self versus other” relations as well as acts of self identification with collectivities like terrorist groups or movements.

On research methods, the two constructivist frameworks introduced here have different focuses of analysis corresponding to their seemingly competing epistemological and methodological stances. Nevertheless, it is suggested here that, as each approach

have its own merits and shortcomings, one point of departure is to recognize the comparative advantage of each approach and develop a division of labor. 'Modern terrorism' is not to be simply generalized. Rather, different cases are to be analyzed separately through different theoretical lenses.

The main objective of this paper has been to stimulate some further thinking and research on identity construction in the studies of contemporary terrorism. Through a multi-level and multi-disciplinary analysis of the interaction of identities, it is believed here that the 'making of modern terrorism' can be analyzed and understood more clearly.

It is the challenge of our research plan to understand and explain terrorism through the hearts and minds of terrorists. An answer may lie behind our understanding of how terrorists identify themselves.

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PAKISTAN, TRIBAL PASHTUNS AND THE AFGHAN INSURGENCY

By Zaffar Abbas

INTRODUCTION

The year 2005 was Afghanistan's bloodiest since the overthrow of the Taliban in November 2001. The first three months of 2006 were no different. Attacks on the Afghan and coalition forces increased manifold, heightening the sense of insecurity in large parts of the country. In the four-year period leading up to 2005, the Taliban and other radical groups opposed to Kabul adopted new and more violent tactics. The latest and the deadliest move in their line of attack was the introduction of suicide bombing which increased steadily through 2005. Along with Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), suicide bombings made no distinction between the so-called legitimate targets, such as the security forces, and the civilian population. The tactical if not strategic shift was quite evident: the resistance in Afghanistan steadily was moving away from an insurgency towards employing terror as a legitimate weapon of war.

As most of the attacks were carried out in areas close to Afghanistan's border with Pakistan, many Afghans laid the blame firmly at Islamabad's door. Recently, the governor of Kandahar bluntly accused Pakistan of supporting the Taliban and other militants suspected of being behind the wave of suicide bombings. President Hamid Karzai may not have gone as far but he too has made it clear that he would like Pakistan to take tougher action to help prevent such incidents. During his visit to Islamabad in February 2006, he handed Islamabad a list of about 150 Taliban activists and other opponents of Kabul who he insisted were at least being harboured in Pakistan if not directly supported by the Pakistani government.

Note: Pashtuns are also referred to as Pakhtuns, Pathans, and Pushtun

Islamabad officially ended its support for the Taliban in 2001 and the Pakistani government denies sheltering Taliban members. President Pervez Musharraf has consistently maintained that a stable and secure Afghanistan was in Pakistan's interest, and declares that Afghan accusations hurt counter-terrorism coordination between the two countries.¹ He has also repeatedly emphasized Islamabad's own military engagement in the country's tribal region that borders Afghanistan and the losses its troops have been taking while attempting to clear the area of foreign militants and their local tribal supporters. Pakistan also accuses Kabul of not doing enough in the form of major deployment of troops on its side of the border to check cross-border movement. Pakistan boasts of arresting over 700 al-Qaeda and Taliban suspects over the last four years including key operatives of Osama Bin Laden's terror network who have since been handed over to the United States. The war of words between Islamabad and Kabul took a turn for the worst in March 2006 when, reacting to a statement by President Karzai, Pakistan's President Musharraf accused him of being oblivious to what was happening in his own country.²

But even if one accepts Pakistan's stance that it has indeed severed all links with the Taliban and their local supporters, few in Islamabad can deny the role of many of the tribal Pashtuns living on the Pakistani side of the border in fueling the insurgency in Afghanistan.³ The assessment of the exact nature and scope of their involvement varies – from providing shelter to foreign militants and Taliban fighters to helping them establish local bases for training and launching offensives into Afghanistan to direct participation in attacks against foreign and Afghan forces.

This paper attempts to assess the level of support for the continuing insurgency in Afghanistan from the Pakistani side. It focuses primarily on the Pashtuns and more specifically on those living in the semi-autonomous and somewhat lawless tribal region commonly known as the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The paper also examines the factors that have pushed the tribesmen towards religious extremism, and the successes and failures of the Pakistani military in attempting to eliminate al-Qaeda and Taliban remnants in the Pakistani tribal belt.

¹ Pakistani newspaper Daily Times, March 9, 2006

² Musharraf's interview with Wolf Blitzer, CNN Late Edition, March 6, 2006

³ Ethnic Pathan like the Pashtu-speaking Afghans

BACKGROUND

The Pashtuns currently are divided across territories controlled by Kabul and Islamabad but their ethno-nationalistic bonds are centuries old. Their involvement in each others affairs has been detailed by historians such as Olaf Caroe,⁴ and can be found in the reports and gazetteers of British rulers of India. These historical documents provide a graphic description of the relationship between successive rulers in Kabul and the Pashtun tribesmen. They also detail the geographical divisions that occurred as a result of the British-Afghan wars triggered by British attempt to subjugate the fiercely independent tribesmen.⁵

The Durand Line drawn in the late 19th Century between territories controlled by Kabul and British India remains a controversial boundary to this day. The dispute, in fact, is a strong reflection of the kind of relationship Kabul wants to have with the Pashtuns living on the Pakistani side of the divide. In over 100 years, no ruler in Kabul – the Amirs, the Communists, the Mujahideen, the Taliban nor the present government – has accepted the Durand Line as a legitimate international border.⁶ Indeed, during his recent visit to Islamabad, President Hamid Karzai demonstrated Afghanistan's affiliation with the Pakistani Pashtun nationalists by visiting the leader of the Awami National Party (ANP), Asfandayar Wali, to condole him on the death of his father Wali Khan. During this same visit to Pakistan, Karzai also rejected suggestions by the Pakistani government to build a fence along the Durand Line; there should be no such restriction between brothers, he said. This sentiment is shared by many Pashtun nationalists living on the Pakistani side of the divide. {and, indeed, even by the religious elements in recent times.—WHAT?}

Islamabad's tumultuous relationship with Kabul dates back to Pakistan's creation in 1947, when Afghanistan raised objections to Pakistan membership in the United Nations; a perceived act of hostility that some Pakistani analysts continue to raise to this day.⁷ Moreover, Islamabad has always looked towards Kabul with suspicion because of the latter's encouragement to Pakistani Pashtun nationalists in their campaign for a

⁴ Caroe, Olaf, *The Pathans 550 BC – AD 1957*, Macmillan & Company, London, 1965

⁵ Report on Waziristan and its tribes – Sangameel Publication, Lahore

⁶ Report on Pakistan's Federally-administered Tribal Areas, IPRI paper 10, 2005, published by Islamabad Policy Research Institute

⁷ [Jalazai, Musa Khan, *The foreign policy of Afghanistan*, Sangameel publication, Lahore

greater Pashtun nation, the so-called *Pashtunistan*. For its part, successive Afghan governments have remained weary of Pakistan's regional policy as well as its attempts to use Afghanistan either as its strategic backyard or as a surrogate.

Pakistan's most direct involvement in Afghan affairs started with the rise of the Communists in Kabul as a result of the 1978 *Saur* Revolution. The influx of Afghan refugees into Pakistan and the start of a CIA-sponsored low-intensity conflict to destabilize the communist regime pushed Islamabad into an entirely new role in regional affairs. And with the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in late 1979, Pakistan became the base for the Afghan resistance movement with direct support by the CIA and Saudi intelligence services.⁸ Pakistan was now clearly a frontline state in the war against Soviet expansion with the northwestern city of Peshawar becoming the hub of the so-called free-world's intelligence and espionage operations.

From among the Afghans themselves, the Islamic groups were created to be the principal defenders of a free Afghanistan. However, everyone from Osama bin Laden to members of the Muslim Brotherhood and other Arab radicals were encouraged to use Pakistan's soil for Jihad against the godless communists.⁹ True that there was little love lost between elements of Islamic jihadist movements and the US – the latter acting as the main policy maker behind the conflict. But the philosophy driving the US Afghan (read global) policy was quite simple: The enemy of your enemy is a friend. And what emerged from more than two decades of conflict, civil war, religious militancy and terrorism was a direct result of this shortsighted policy. In short, the policy ensured that the Americans – as well as Pakistani policy makers and intelligence agencies – would nurture and use jihad and jihadists for regional policy objectives for many years to come.

What is happening in Afghanistan today is neither new nor unique. To a great extent, it is a continuation of the conflict that started in the aftermath of the 1978 communist revolution. In the first phase of the conflict, US-backed Mujahideen battled the Soviet-backed communist regime and, later on, the Soviets themselves. In the second phase, following the overthrow of the communists, Mujahideen fought Mujahideen (Gulbadeen Hekmatyar versus Ahmed Shah Masud). This was followed by a war between the Taliban (essentially, a fundamentalist Islamic students militia) and the

⁸ Coll, Steve-- *Ghost Wars*, The Penguin Press, New York 2004

⁹ Gannon, Kathy -- *'I is for Infidel': from holy war to holy terror*, Public Affairs, New York 2005

Mujahideen, with the former achieving power in Kabul. And finally, we have a US-backed administration battling the Taliban and al-Qaeda.

Other than the violence, there has been one constant factor in the various phases of this long-running conflict—the involvement of Pakistan's Pashtun tribal belt. The people of this region were used, exploited and manipulated by the American, Saudi and Pakistani intelligence services as well as the Islamic radicals for their own vested interests. The tribesmen of the semi-autonomous FATA region had for centuries been living according to their own Pashtun traditions with scant respect for modern laws and no interest in economic or social development. Though historically a religious people, with many of their warriors, such as Mullah Malang and Mullah Powinda, viewed primarily as religious figures, the Pashtun fought against rival tribes and against security forces perceived as occupiers (i.e., the British colonial forces) mostly to defend the independence of their tribal homeland.

However, over the last 25 years or so, political Islam and radical Islamic values have taken a dominant role in the activity of the tribesmen's whether they are battling Pakistani security forces or a regime in Kabul. It is for this reason that FATA, particularly its more conservative tribal agencies such as South and North Waziristan and Bajaur, have continued to serve as a base for the continuing insurgency in Afghanistan. The region has also served as a base for spreading Islamic extremism to the rest of Pakistan.

Pakistan's Tribal Territories

The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) is wedged between the country's Northwest Frontier Province (WNFP) and Afghanistan. It comprises the seven tribal agencies of Mohmand, Khyber, Kurram, Orakzai, Bajaur, North Waziristan and South Waziristan. Other territories governed under special laws (Frontier Crimes Regulations or FCR) introduced by the British during the colonial era are also geographically contiguous with the FATA. This primarily mountainous region has a population of around seven million and its highly porous border with Afghanistan stretches several hundred kilometers.

Until the US-led military operation in Afghanistan following the 9/11 attacks in New York and Washington, Pakistani security forces rarely interfered in the affairs of the various FATA agencies. The rugged tribesmen had always been reluctant to accept foreign forces and the Pakistani troops were no exception. As a result, the region not only

remained lawless for centuries, governed mostly through local custom, but also remained extremely underdeveloped.

Until the turn of the 21st Century, FATA was among Pakistan's most impoverished regions, with nearly 50 per cent of the tribesmen living in abject poverty and 75 per cent with no access to clean drinking water.¹⁰ The problems of infant mortality and high death rate among women during childbirth are severe; nonetheless the population growth rate is 3.9 per cent compared to 1.9 per cent for the rest of the country. Literacy hovers around 17 per cent compared to the national average of 40 per cent, while female literacy remains under one per cent.

The tribal people were given universal adult franchise in 1997 but political parties are still outlawed from functioning in the tribal belt. The area is administered directly by the federal government.

It was against this backdrop that the region became host to those involved in the Afghan conflict, with a constant influx of refugees leaving Afghanistan while US and Pakistani-backed anti-communist Mujahideen launched attacks into Afghanistan. Thus it was that this impoverished region became home to thousands of Afghan and Arab Islamic fighters, and became drastically radicalized in the process.

Fallout

A large part of the Taliban cadre had lived and studied in madrassahs (religious seminaries) in the Pashtun-dominated region. In many ways they were the ideological centres for Pakistani and Afghan Taliban.¹¹ Coupled with their historic affiliation with the Pakistani Pashtun areas, a backlash to the US-led military operation in late 2001 was only to be expected. Few, however, could have anticipated the political and militant fallout witnessed since then—a fallout that was not limited to FATA but spread out to the Northwest Frontier Province as well as along the Pashtun belt of Baluchistan province.

On the political front, the unprecedented electoral gains secured by an alliance of six Islamic parties, the Muttehad Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), in the 2002 elections was a major shock for liberals, moderates and analysts alike.¹² The MMA emerged as a clear

¹⁰ Report on FATA, IPRI paper 10, 2005, Islamabad Policy Research Institute

¹¹ Amir Mir – The True Face of Jihadis, Mashal Books, Lahore, Pakistan

¹² Pakistani magazine Newline, November 2002

winner in the NWFP and a major player in Baluchistan. Even though the parliamentary elections in FATA were on a non-party basis, most of the parliamentarians elected from the region were either supporters or sympathizers of religious parties.

Pakistan's religious right had not seen such electoral prominence even at the height of the Taliban rule in Afghanistan as is evident from the results of the 1997 general elections. For many analysts, the public response had more to do with anti-Americanism than any real love for the Islamists. Since the Islamic parties were the only ones contesting elections from an anti-American platform, many Pashtuns and others angered at the US involvement in the region voted for the MMA.

Another and far more alarming aspect of the fallout was the large number of Taliban, al-Qaeda and Muslim militants of Uzbek, Chechen and other origins crossing into Pakistani territory. Most of them poured into the tribal region through the highly porous border. For many, it was familiar territory from the days of the first Afghan jihad against the Soviets.¹³ But even for those new to the area, it was far from being hostile territory as the tribal Pashtuns stuck to their age-old tradition of hospitality and welcomed these foreign Islamists. In any case, a large number of the tribal Pashtuns, particularly those in Waziristan, Bajaur and Mohmand agencies, had been fellow Jihadis at some point and as such immediately opened their doors to their brethren on the run. It was this mixture of tribal pride governed by the concept of Pashtunwali and the Jihadi bonding that made FATA an obvious sanctuary for many Taliban and al-Qaeda militants.

In the initial phase, it was difficult to assess where the tribal Pashtun hospitality would stop. Was it to remain limited to providing shelter or would it also translate into providing them with some kind of a base for cross-border insurgency. By this time, Pakistani troops as well as intelligence operatives had moved into some of the tribal regions, arresting hundreds of Taliban and al-Qaeda suspects from the area. There is evidence that at the time, tribesmen in Khyber or Mohmand were willing to cooperate with Pakistani troops as long as they did not interfere with local customs and practices (including tribal conflicts or the production of hashish if not poppy). In fact, those in Bajaur agency were quite wary of the Taliban following their bitter experience with the self-styled jihadi force of a Pakistani conservative Mullah, Sufi Mohammed of Malakand. Hundreds of local tribesmen went with Sufi Mohammed to fight against the Northern Alliance but were sent to the frontline without any training or sophisticated weapons. A

¹³ Amir Mir – The True Face of Jihadis, Mashal Books, Lahore, Pakistan

majority was either trapped in Kunduz or simply massacred. The highly conservative South and North Waziristan were perhaps the only tribal agencies where refuge for militant Islamists was not a problem as even the army was reluctant to go in because of the region's history of resisting "foreign" troops. Subsequent events coupled with the ability of some Taliban remnants to reorganize, the birth of a new breed of Islamists among the local tribesmen and the mishandling of the Waziristan situation by the Pakistan army turned the area into a hub for Islamic militancy, both at home and across the border in Afghanistan.¹⁴

Pakistan Military's Tribal Operation

It was with some reluctance that the Pakistani military decided to go into the tribal areas, including parts of the tribal belt that had always been regarded as a 'no-go area' for any outside force. The military was sent in to try and seal-off the border with Afghanistan and was part of the overall US-led military operation against al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan. There were places such as the Tirah valley in the Khyber agency (overlooking the infamous Tora Bora caves) where Pakistani troops set foot for the first time since the country's creation in 1947. Similarly, thousands of troops moved into Mohmand agency and the adjoining tribal regions.

The troops' presence was alien to local culture and it took painstaking negotiations, lots of persuasion, some veiled threats and offers of fringe benefits in the form of roads, schools and clinics that the troops' presence was accepted by local tribal leaders.¹⁵ The classic carrot and stick policy meant that at times, locals were pacified with money while at places, the age-old system of collective punishment was enforced in the form of demolition of houses and shops of anyone perceived to be aiding or protecting foreign militants. It worked to a large extent and the authorities were able to establish peace even in South Waziristan even if only just. Oddly though, this relatively successful policy was soon abandoned either under US pressure or a mistaken belief in Islamabad that the situation could perhaps be used to rapidly establish Islamabad's writ in the area. The result has been a disaster.

¹⁴ Based on several trips by the author to Waziristan and rest of FATA since the start of the military operation

¹⁵ Yousufzai, Rahimullah-- bbcnews.com, 2003

Waziristan

Waziristan has always been a bit of an enigma for the world outside its tribal confines. Its extremely poor, underdeveloped and quite conservative people have consistently rejected outside interference including promises of development. South Waziristan in particular has a history of battles and armed conflicts dating back to the late 19th century. Many of the current skirmishes or ambushes in the area are no different from those in the late 19th century – the only difference being the type of weapons and transportation in use.

Since the Pakistani military first moved into South Waziristan, there have been at least four full-fledged security operations in the area. These have involved thousands of troops, heavy weaponry, and at least on two occasions, even fighter bombers have been employed. In between, there have been a number of peace deals but they have proven largely inconsequential as the local tribesmen have so far refused to hand over foreign militants willingly. Since early 2004, Pakistani security forces have been engaged in an undeclared war in South Waziristan where the tribesmen have been consistently honing their skills in fighting an invading force.¹⁶

The Wazir and Mehsud tribesmen of Waziristan are traditional fighters who learn to use the gun at a very early age. Many of them had participated in the American-backed jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan and had later fought the northern alliance forces alongside the Taliban. The tactics they used in their fight against the British in the late 19th century have improved vastly with the experience gained in the Afghan civil war. With their improved skills, they have been able to put up a fierce resistance against the Pakistan army despite being lesser in numbers and relatively ill-equipped.

As per their tradition, the tribesmen have continued to produce one cleric after another to lead the resistance. First it was Nek Mohammed, a fierce-looking lad who at one stage forced the military into a peace deal without handing over any foreign militants. He was subsequently killed in a missile attack but is still regarded as one of the Waziri heroes. His death failed to create a vacuum of leadership and within no time another local militant Abdullah Mehsud emerged as an even more defiant leader of the tribal fighters. A former detainee of Guantanamo Bay, Mehsud had lost one leg while fighting alongside the Taliban before being arrested and given into American custody. He

¹⁶ Abbas, Zaffar-- bbcnews.com, 2004

is still among the most wanted men and has been putting up a fierce resistance to military operation in the area. Even otherwise, it soon dawned on the Pakistani military establishment that the adversary in the tribal region was well entrenched, fully equipped and motivated.¹⁷ By its own admission, the Pakistani military says it has so far lost around 350 men in Waziristan. And while more than 70,000 troops remain deployed in the tribal and border belts, the militants still seem to have an upper hand.

The situation in South Waziristan, as it stands today, is that of an unannounced truce loaded in the favour of tribal militants. Security forces have scaled down their operation, only responding to attacks by the militants. Local tribal militants are back in the agency's main town of Wana and virtually in control of the area. Eight different groups are operating their offices in the town and have driven out most of the pro-army tribal leaders or Maliks.¹⁸ They were the lucky ones, given that 80 tribal Maliks (tribal leaders) have been killed in various reprisal attacks after being dubbed by the militants as army collaborators or American spies.¹⁹ Most of the journalists have also been forced out of Waziristan, intimidated either by the security forces or the militants.

The situation is far worse in North Waziristan where local Taliban seem to be in control of most parts of the tribal agency. They emerged on the scene in a big way in December 2005 after armed students of local madrassahs (religious seminaries) killed several tribal Maliks, who were dubbed as bandits and tribal thugs. Many of them were beheaded and their decapitated bodies were put up for public displays as a mark of their own system of dispensing justice. Lack of access to the area makes it difficult to assess the depth of the Taliban's local support. But after the Governor of NWFP who represents Islamabad in the tribal areas announced the suspension of military operations in North Waziristan,²⁰ the local Taliban got the encouragement to move into the main town of Miramshah in an attempt to enforce their own Shariah (Islamic) system. Since then a major security operation and reprisal attacks by the local Taliban have resulted in over two hundred deaths.

The Bajaur tribal Agency had remained relatively quiet despite indications that it was turning into a hub of cross-border activities by the Taliban and Hekmatyar's Hizbe

¹⁷ Abbas, Hasan: Pakistan's Drift into Extremism, Pentagon Press, India 2005. P234

¹⁸ Abbas, Zaffar --Enduring Failure, Pak magazine, Herald, Feb 2006

¹⁹ Pakistan Newspaper, The News, Feb 23rd, 2006

²⁰ Pakistani newspaper, Dawn, Feb, 2006

Islami operating in the Kunar region. But Bajaur too turned hostile after the US missile attack in January. The missile fired at a house in the border village of Damadola was apparently aimed at al-Qaeda's number two, Ayman Al-Zawaheri. Not only did he survive, he went on to issue statements aimed at ridiculing the attackers. Thirteen innocent lives, including those of women and children, were lost in the attack providing a fillip to extreme anti-US and pro-Osama feelings in the area. Since then, there have been a series of demonstrations with a wanted militant of the area, Mulla Faqir Mohammed, now riding the tide of popularity. An editorial in Pakistan's paper Daily Times described the situation as "scary". Demonstrations have not remained restricted to Bajaur and have spread out across the NWFP where people now openly raise slogans in praise of Bin Laden and the Taliban leader Mullah Omar. It seems that Pakistani security forces' mishandling of the situation and missile attacks by American drones flying in from across the border have combined to create a new atmosphere of extremism. The angry public reaction to the direct American military strikes left President Musharraf now choice but to describe it a violation of Pakistan's sovereignty.²¹ Other issues such as the US involvement in Iraq or the situation in Palestine have only served to fuel this new wave of militancy further.

Al-Qaeda and Taliban

The scope of this paper does not allow an examination of how Taliban and al-Qaeda became synonymous. But it is now an established fact that the two are often clubbed together when mentioned in the context of militancy in the tribal region. What is not so obvious anymore is that till quite recently, the two were very distinct entities. However, circumstances since 9/11 have made them so interdependent that it has become quite difficult to separate one from the other. Afghanistan watchers during the Taliban reign like author Jason Burke or Rahimullah Yousufzai know that Bin Laden and his group of Arab fighters had little role in Afghan affairs. They either kept themselves away from matters of governance or operated independently, and under pressure always preferred to remain subservient to Mullah Omar. Without going into the details of Mullah Omar's deeply flawed decision to allow Bin Laden to set up his base in Afghanistan, it can be argued that al-Qa'eda exploited the Afghan hospitality to the hilt. By the time American forces moved in, the Taliban leadership found itself allied to al-Qaeda by default.

²¹ President Musharraf's interview with the Guardian, April 28, 2006

There is one critical difference between the philosophy and politics of the Taliban and al-Qaeda. The former, being Afghan, was never an internationalist entity. The Afghans have rarely operated outside their own territory. Of course, there were exceptions associated with Pakistani or international militant movements such as the Ikhwan or Brotherhood, or the one in Kashmir. But by and large, the Afghans prefer to fight within and for their territory. Of course, their territory includes the Pashtun land on the Pakistani side. This means that despite being political introverts, the Afghans do believe they have a role in any situation which involves foreign presence on their soil – be it the war against the British, the Soviets or a regime in Kabul that draws support from Washington. That is perhaps why it is easy to find many Pakistani Muslim radicals or Uzbeks in what is largely an Arab network, but not as easy to find Afghans in al-Qaeda's global network. This Afghan introvertedness is largely a cultural tendency which has over the past few years been forced to assume an international dimension.

Drift Towards Al-Qaeda-ism

Perhaps it was Jason Burke, journalist and author, who first used the phrase “Al-Qaedaism” to describe the spread of extremist Islamic ideology. Indeed it is this problem that the Pakistani authorities are confronted with in the country's tribal territories, the NWFP and Baluchistan. In the early days of the Taliban, these areas were producing supporters for the Islamic student militia. They now seem to be drifting towards more extremist views and tactics – a clear indication being the adoption of suicide bombing as a tactic of warfare. Until a few years ago, it was impossible to imagine an Afghan or Pakistani Pashtun blowing himself up in the name of Jihad. There was hardly a Pashtun among the hundreds of Pakistani Islamist radicals who adopted al-Qaeda's Arab model of militancy. This no longer seems to be the case which is perhaps what has led the authorities in Kabul to argue that suicide bombings, the use of IEDs and hit-and-run tactics maybe the work of non-Afghans coming from Pakistan.

A detailed article in the New York Times (January 22, 2006) carries photographs of two Pakistani members of a supposed suicide gang that was busted by the Afghans. It talks of an anti-Afghanistan operation spread from the shores of Karachi to the border region of Baluchistan, claiming that Pakistani authorities have not done enough to stop the extremists. President Karzai has been quoted by author Ahmed Rashid²² as saying:

²² Eurasianet, cited by Pakistani newspaper Daily Times Feb 23, 2006

“we have provided President Musharraf with a lot of very detailed information on acts of terrorism being carried out in Afghanistan, and we discussed in great detail what actions Pakistan could now take”. Mr. Rashid goes on to say that President Musharraf, who usually is vehement in denying any kind of Pakistani connection to terrorist operations, was clearly subdued as a result of evidence given to him by the Afghan intelligence.

It is difficult to say anything about the authenticity of the information provided by Kabul but senior Pakistani security officials say the ongoing anti-terror operation is not as simple as many people would like the world to believe.²³ These officials say the use of security forces can control or eliminate a group or force of militants, whether local or foreign, but cannot stop the making of a suicide bomber. In fact, one senior security official said, the speed with which the crackdown has been carried out has only given a new fillip to the wave of extremism, and has thus created the right atmosphere for radical religious groups to exploit the situation.

These officials point to the number of suicide attacks that have occurred in Pakistan, mostly targeting minority Shiite Muslims. In December 2003, President Musharraf himself was the target of an attack by two suicide bombers. The subsequent discovery that one of the suicide bombers was a Kashmiri fighter once trained by the Pakistani intelligence while the other was an Afghan perhaps became the turning point in President Musharraf’s perspective on Islamic militancy. He had already come down hard on local militant groups, banning a number of them, but he is now determined to go after even those once revered by the Pakistani intelligence.

A far more startling revelation was that an Afghan had opted to become a suicide bomber. It was something extremely rare, if not entirely new. Analysts Rahimullah Yousufzai says Afghans or Pashtuns are traditionally trained to secure an exit before getting involved in any battle.²⁴ This visible shift towards religious extremism indicates a growing influence of Arab extremism or al-Qaeda-ism in Afghan militant operations. Since then, there have been a series of suicide attacks inside Afghanistan, killing scores of people. Many in Kabul would like to believe it’s mostly the work of non-Afghans. That is a possibility but there has been no clear evidence to substantiate it so far.

²³ based on background interviews conducted by the author

²⁴ A series of interviews with the author

With a prevalent Madrassah culture and deep religious roots, the area has always been supportive of the Mujahiddeen and later the Taliban.²⁵ In fact, some of the madrassa have continued to provide the fodder for jihad in Afghanistan.²⁶ But the events of the last few years coupled with Pakistani and American mishandling of the situation has steadily pushed its people towards extremes. Over time, its culture has steadily transformed from conservative Islam to political Islam, from fundamentalism to radical extremism and with the advent of indiscriminate suicide bombings, from extremism to terrorism. This, perhaps, is the kind of “al-Qaeda-ism” which is finding roots in the tribal region and if not tackled with care, may spread beyond these territories.

As Yousufzai points out it shows that al-Qaeda is winning in the sense that it has convinced even the Afghans or Pashtun Islamists to adopt suicide tactics. Some of the factors he points out for this marked shift in Taliban tactics include: inspiration coming from Iraq, glorification of such people or their acts in the form of video tapes, endorsement by some Islamic scholars or ulema, and its sheer destructive potential that does not require a full fledged war effort. But above all these, it is the growing desperation that he says is rapidly pushing the Afghan Islamists and the local tribal Pashtuns towards such extreme measures.

CONCLUSION

It’s basically about how well we know how religious sentiments can be exploited to make people militants or even terrorists. A study carried out by Rand in the early 1990s on the prospects of the spread of Islamic fundamentalism in the region had concluded that there was little or no chance of a fundamentalist take-over in Afghanistan, Turkey or Pakistan. The report²⁷ was based on a study of various developments in the region in comparison with the conditions which brought Islamists to power in Iran. It clearly shows the world’s lack of understanding of the region as within a matter of a few years the Taliban emerged and seized power in Afghanistan. In subsequent years, Islamists have continued to make inroads into other neighbouring countries.

Predicting Afghanistan has always been difficult but in the present circumstances it may be impossible to simply wish away the Taliban and their tribal supporters. A low-

²⁵ Burke, Jason --- Al Qaeda, Penguin Books, London

²⁶ Rashid, Haroon-- Pakistan’s Jihad University, bbcnews.com

²⁷ Graham E. Fuller – Islamic Fundamentalism in the Northern Tier Countries, Rand 1991

intensity conflict in Afghanistan, with clear support coming from across the border is likely to go on for a long time, even though the anti-Kabul elements are unlikely to gain enough support to create huge problems for the allied forces and the Kabul administration they back.

The United States, instead of rushing for immediate results in the tribal areas, will have to understand the sensitivities involved in dealing with the tribal militants. The Afghan government, though faced with daily attacks by the Taliban, is in a better position to understand the difficulty of handling tribal Pashtuns. President Musharraf recently said that a stable Afghanistan was in Pakistan's interest, and despite the deep suspicion found in some Afghan circles, many western diplomats in Islamabad are convinced that he is deeply committed to eliminating extremism from the region.²⁸ The view is also in line with the recommendations of 9/11 Commission, which calls for supporting President Musharraf in his campaign against religious extremism.²⁹ If that indeed is the case, then President Musharraf perhaps needs to ask his security forces to slow down the military operation and instead return to the age-old practice of using tribal jirgas, development incentives and other means traditionally used to win local loyalties. Only then can the Pakistani security forces hope to counter the impact of militants leading the tribals in the name of Pashtun pride and Islam. Some analysts suggest that regular troops be replaced with paramilitary forces such as the Frontier Corps. The latter, because of their uniform, look like local tribesmen and have a better understanding of local laws, customs. Most are experienced in dealing with the clerics and tribal elders – something that is a must if hearts and minds are to be won in this lawless territory. Coupled with all this is the insistence of the Pakistani government that Kabul should not only recognize Durand Line as an international border, but efforts should be made to fence it in order to prevent cross-border movement of armed militants.³⁰ However, Islamabad also knows its not as simple because a very strong lobby of secular Pashtun nationalists on the Pakistani side are also opposed to Durand Line being given the status of a recognized international border.

It is indeed an extremely difficult choice, as all indicators in the tribal region are pointing towards a steady drift into extremism. Soon after the start of the latest military operation against suspected foreign militants in North Wazirsitan, President Musharraf

²⁸ Based on authors background briefings with more than one western diplomat

²⁹ The 9/11 Commission Report—authorized edition, W. W. Norton & Company, New York. p369

³⁰ 'Karzai Can't Have it Both Ways' – Pakistani newspaper Daily Times, March 12

announced that the war against Al-Qaeda has almost been won.³¹ But in the same interview he also expressed the fear about the rise of a Taliban-style extremism in the Tribal region, particularly Waziristan, and its spill-over in the adjoining settled areas of Pakistan. Three years of outright military action including occasional missile strikes by CIA-operated drones has only aggravated the situation. And there is no dearth of those who seem convinced that they can play the situation to their benefit. Pakistan's religious parties have never in the past received more than 10 per cent of the popular vote. They are only too aware that if they fail in the political arena, they may even lose whatever seats they won in the last elections on the slogan of anti-Americanism. They are now enjoying the dividend from the military adventurism of the last three years in the tribal territories. They seem convinced that the military operation will not be abandoned. That suits them fine. The longer the situation drags out, the sharper the rise in their popularity graph – not just in the tribal region but well beyond it. Indeed, if the protest rallies on the entirely unconnected issue of Prophet Mohammed's caricatures are any indication, the Islamists may currently be dreaming of a growing wave of popularity across Pakistan.

³¹ President Musharraf's interview with the Guardian, April 28, 2006

Appendix

TRIBAL BREAKDOWN IN FATA; DURAND LINE, AGREEMENT; MAPS OF FATA, PASHUNISTAN, AND ETHNIC DIVISION OF PAKISTAN

COMPOSITION OF TRIBAL AREAS

The Tribal Areas as defined in Article 246 of Pakistan's constitution are:

1. Federally Administered Tribal Areas.
2. Provincially Administered Tribal Areas.

FEDERALLY ADMINISTERED TRIBAL AREAS

Name of Agency/F.R	Area in Sq.Miles.	Population According to March 1981 Census (in thousand)	Main Tribes
Bajaur Agency	498	289	Ullman Khel, Salarzai, Charmungi.
Mohmand Agency	887	164	Tarakzai, Halimzai, Khwaezai, Baezai, Safi, Mullagori, and Utman Khel.
Khyber Agency	995	284	Afridi, Shinwari, Mullagori,
Orakzai Agency	403	359	Orakzai.
Kurram Agency	1305	294	Turi, Bangash, Ziamusht, Mengal.
N.W. Agency	1817	239	Utmanzai Wazir, Daur, Saidgi, Gurbaz.
S.W. Agency	2556	310	Mahsud and Ahmadzai Wazir.
F.R. Peshawar	101	37	Hassan Khel.
F.R. Kohat	363	57	Jawaki and Adam Khel.
F.R. Bannu	339	79	Jani Khel, Bakka.
F.R.D.I. Khan	1247	86	Bhittani, Sherani.
	10511	2198	

DURAND LINE AGREEMENT-1893

Agreement between His Highness Amir Abdur Rahman Khan, G.C.S.I., Amir of Afghanistan and its Dependencies on the one part, and Sir Henry Mortimer Durand, KCIE, CSI, Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, representing the Government of India on the other part, -1893.

Whereas certain questions have arisen regarding the frontier of Afghanistan on the side of India, and whereas both, His Highness the and the Government of India, are desirous of settling these questions by a friendly understanding, and of fixing the limit of

their respective spheres of -influence, so that for the future, there may be no difference of opinion on the subject between the allied Governments, it hereby agreed as follows:

(1) The eastern and southern frontier of His Highness's dominions, from Wakhan to the Persian border, shall follow the line shown in the map (not reproduced) attached to this agreement.

(2) The Government of India will at no time exercise interference in the territories lying beyond this line on the side of Afghanistan, and His Highness the Amir will at no time exercise interference in the territories lying beyond this line on the side of India.

(3) The British Government thus agrees to His Highness, the Amir retaining Asmar and the valley above it, as far as Chanak. His Highness agrees on the other hand, that, he will at no time exercise interference in Swat, Bajawar or Chitral including the Arnawai or Bashgal Valley. The British Government also agrees to leave to His Highness the Birmal tract as shown in the detailed map already given to His Highness, who relinquishes his claim to the rest of the Wazir country and Dawar. His Highness also relinquishes his claim to Chageh.

(4) The frontier line will hereafter be laid down in detail and demarcated wherever this may be practicable and desirable by Joint British and Afghan Commissioners, whose object will be to arrive by mutual understanding at a boundary which shall adhere with the greatest possible exactness to the line shown in the map (not reproduced) attached to this agreement, having due regard to the existing local rights of villages adjoining the frontier.

(5) With reference to the question of Chaman, the Amir withdraws his objection to the new British Cantonment and concedes to the British Government, the rights purchased by him in the Sirkai Tilerai water. At this part of the frontier, the line will be drawn as follows:

"From the crest of the Khwaja Amran range near the Psha Kotal, which remains in British territory, the line will run in such a direction as to leave Murgha Chaman and the Sharobo spring to Afghanistan, and to pass half way between the New Chaman Fort and the Afghan outpost, known locally, as Lashkar Dand. The line will then pass half way between the railway station and the hill known as the Mian Baldak, and turning southward, will rejoin the Khwaja Amran range, leaving the Gwasha Post in British territory, and the road to Shorawak to the west and south of Gwasha in Afghanistan. The British Government will not exercise any interference within half a mile of the road."

(6) The above articles of agreement are regarded by the Government

of India and His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan, as a full and satisfactory *settlement* of all the principal differences of opinion which have arisen between them in regard to the frontier, and both the Governments of India and His Highness the Amir, undertake that any differences of detail such as those which will have to be considered hereafter by the officers appointed to demarcate the boundary line, shall be settled in a friendly spirit, so as to remove for the future as far as possible, all causes of doubt and misunderstanding between the two Governments.

(7) Being fully satisfied of His Highness's good will to the British

Government, and wishing to see Afghanistan independent and strong, the Government of India will raise no objection to the purchase and import by His Highness of ammunitions of war, and they will themselves grant him some help in this respect. Further, in order to mark their sense of the friendly spirit, in which His Highness the Amir has entered into these negotiations, the Government of India undertake to increase by the sum of six lakhs of rupees a year the subsidy of twelve lakhs now granted to His highness.

Kabul; H.M. Durand. 12th November, 1893 Amir Abdur Rahman Khan

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

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PART II

HOW DO VIOLENT IDEOLOGIES SPREAD?

OVERVIEW: HOW DO VIOLENT IDEOLOGIES SPREAD?

SUMMARY OF DISCUSSIONS

Session II, “How Do Violent Ideologies Spread?,” focused on the mechanisms that terrorist and insurgent organizations use to build and expand their support base, both domestically and internationally. The two presentations focused on secular movements outside the Muslim world—the Maoist insurgency in Nepal and the LTTE in Sri Lanka—highlighting the need to analyze the spread of violent ideologies beyond the narrow Islamist extremist context. In his commentary, Amir Rana emphasized that only by doing so will it be possible to identify commonalities and synergies that reach across the religious-secular divide. This is, in turn, potentially important in understanding the transition to violent religious extremism in previously secular polities such as Pakistan and Bangladesh. In Pakistan, according to Rana, the driving force behind Islamist radicalism beginning in 1979 was money from both Saudi Arabia and the United States. Before that, Pakistan considered itself a secular society and even its religious political parties opposed the creation of an Islamic state. But as the number of radical madrassas grew, thanks to Saudi largesse, internal sectarian and religious-secular tension developed as well. Successive Pakistani governments fanned the flames, first, by radicalizing educational materials in Pakistan’s public school curriculum and, later, by failing to take steps to revise them and bring religious schools under some sort of supervision. In short, like Nepal and Sri Lanka, Pakistani society fell victim, in Rana’s view, to ideological divisions that were the product of “radicalism as big business.”

All three examples discussed in this session highlighted the degree to which terrorist and insurgent groups play on external politics to their advantage. The Maoists, for example, know that India will not tolerate external involvement in the peace process in Nepal, a traditional sphere of Indian influence. The LTTE and Pakistani radicals have, likewise, exploited regional tensions and porous international borders to their advantage. In addition, both the Maoists in Nepal and the LTTE have developed expatriate networks—a very sophisticated one in the LTTE case—to promote their political cause and raise money from diaspora communities.

Both the Nepalese Maoists and Pakistani radical Islamists have effectively exploited education systems in spreading their ideologies and recruiting foot soldiers. The Maoists extort money from private schools in Nepal and force schools in rural areas to allow them to conduct indoctrination and paramilitary type training on a regular basis. Private school students are often pressed into service by Maoist fighters, as well. In Pakistan, madrassas spread radical ideologies and have become an ideological battlefield in the country.

Fund-raising is, of course, key to the spread of radical ideologies throughout the South and Southeast Asian regions. Two sources of terrorist funding emerge as particularly important: the exploitation of diaspora populations and, for Islamist groups, contributions from foreign sources through organizations masquerading as “humanitarian” and educational NGOs. The LTTE stands out as being particularly effective in mobilizing the economic resources of the Tamil diaspora, which has become a major source of funding—a subject that is covered in greater detail in Part III. The Nepalese insurgents have also come to rely on funding from the country’s expatriate community, as have various groups in Pakistan. Radical groups have also become adept at channeling money through charitable organizations, with or without their knowledge. The LTTE and radical Islamist groups in the region have set up front organizations through which individuals can contribute money and make it look like a legitimate charitable contribution.

Perhaps the most important vehicle for the spread of radical ideologies in this day and age is modern mass communication. Virtually every radical and insurgent group in the region has one or more websites that it uses for promoting its ideology, recruiting, indoctrination, and fund-raising. One of the greatest challenges in the counterterrorism field in the coming years will be finding ways to track and control the activities of radical organizations on the Internet. Most governments in the region are either unwilling or unable to track the Internet activities of their own domestic terrorist organization, and getting them to crack down on foreign groups operating in their countries is even more difficult. Moreover, the decentralized nature of both the medium (the Internet) and the message makes determining legal jurisdictional responsibility difficult, if not impossible. The unregulated and geographically dispersed nature of the Internet also complicates enforcement. Internet Service Providers are reluctant to cooperate with government attempts to control content, and the standards of proof for enforcing anti-terrorism and

anti-insurgent laws to shut down websites is often extremely high, and the potential political backlash against attempts to constrain free speech is unpredictable.

THE PAPERS

Yubaraj Ghimire, in “The Many Dimensions of Nepali Insurgency,” describes Nepal as a “laboratory” in which one group—the Maoists—are attempting to rebuild society according to the dictates of a radical ideology. He outlines the three-way struggle for power between the monarchy (backed by the Army), the Seven Party Alliance (SPA), and the Communist Party of Nepal—Maoist (CPN-M) in which the Maoists have gained considerable ground and stand poised to obtain a major role in the government of Nepal. Popular support for the Maoists stemmed from three, interrelated factors: first, the traditionally wide (and ever-growing) gap between the very rich and the very poor in Nepal; second, the rising expectations of the population when Nepal became a constitutional monarchy in the early 1990s; and, third, the resulting struggle between the political parties and the monarchy, the latter repeatedly suspending democratic processes. According to Ghimire, there is also an important international element: Nepal’s Maoists have forged an alliance with Indian Maoists and have received important material support and sanctuary across the long open border with India. The recent peace negotiations between the government, political parties, and the Maoists have promise only if a genuine democracy and effective government are the result. The sincerity of Maoist participation in the peace talks remains uncertain. Nepali opinion remains highly suspicious of the Maoists’ motives, and yet they must be included since they could, and would, torpedo any peace agreement that attempted to exclude them. Unfortunately, Ghimire warns that the lasting legacy of the Maoist insurgency in Nepal may be the legitimizing of violence as a means of changing the political status quo—an outcome that he urges the international community to take steps to prevent.

In “Tactical Innovation in Terrorism and Its Global Proliferation,” Shanaka Jayasekara warns that any global counterterrorism dragnet must include a greater focus on the activities of local terrorist groups. Regional and global terrorist movements emerge from these local groups; and if counterterrorism forces can catch and eliminate them while they are still operating on a more limited scale, the proliferation of groups and capabilities will be easier to control. Shanaka describes a “caste system” of terrorism

Note: This overview discusses the three papers presented, although only one paper, by Ghimire, was submitted for publication and is therefore included here.

that focuses primarily on the global groups, creating a “safety zone” in which local groups can operate and develop new capabilities below the radar of the international counterterrorist dragnet. Local groups like the LTTE and Hezbollah have exploited this safe space to forge important innovations in areas including suicide terrorism, maritime terrorism, aviation, logistics networks, and fund-raising and money laundering. Some of the terrorist tactics that plague the international community today—including suicide bombing, sea-borne strikes such as the one against the USS Cole, and the exploitation of civilian aviation training—were pioneered in and exported from LTTE operations in Sri Lanka. Similarly, regional and global terrorist networks seem to be learning from the LTTE’s experience in exploiting the global reach of diaspora communities, the exploitation of the internet and other global communication, forging alliances with international organized crime, and the use of legal NGOs and humanitarian organizations as a fund-raising front. Shanaka urges greater attention to these innovations at the local level in the interest of stemming their further proliferation at the global level.

Hiroshi Karube gave an informal presentation on Japan’s Counterterrorism Programs. In recent years, he said, Japan has pledged itself not to become a “loophole” in global counterterrorism measures and has significantly strengthened its domestic counterterrorism capabilities. It is also committed to playing an increasingly active role in the international effort to counter the spread of terrorism. In particular, Japan advocates the establishment of international standards for counterterrorism, greater international cooperation, and increased capacity-building assistance to developing nations. Japan’s historical experience of terrorism goes back to the mid-18th century when Japanese traditionalists used assassination as a tool against advocates of opening Japan to Western influence. According to Karube, this gives Japan some understanding of how the forces of traditionalism can use terrorism to achieve their political ends. Japan responded to this internal disruption by adopting Western technology and culture in a way that kept much of the traditional Japanese spirit, a historical and cultural legacy that may also have relevance in other societies struggling with the tensions between traditional values and modernization. In addition, Japan’s potential to play a regional role in counterterrorism research is enhanced by the fact that it does not trigger the cultural and political suspicion that the US does in the Southeast and South Asian regions.

THE MANY DIMENSIONS OF NEPALI INSURGENCY

Yubaraj Ghimire

INTRODUCTION

Nepal is an ideal place for a radical ideology to shape. It is a nation that has been governed and ruled by an absolute monarchy for most of its 237 years of independence; a society in which poverty, illiteracy and diseases, are widespread; and a country largely unable to craft plans and policies of the scale and intensity required to tackle its many economic and social challenges and defeat radical ideologies. Nepal, as the past ten years seem to indicate, has become a laboratory for political experiments aimed at building a new society rooted in a radical ideologies.

Nepal represents the South Asian predicament—the hope of the very rich and despair of the very poor. The richest one fifth of Nepalese earn about forty per cent of the nation's income while the poorest one fifth must manage on less than ten per cent; and, worse, 43 per cent of the population lives below the poverty line.¹

Nepal was ranked 136th out of 177 countries on the Human Development Index in the most recent UN Human Development Report (2005).² The country presents extremes of despair and prosperity. The richest 12 per cent of households control around 71 per cent of the country's wealth. The poorest 20 percent earns only four per cent of the national income according to a Nepal South Asia Center report. The per capita income, which remains around \$240US annually shows the same distribution trend varying from \$312/year from the capital to less than \$100/year in the more remote rural areas. What could be a better market in which to sell the radical dreams of the ultra leftist call —

1 Dr Dhruba Rizal and Yozo Yokota, Understanding Development, Conflict, and Violence, p.37.

2 United Nations Development Programme, UN Human Development Report 2005, International Cooperation at a Crossroads: Aid, Trade, and Security in an Unequal World (New York: UNDP, September 2005) p. 221; the HDI is a composite index that measures a country in three basic dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life (life expectancy at birth), knowledge (adult literacy rates and school enrollment), and a decent standard of living (GDP and Purchasing Power Parity in USD).

“Rise in revolt! You have nothing to lose but shackles of bondage!” The ever-increasing ranks of hopelessly unemployed youth present the Maoists a rich recruiting base for a guerilla force that includes school children. This has however, attracted global attention, bringing the Maoists under sharp criticism for their human right record. And there are serious doubts as to whether the Maoists will be able to achieve their desired objectives over the long term if they continue to ignore domestic and international criticism of their use of violence as an instrument of politics.

The Maoists movement's experiment with insurgency in Nepal reached its ten-year mark in February 2006. In that time, it has claimed more than 13,000 lives with nearly 35 per cent of those falling victims to the Maoists. The remaining 65 per cent of fatalities were at the hands of security agencies acting on behalf of the state, many of them occurring outside of direct combat engagement with the insurgents. International human rights groups have established that 'extra-judicial' killings on the part of the Nepalese government have taken place in sizeable numbers. Most tragically, the insurgency has seen more than 500 children killed and many others wounded, including a large but unspecified number who had been conscripted into the guerrilla force.

"Everything is an illusion except the state power" was, and remains, the guiding mantra of the Maoists, who plunged the country of Buddha's birth into violence. The Maoists clearly envisioned a Nepal without a “Monarchy”—another communist regime to the south of China. Mainstream political parties, along with an overwhelming segment of the population, are not really interested in the Maoist political agenda, but are, at the same time, seriously questioning their ideological commitment to “constitutional monarchy” as it has played out in Nepal. Successive kings, especially the present one, have supported democracy only when it was expedient for them to do so in order to hang on to power; and, in every case, they have re-assumed absolute powers at the first available occasion.

THE BACKGROUND OF THE MAOIST MOVEMENT

In September 1995, when Nepal's experiment in multi-party democracy and constitutional monarchy was only five years old, a group of radical communists sat together and charted out a plan for initiation of a “People's War.” They had previously formed an umbrella organization—the Communist Party of Nepal-Marxist (CPN-M)—whose central committee embraced Mao Zedong’s strategy of a protracted people's war. In Nepal, that strategy would involve isolating the cities by controlling the countryside.

The CPN-M leaders and activists, who had either briefly flirted and later became disillusioned with "parliamentary system" of democracy or who always hated such a system of government, were firmly committed and would brook no divergence from this approach. At the time, Pushpakamal Dahal (aka Prachanda) was chosen as the CPN-M's leader, which he has remained ever since.

On February 4, 1996, Baburam Bhattarai submitted a 40-point charter of demands to the Nepalese Government with a month's ultimatum—either accede to its terms or face an armed uprising. The agenda fell into three categories of demands:

- Political: the abolition of monarchy and the election of a constituent assembly to draft a new constitution for the Republic of Nepal.
- External: most treaties that Nepal had signed in the past should be abrogated on the grounds that they were 'unequal' in letter and spirit and heavily weighted against Nepal's independent and sovereign status. Foremost on this list was the 1950 treaty of peace and friendship with India.
- Economic: the role of multi-national companies in the Nepalese economy should be curtailed, and the market economy should come under stricter state control. The CPN-M believed such isolation was crucial in keeping Nepal outside the sphere-of-influence of the twin evils of 'imperialist' America and 'expansionist' India and in paving the way for the success of the People's War.

On Feb 17, 1996, with still about a fortnight left before its deadline to the Government was set to expire, Maoists attacked and overran three poorly equipped police posts in three districts—Rolpa, Rukum and Sindhuli. The Maoist People's War had begun. In the ensuing decade, its impact has reached far beyond Nepal's borders. India, the United Kingdom and the United States joined the government of Nepal in denouncing the Maoist insurgents as terrorists. The current challenge for the Maoists is to come out of their outlaw status and convince the other parties that they are serious participants in the project of building peace and stability in Nepal.

THE GROWTH AND SPREAD OF THE MAOIST INSURGENCY IN NEPAL

The People's Movement of 1990 not only ended the King's authoritarian rule but made the Nepalese people more conscious of and assertive about their rights and expectations. It encouraged them to organize protests against the Government. Such protests, especially those by major political parties constituting the main opposition to the

Government, became almost routine. At the same time, general strikes and other work stoppages became more frequent and took their toll on the Nepalese economy.

The taste of political empowerment led to soaring popular expectations of the fruits of elected Government, often to quite unrealistic levels. When these expectations went unmet, frustration spread among the people. This dynamic played into the hands of the Maoists, seeming to vindicate their claim that nothing short of People's War was going to permanently and positively change the lot of the people.

The CPN-M designed its political philosophy to rally the people around the notion of People's War from the beginning. The party began its career in Nepal with just 70 active members.³ To increase its base of support, the Maoists initiated a series of populist schemes. These included setting up local “kangaroo courts” which presumed to “dispose” of disputes at the local level that the official state court system had failed to resolve. The Maoists also prohibited alcohol, banned gambling, and used its proto-courts to punish men found guilty of domestic violence. Land reform put the 'tillers' in control of the land they cultivated. The Maoists also established legitimate businesses, including private schools. Formation of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and its engagement in operations against the Nepali Police, extortion from private individuals, bank robberies, and other criminal activities continued in parallel with the CPN-M's more legitimate efforts at political expansion and ideological indoctrination. On the basis of the popular support and status they acquired, the CPN-M was invited to the negotiating table by the Government for the first time in July 2001.

November 23, 2001 was a turning point in the history of Maoists movement in Nepal. Quietly, the Maoists walked away from negotiations after three meetings had stretched over a period of four months with little apparent progress. They raided an army barracks in Western Nepal's Dang area, virtually emptying its armory and enormously enhanced the quality of arms in the possession of the rebels. The loss of those munitions to the Maoists profoundly demoralized the Royal Nepal Army (RNA). It was around this time that the Maoists announced that they had now entered the 'offensive' phase of the “Peoples' War” against the Government.

Prior to the Dang raid, the Maoists fought the ill-equipped police mainly with rifles snatched from the police during an earlier series of successful attacks. In addition,

3 Baburam Bhattarai's article in Janadesh.

the insurgents had some locally manufactured explosives and arms smuggled across the long, open border with India.⁴ There were a few instances of Maoists having smuggled weapons, primarily side arms, across a not so effectively regulated boarder with Tibet, but this trade was effectively stifled after two Nepalese smugglers were intercepted by Tibetan authorities and sentenced to death. There are suspicions that Maoists receive arms from insurgent groups such as the People's War Group (PWG) in India's southern state of Andhra Pradesh and LTTE in Sri Lanka. The Maoists have also had the advantage of sending their cadres for training at facilities run by these two groups. There are fairly credible reports that weapons from Naga rebels have been sold to Nepali rebels through the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) at prices far below market value. As a result of all these activities, Nepalese Maoists are better equipped now than ever before, if the weapons found in rebel possession are any indication. The level of confidence among the Maoist leadership increased so much due to this arsenal that Prachanda, in a series of articles in his party's mouthpiece, *Janadesh*, boasted that they could push 'imperialist U.S. and expansionist India into one grave' if they came forward in support of the monarchy in Nepal.

While procuring arms was obviously vital to sustaining the insurgency, the Maoists also recognized that establishing a viable political network was far more important to the long-term operational success of the movement. The CPN-M was keen to spread its influence and network in India, in particular, and South Asia in general. To do this, it formed a regional organization—COMPOSA—(Coordination of Maoists Organizations of south Asia) and encouraged its closest Indian ally, the PWG, to establish some new units in Bihar, along the Indo-Nepalese border. Despite Maoist denials, the Government of India has repeatedly asserted in Parliament that Maoists along the Indian-Nepalese border are engaged in the formation of a CRZ—Compact revolutionary Zone—running Nepal down to far southern India. There are, however, striking differences between the modus operandi of the Indian Maoists, mainly the PWG, and the Nepalese Maoists. For example, unlike the Indian Maoists, attacks on civilians, political rivals, and physical infrastructures—including roads, bridges, and communication towers—are quite common for the Maoists of Nepal. Such tactics have undermined their popularity, even among the poor and rural populations that might otherwise support them. Also, Nepalese Maoists, again unlike their Indian counterparts,

4 The Indo-Nepalese border is 1750 kilometers long and open on three sides—east, west and the south.

have targeted private and boarding schools, abducted around 10,000 children and teachers, given them indoctrination lectures and training in the ideology of Peoples' War, and left them with the warning that they are expected to come to the service of the Peoples' War if it is ever required of them. But both Nepalese and Indian Maoists share the goal of capturing state power through violent means, and both believe that success or failure on one side of the border would have a direct impact on the other. Prachanda asserts that if the Maoists succeed in establishing a genuine multi-party democracy in Nepal, which of course would include Maoist participation, the result would be a shot in the arm for the Naxalite movement (India's Maoist movement) in India.⁵

There is fairly strong evidence that Nepalese Maoists have crossed into India for training and arms procurement, to make money (through extortion at times), and for sanctuary. On occasion, they have also made it clear that Indian and Nepalese Maoists are joined in common responsibility to liberate the world and pave the way for the rise of proletariat rule. On September 1, barely 48 hours before Nepalese Maoists declared a 3-month unilateral ceasefire to pave the way for a broader dialogue with democratic forces in Nepal, CPN-M Chief Prachanda and the Communist Party of India—Maoist (CPN-M) General Secretary Ganapathy issued a joint statement committing the two parties to waging a People's War across the globe:

[The] two Maoist parties solemnly appeal to the entire oppressed masses, the world over, and Nepal and India in particular, to raise [their] voice against every evil design of imperialism and expansionism to repress the revolutionary cause of the oppressed people in Nepal & India. And we pledge to fight united until the entire conspiracies hatched by the imperialists and reactionaries are crushed and the people's cause of Socialism and Communism are established in Nepal, India and all over the world.⁶

Such firm ideological and strategic alliances, which clearly still exist, indicate that Maoists may opportunistically use 'peace talks' for tactical gains, but not necessarily with any serious commitment to end the conflict.

The Nepalese Maoists have entered into occasional, short-term tactical alliances or understandings with either the King or the political parties. But in so doing they have

5 (Prachanda's interview to The Hindu, daily—New Delhi-Feb 6-2006)

6 (Joint statement by Prachanda and India-Maoist Ganapathy)

made it clear that they are not going to be misled by any 'illusions', and they ultimately still seek state power on their terms. In that light, and notwithstanding their unilateral ceasefires or understandings with the Nepalese pro-democracy parties, the joint commitment of Prachanda and Ganapathy to continued revolutionary People's War clearly represents both parties' long-term policy.

WHAT DOES THEIR SPREAD OR SUCCESS MEAN FOR THE REGION/INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY?

The Maoists may have begun their movement in 1996 with the declared objective of overthrowing the monarchy in Nepal, but they have been able to create concern across the world. For instance, the United States, especially in the post-9/11 environment, has repeatedly put the Nepalese Maoists on its list of terrorist organizations. India calls the Maoists 'terrorists,' but has encouraged the pro-democracy political parties and the Maoists to work together for democracy in Nepal. Germany, which supports Nepal's grass root democracy plan, fears the impact of that success by armed Maoists in Nepal will spill beyond that country's borders, potentially to the detriment of democracies elsewhere in the region.⁷

The United States fears that Maoists can capture the Nepal capital, Kathmandu, or topple the monarchy. The source of U.S. concern is whether, should they overthrow the monarchy, the Maoist will allow other, pro-democracy parties to continue to function. This was the question that U S Ambassador James F Moriarty posed before an assembly of intelligentsia and diplomats in Kathmandu in February 2006. Moriarty also called the 12-point understanding between an alliance of seven pro-democracy parties and the Maoists reached in Delhi 'wrong headed,' warning that the Maoists would likely not renounce violence:

The Maoists are clearly taking political advantage of the current situation. I hope that the parties and most Nepalis will look upon [them] with suspicion because [the] Maoists do not seem to be changing the way they operate. It is very clear that they have every intention of continuing their armed insurgency while the parties put political pressure on the king.⁸

7 (Interview with German Ambassador to Nepal Rudiger Published in Samay magazine: June 2004).

8 Moriarty interview with Samay magazine

Moriarty's latest warning, although consistent with what he has said before, came in response to three interviews that Prachanda gave in quick succession in February 2006. In these, the CPN-M leader singled out the U.S. as a villain because, in his view, it has targeted Maoists—the 'people's force'—for special attention in its global war on terrorism.

Nonetheless, the U.S. has cautiously welcomed the 12-point understanding in which Maoists agree to accept a peaceful solution, provided a constituent assembly is elected that would draft a new constitution for Nepal under U.N. or other mutually acceptable international supervision. This understanding further states that Maoists would not target the Seven Party Alliance (SPA) supporters and would return all property forcibly seized by the rebels. The pro-democracy alliance, on the other hand, agreed to establish a “Democratic Republic” in Nepal. But the burning question remains: Can the armed Maoists be trusted? The Nepalese who crave peace and stability first want to see the Maoists prove their peaceful intentions.

The situation changed drastically in April 2006 when the King's direct rule came to an end, and the SPA came to power. Whether this leads to a settlement—a truly constitutional or ceremonial monarchy along with a parliamentary system that can effectively accommodate the Maoists, and a functioning democracy which would address the vital socio-economic as well as politico-administrative issues which the Maoists have raised—remains the biggest question mark for Nepal's future political and economic stability. There is an important role, as well, for the key international players who want to contribute positively to the reform process in Nepal and who agree that the Maoist problem does not lend itself to a military solution. In short, there seems to be a widespread interest in encouraging the peace process.

MAOIST SPA UNDERSTANDING AND PROSPECTS FOR PEACE

The SPA, which had been fighting for restoration of democracy after the King assumed direct power in February 2005, also undertook to bring the Maoists into the political process. They did so, however, with the clear condition the CPN-M must first renounce violence. With India's covert assistance, the SPA entered into an agreement with the Maoists in November 2005, signing the aforementioned 12-point understanding outlining their shared goal of bringing the absolute monarchy to an end and establishing a competitive parliamentary system that would include CPN-M participation through an elected constituent assembly.

The King, however, refused to recognize this understanding. This refusal only infuriated the SPA and the general masses, which in turn led the SPA to call for a decisive mass movement beginning 6 April 2006. The movement snowballed, reaching its crescendo when King Gyanendra was forced to give in on 24 April 2006, acknowledging not only that the sovereignty lay with the people, but also that they were the sole source of political and state powers. Along with the declaration, the King handed power over to the SPA. As a result, the 12-point understanding between the Maoists and the SPA, literally overnight, became an understanding between the Government and the rebels.

Through the same declaration, King Gyanendra recalled parliament, which he had dissolved six years earlier, and appointed SPA leader G. P. Koirala as the Prime Minister. In so doing, the King ended his 15-month long control of all executive powers in Nepal. The revived parliament, in turn, stripped the King off all his powers, and brought the hitherto Royal Nepal Army (now renamed simply the Nepal Army) under the command of parliament. The new government conceded to Maoist demands for elections for the constituent assembly to draft the new constitution, removed the “terrorist tag” and “red-corner” notices issued against them by the previous government, and invited the CPN-M to come forward for dialogue.

Virtually overnight, the nature of conflict changed. From a triangular struggle among the CPN-M, the political parties, and the monarchy, it suddenly became a two-way debate, with the SPA (Government of the day) and the Maoists already negotiating the terms and rules under which they would conduct their dialogue. The doubts and fears concerning the Maoists’ real commitment to the peace process, however, have not fully receded. In response to the new situation, the Maoists (perhaps sensing popular misgivings) held in June 2006 their first-ever public demonstration in Kathmandu pledging their commit to the peace process. The CPN-M’s top leaders, Prachanda and Baburam Bhattarai, have also returned to Nepal from India, where they had spent much of the ten years since the insurgency began. Most important, a government/Maoists commission, with three members from each side, has drafted a 25-point code of conduct to guide them in the upcoming dialogue process to end the decade-long conflict.

INTERNATIONAL CONCERN

The two sides also agreed to secure a U.N. role in monitoring the ceasefire, demobilization process, and conduct of the constituent assembly. The U. N., in turn, has

expressed a willingness to shoulder such responsibility if approached by both sides.⁹ But a U.N. or extra-regional role in a settlement of the conflict has always been something that its immediate neighbor India, a regional hegemon and emerging world power, does not welcome.

India seems to believe that while international involvement in the demobilization and conduct of constituent assembly is acceptable, broader international involvement in monitoring the ceasefire or conducting the peace dialogue could complicate the whole affair, perhaps in a way detrimental to India's regional interests. In fact, India's foreign office has conveyed to Nepal its confidence that the Nepalese are quite capable of monitoring their own peace process. Clearly, India believes that the Nepalese would be more sensitive to India's interests than would the U.N. or international monitors. India's rejection of Norwegian involvement in Sri Lanka is a stark reminder of its feeling concerning the prospect of foreign peacekeepers on the South Asian subcontinent. India's concern intensified after Norway came forward to lobby openly for the role of peace broker in Nepal.¹⁰

While understanding and sympathetic to India's concerns, the international community shares an understandable, if not totally justified concern, regarding the future of Nepal. During the King's 18-month period of absolute rule, the international community stopped all aid to his regime and established parameters for the pro-democracy movement, including peaceful resolution of the conflict and strict adherence to human rights by Maoists and the SPA. India stopped supplying lethal arms and ammunitions to the Royal Nepal Army (RNA) in February 2001 on the grounds that they might be used against the civilians and the pro-democracy forces. The U.S., U.K., and other countries that had been providing training and other support to the RNA followed suit, making restoration of democracy the pre-condition for resuming pre-coup levels of assistance. China, Nepal's northern neighbor, briefly supported the royal regime with supplies of arms, but withdrew once it became clear that the tide was going against the King.

India is under pressure from the pro-democracy alliance, especially its radical component, to shed its 'twin-pillar' theory that political parties and constitutional monarchy should work together in Nepal, and instead give the Maoists-SPA alliance a

9 (U. N. Asst. Secretary General K C Gautam's interview to BBC Nepali service on May 31)

10 (Eric Solheim, Chief Negotiator in Sri Lanka in an interview to Padma Rao, Der Spiegel, May, 2006).

chance to explore establishing a Democratic Republic. Siddhartha Vadharajan, Deputy Editor of *Hindu* opined, soon after interviewing Prachanda, that India's failure to shed the twin pillar theory would mean accepting a leading role for the U.S. in Nepal. He considered such a situation unacceptable, owing to India's greater stake in Nepal than other outside countries, and called instead for India to abandon the twin pillar concept and assert leadership in bringing the Nepalese parties together.

Other opinion makers in India have reacted as sharply to U.S. and other third country involvement in Nepal: "If Pakistan-based cross boarder terrorism violates Indian sovereignty, the same sovereignty is no less transgressed when despite the 1950 treaty with Nepal, Indian sensibilities are ignored by Mr. Powell's explicit offer of military aid to the Himalayan Kingdom."¹¹ Prachanda, in his recent interviews, has not suggested that the CPN-M would demand that Nepal abrogate its 1950 treaty with India, a point that they raised in their 40-point charter of demands ten years ago. This has raised suspicions that the Maoists are angling for Indian support which they now realize is necessary to sustain their future role in Nepalese politics.

With India playing a near decisive role in Nepalese affairs and remaining opposed to third party involvement in Nepal (as it did in Sri Lanka), and with the main Nepalese players continuing to show no ability or vision to sort out the conflict, the future of Nepal remains uncertain. And this uncertainty continues to have a direct negative impact on the country's economy, (especially on the all-important tourism industry), and on day-to-day security. Fears continue to be expressed that the Nepalese state might collapse altogether.

POSSIBLE WAYS OF TACKLING THE CHALLENGE OF PEACE

The Maoists' memorandum of understanding with the SPA, and their pledge to become a part of a competitive parliamentary political process is cause for hope, and as such must be explored and encouraged. But apprehensions remain that the current Maoist cooperative mood is a tactical ploy to consolidate their position without disarming. The U.S., among others, continues publicly to express such concerns. Within Nepal, the King is accused of failing to encourage the peace process when the Maoists unilaterally declared ceasefire a four-month ceasefire. In the aftermath of the King's removal from all

11 (TOI edit, 22 Jan 2002 response to Colin Powell's offer of military aid to Nepal to fight terrorism)

but ceremonial power, the political parties are running the show. Their ability to achieve their goals is now to be tested.

There has been an emerging consensus that the Maoist conflict cannot be solved militarily. Obviously, one preferable option would be to bring key players—from the ranks of government and the Maoists into a process of dialogue in the new, broad, democratic political context. As 'terrorism' continues to be an issue of global/regional concern, the challenge of clearly defining what constitutes terrorism may be another prerequisite. This also calls for uniform response from any country, especially the ones in Nepal's neighborhood, to react in a uniform and preferably unified manner against terrorism anywhere.

DOUBTS ON MAOIST SINCERITY FOR DIALOGUE

Why doubt Maoists since they entered into dialogue with the political parties so soon after the Royal regime fell? Because they not only have used the pretense of dialogue and ceasefire twice before (July 2001 to Nov 2001) and (Jan 2003 to Aug 2003) to consolidate their position, but also because they walked away from negotiations in the past in order to further their narrow interests, inflicting heavy damage to the unsuspecting government of the day, which for its part had entered into negotiations in good faith.

The Maoists' phenomenal increase in size and the number of territories under their control has made them more confident. They have continued to form "principal base" areas, "secondary" or guerrilla areas, and "propaganda" areas (cities) on the basis of their long-term strategy to establish a proletarian regime. The Maoists applied the theory of fusion in practice so that they can mould Nepal according to Chinese and Soviet models of revolution. Their three-phase strategy—Strategic Defense, Strategic Balance and Strategic Offence—is now, according to official CPN-M claims, in the final phase.¹² Why would the Maoists give up and concede to, at best, a shared power arrangement within a parliamentary democracy when they believe they are so close to their goal of total state power? The fear remains that the Maoists are cashing in on the popularity and larger legitimacy the mainstream political parties have acquired as a result of their successful and peaceful mass movement.

The SPA decision not to invite the Maoists as partners in their 19-day "peaceful movement on the ground" was based on the conviction that they would not share the

¹² Himalayan People's War :Nepali Maoists role edited by Michael Hutt

platform with the Maoists as long as the latter were in possession of arms. This principled stance was among the crucial factors behind the enhanced international respect for the SPA. Back home, the success of the peace movement also represents a rejection of the violent tactics that Maoists have unleashed in the country over the past decade. This is why Maoist leaders have started claiming a share in the success of the peace movement, asserting that their cadres acted as catalysts and mobilizers. The CPN-M also held a massive peaceful rally in the capital on 2 June 2006, ostensibly to express their sincere support to the peace initiative and as proof—tactical or sincere—that they would adhere to the peace dialogue. At the same time, they warned that “some countries”—a thinly veiled reference to the U.S.—were out to foil the peace process.¹³

The peace dialogue is ongoing, although obstacles remain: Demobilization continues to be a major source of anxiety. Will Maoists agree to disarm? According to a Nepal Army estimate, the Maoists still have around 6,500 to 7,000 armed guerrillas and around 10,000 to 12,000 trained militias. There is no official estimate of the number and types of arms under their possession, except for the weapons stolen from Government security agencies during the past ten years. Most of the Maoists’ arms have been procured clandestinely, largely across the porous border with India.

Given India's role in Sri Lanka, an important segment of Nepali officialdom believes that the Maoist problem cannot be treated solely as a homebred phenomenon. The presence of top Nepalese Maoist leaders in India and the latter's involvement in bringing the SPA and Maoists together in the 12-point understanding are cited as a few further examples of the need to bring India into the process. But India's declared commitment to the U.N. and the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) resolutions against terrorism does not give India, or any other country in the region, free-reign to use terrorism as an excuse to interfere in the internal affairs of its neighbors.

CONCLUSION

Nepal's Maoist problem clearly has its roots deep in socio-economic, ethnic, regional and religious disparity within Nepal. Ineffective state apparatus and the chronic ineffectiveness of successive governments may have contributed to the frustration of the Nepalese people and helped plant the seeds of insurgency. But the question arises: Why

13 (Maoists peace negotiator K B Mahara's speech)

did not such a violent movement erupt during the totalitarian regime of the King prior to 1990? On the contrary, the first signs of insurgency came when Maoists began targeting the embryonic democratic political system. As Samuel P Huntington says ...”perhaps the most important and obvious but also most neglected fact about successful great revolutions is that they do not occur against the democratic political system. Revolution requires political institutions which resist the expansion of participation.” The fact that India, a vibrant democracy has such insurgencies amply supports the point. Out of total 602 districts, at least 175 are affected by the Naxalites, an Indian Maoist movement according to Indian government reports to parliament. The state's failure to respond forcefully when the problem first emerged might be one reason for such a rapid growth. In case of Nepal, the failure to respond to the Maoist 40-point charter of demands when it was presented to the Government in November 1995 was perhaps a contributing , but certainly not the sole, factor for Maoists rapid growth and expansion. It would be a mistake to say that a positive response alone would have nipped the problem in the bud. Even once the problem spread and almost every part and populace of the country was affected by Maoist violence, it took more than nine years for key pro-democracy parties to come together and work out an understanding on how to deal with the Maoist problem. Agenda-based negotiation was the common agreement as suggested in the 12-point program. Secondly, the political parties and the successive governments never developed a clear understanding as to the proper use of military force. Instead, the state adopted a reactive policy, rarely pro-active one.

In the context of Nepal, even if Maoists honestly pursue the current peace process, violence has come to acquire legitimacy as an instrument of future politics. The current round of talks obviously needs to take into account the social, political, administrative and ethnic aspirations and demands of all sides. These, in addition to the challenge of restructuring the states, have thrust Nepal's territorial and emotional integrity into a period of high risk. Most of Nepal's roughly 59 ethnic groups are asserting the right to 'self-determination' in the restructuring of the constituent assembly. Many believe the adherence to “ethno-nationalism” is another Maoist ploy to keep the polity divided. Major suspicions hinge on three questions: Will the Maoists surrender their arms during or after negotiation to facilitate fair and intimidation-free election to the constituent assembly? Will they peacefully accept the outcome if elections go against them? And, will they accept shared responsibility with the state's agencies for the widespread violations of human rights that have taken place over the past ten years?

Even if the Maoist problem is solved, it is high time that Nepal exercise inclusive democracy, and give highest priority to poverty alleviation programs. But the people's potential willingness to pursue their political ambitions—individual or collective—through resort to arms needs to be an international concern. The success of any movement that abandons peaceful state-building in favor of force would undoubtedly have an impact far beyond the borders of the country concerned. In this regard, Nepal's Maoist movement remains a threat and an object lesson to which the entire world must pay keen attention.

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PART III

HOW DO TERRORIST GROUPS DO BUSINESS AND SUSTAIN THEMSELVES??

OVERVIEW: HOW DO TERRORIST GROUPS DO BUSINESS AND SUSTAIN THEMSELVES?

SUMMARY OF DISCUSSIONS

The theme of Session III was the “business” of terrorism. In his introductory comments, Praveen Swami pointed out that the counterterrorism community is still in only the very early stages of understanding the organizational structures and management styles of terrorist organizations. There has been intense focus in recent years on identifying and shutting down the financial networks that support terrorist organizations, but as Swami points out, the amount of money involved in most terror operations is relatively trivial. Moreover, terrorist organizations have evolved in response to crackdowns on the financial systems and rerouted their financial operations underground or, more often, into legal and above board businesses. More broadly, Swami warns that we need to learn much more about the organizational structures and management styles of terrorist organizations well beyond the realm of finance, to include how they market and distribute their ideological “product,” disseminate “lessons learned,” plan operations, make and implement group decisions, and establish operational and ideological priorities.

Terrorist financing remains a central concern of the counterterrorism community, and the participants in this session agreed that it should be a high priority for future CATR research. One of the key challenges is to understand the terrorist “business model.” Most terrorist groups are not in the business of making money for its own sake. The links between requirements, assets, and operationalization—the terrorist balance sheet—remains largely a mystery. For this reason, their requirements are usually limited and the financial operations flexible and hard to trace. One major question, since the post 9/11 crackdowns on the use of the international financial system by terrorist groups, is how do they store their wealth? There are indications, for example, that recently outlawed religious extremist groups in Pakistan and Kashmir are pooling and hiding their resources by investing heavily in real estate. Are there other ways that groups cooperate in hiding money? And to what degree do they rely on legitimate “front” activities to store financial resources until they need them for operations?

How terrorist groups use diaspora communities is a question of particular importance in South Asia. Virtually every South Asian country has large expatriate communities living and working in the relatively more prosperous West. Again following the LTTE example, terrorist organizations are increasingly recognizing the ideological and financial potential that resides in those communities and are finding ways to exploit them. Some, like the LTTE, have developed sophisticated networks to reach out to and mobilize—and sometimes to extort—diaspora support. Others invest in legitimate businesses and real estate in expatriate enclaves abroad as a means to launder and store their wealth. NGOs and charitable organizations that tap into expatriate communities are another important source for building up terrorist coffers. For example, how do well meaning Pakistanis in the United Kingdom know that the money they donate to earthquake relief is not being sidetracked to support terrorist activities? Finally, terrorist and insurgent groups enlist or prey upon diaspora communities for extortion, drug trafficking and weapons smuggling operations.

Another important factor in enabling terrorists is the relationship between violent extremist and separatist groups and governments. Virtually every country in South Asia has, at one time or another, provided support or sanctuary to a terrorist or insurgent group from a neighboring state—a pattern that is not unheard of in Southeast Asia. In most cases, the aim is to keep a regional rival off balance. In others, it is a means of providing external outlets for domestic extremist sentiment. The complex and porous interstate frontiers in the region also facilitate fluid operations between countries, with or without government collusion. But government involvement with terrorist movements is not purely external. In Bangladesh, Nepal, and Pakistan, internal politics are fraught with examples of governments and political parties playing radical groups and sympathizers off against domestic political opposition in an effort to strengthen their parliamentary majorities or buy electoral support. As one participant remarked, South Asian states have to learn that if you raise pet tigers in your backyard, one day they will grow up and bite you.

The Papers

In “Terrorists under the Radar,” Jaime Burnell argues that the new, decentralized and networked structures of international terrorist organizations makes them more resistant to traditional counterterrorism approaches that focus on attrition of terrorist leaders. Terrorist groups have evolved, in response to counterterrorism and law

enforcement, into organizations with structures that look more like business franchises than they do like the terrorist groups of the past. These organizations also benefit from “lessons learned” exercises and from observing how law enforcement and legal processes respond to and prosecute terrorist actions. Burnell warns that terrorists have become particularly attentive to the loopholes and gaps in domestic and international counterterrorism legislation and the general lack of effective international cooperation in law enforcement and prosecution. For this reason, governments must work together to close the legal and intelligence-sharing gaps to reduce the operational space within which terrorists conduct their business. If the nations of the region can work together to keep the terrorists on the run, Burnell concludes, the latter will have to spend their energy on survival rather than on conducting and expanding their operations.

Abdul Azad opens his “Funding Terrorism: The Case of Bangladesh” with a warning that terrorist financing is a frustratingly diverse and moving target. There are a number of sources of and approaches to terrorist funding and, Azad warns, counter-terrorist efforts are not devoting enough attention to understanding the evolving financial models of terror groups. He sees terrorist groups moving increasingly toward informal mechanisms that will depend more heavily on cooperative detection and enforcement on an international level. South Asia presents a particular challenge because of its instability; porous borders; complex cross-border ethnic, religious, and ideological ties; and large diaspora communities that funnel money back into the region. According to Azad, Bangladesh is beginning to grapple with the challenge of tracing the roots of Islamist terrorism in the country and its connections to outside sources of support and financing. It is, he believes, still largely a domestic movement, which presents the government with the opportunity to nip terrorism in the bud by addressing the underlying political, social, and economic grievances that trigger it. This, in turn, will also require a serious commitment to regional cooperation among the nations of South Asia.

Vipula Wanigasekera warns that counterterrorism efforts must expand their scope to include the seemingly legitimate enterprises that terrorist organizations use to raise funds. In “Management of the Tamil Diaspora: The LTTE’s Primary Function Abroad,” he focuses on two important elements of fund raising —legitimate business enterprises and what he calls “diaspora management.” LTTE management of the Tamil diaspora is, according to Wanigasekera, much more comprehensive than simple fund-raising. It promotes Tamil culture abroad, helps expatriate Tamils get economically established in their new homes, and keeps them culturally and politically tied to the homeland. It also

uses the Tamil diaspora to lobby foreign governments on behalf of LTTE causes and build and run its network of legitimate businesses abroad, including restaurants, banks, and other small businesses. The LTTE also runs a sophisticated media enterprise that includes a satellite television network. The Tamil diaspora also constitutes a valuable recruiting base for the LTTE, which brings Tamil youth back to Sri Lanka for cultural education and paramilitary training. Wanigasekera urges the counterterrorism community to devote greater attention to the LTTE's program of diaspora management as a model that other terrorist and extremist groups are likely to copy in the future.

UNDER THE RADAR: TERRORIST GROUP SURVIVAL, PROFIT AND COUNTER MEASURES IN AVOIDANCE OF THE LAW: THROUGH EFFORT AND OUR FAILURE

Jaime Sarah Burnell

Justice may be blind, but she has very sophisticated listening devices.

—Edgar Argo

Counter terrorism operates on an insecure and unaccommodating platform. It must function within legal, ethical and moral confines to address illegal, unjust and aggressive acts. Counter-terrorism operatives are bound by structure, accountability and legitimacy while terrorists enjoy greater flexibility and freedom of action due to fewer operational constraints. Effective counter-terrorism activity within the framework of legal responsibility presents an enduring challenge to law enforcement, security services and the legal and justice systems that underpin their efforts. Counter-terrorism measures in democracies must evolve in a rational and collaborative manner; yet, while these protracted democratic processes play out, terrorists can adapt their capability in response and need not placate a broad support base. Such considerations will by definition burden government campaigns to prevent, prosecute and imprison terrorist operatives. Exploiting legal loopholes and tactical errors to evade arrest and prosecution, terrorist groups test the tension between requirements for secrecy and accountability in democratic states. While defending democratic rights and principles is an obligation for most governments fighting terrorism, the constraints the rule of law places on their freedom of action provides potentially valuable opportunities for terrorists.

Terrorism has conservative goals. Groups work within a classic framework, variable among specific functional groups, but showing some broad similarities, including: the use of high-profile violence to instill fear, inflict mass casualties, garner media attention and, ultimately, achieve political or religious goals. The conservatism of terrorist groups' social and political goals does not always extend to the means they are willing to employ to accomplish them. Even when terrorist aims are by and large fixed, the means by which to achieve them must employ flexibility and innovation. This is particularly the case in the cat and mouse game that is counter-terrorism.

Despite the understandably poor relationship between terrorists and counter-terrorist forces, a grudging mutual respect can emerge. Dixon (alias Kishore) a senior figure in the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) composed a congratulatory note to his pursuers, the Sri Lanka police and security services when they tracked him down to Coimbatore on July 29, 1991. He promptly committed suicide.¹ The mutual appreciation that may engender such perverse expressions of esteem is of the complexity of their respective goals. This further underscores the constant initiative required on both sides to meet the challenge of responding to the other's innovation and strategic maneuvering. Such innovation manifests itself not just in the technical sphere but also in organizational approaches: terrorist recruitment and operational practices and direct responses to counter-terrorism measures. Terrorist groups have, for example, had to develop counter-interrogation procedures. The sustaining principles of both sides remain unchanged: one side attacks, the other side strives to stop it. Constant evolution must occur on both sides: innovation and advancement is met with counter-measures. This paper will discuss the methods by which terrorist organizations develop counter actions in both the operational space, the intelligence realm, and other areas. These "other areas" include knowledge of the judicial systems, law, and the tactics government agencies use to pursue and neutralize them. In order to avoid capture or defeat, terrorist groups must become knowledgeable about these more institutional dimensions of their environments. This paper also examines the extent to which pro-active decision making by government and law enforcement can reduce the capability of terrorist groups to engineer such changes as well as minimize the degree to which states unconsciously assist terrorists through insubstantial responses and the failure to provide appropriate and effective legal mechanisms for countering terrorism.

KNOW YOUR ENEMY

If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.

—Sun Tzu

1 Frontline Magazine- India Vol. 15 :: No. 03 :: Feb. 7 - 20, 1998 p2

Solid intelligence capability is the bedrock of any counter-terrorism operation. High quality intelligence and the proactive development of plausible scenarios based on it provide the momentum that can enable physical and psychological counter terrorism operations to detect and prevent terrorist attacks. In this regard, though there remains debate over the relative importance of kinetic responses and preemption, not to mention over the proper operational definition of “terrorism,” no one questions the importance of quality intelligence.

Terrorists certainly understand that observing and understanding their enemy is of similar importance. The result is the ability to exploit physical vulnerabilities and organizational impediments of states, which in turn enables terrorist groups to utilize their operational space and capabilities to maximum effect and to operate clandestinely with an awareness of the counter-measures in place to interdict them.

In their effort to understand the enemy and its approaches, numerous opportunities for exploitation exist for terrorists in the democratic world. These fall into three general functional areas. First is the recognition and manipulation of jurisdictional grey areas: for example, the misapplication of legal provisions by law enforcement and other agencies; gaps in functional responsibility or coordination on legal matters; and the failure to implement stronger provisions in areas perceived as moral rather than legal issues. In regard to the last, such provisions are often drafted with the best intentions but fail due to inadequate “teeth” for implementation. Second, is the practical knowledge secured and accumulated through legal or illegal means that benefits the long term profitability of the group. This might include monitoring trial proceedings, information obtained through the normal functioning of the free and open media, and the publication or disclosure of state-sponsored reports (classified or unclassified) into operational vulnerabilities or infrastructure concerns. Finally, terrorist “education in the physical space”: the lessons learned from operational encounters, failures and successes that are then incorporated into the long-term development of the group and its capabilities.

A law is valuable not because it is law, but because there is right in it.

—H.W. Beecher

The notion that strong anti-terrorism legislation is indispensable to the counter terrorist arsenal is not without controversy. The acts committed by terrorist groups are often distinguishable from traditional criminal activity only in terms of their strategic aims. These may comprise murder, destruction of property, conspiracy, and the violent

manipulation of political or religious discontents—all of which have parallels in more traditional criminal enterprises. Arguably, the legal mechanisms for imposing justice in the aftermath of a terrorist act are, some argue, already well-established with solid historical precedent under existing statutes. Al Qaeda and its associated groups are widely perceived and portrayed as a significant qualitative departure from the historical threats posed by more traditional secessionist, nationalist, or politico-religious groups. Consequently, advocates of stronger anti-terrorism statutes argue that the means by which groups like the Irish Republican Army (IRA) were countered in the 1970s and 1980s will be insufficient in the context of Islamist extremism in the 21st Century. However their modus operandi often corresponds to those employed by their predecessors. As such, aggressive legislative steps to protect maritime and aviation assets, to criminalize support for terrorist activity, and the acquisition of equipment and supplies to be used in counter terrorist attacks have only been partially addressed.

Attempts to establish or strengthen counter-terrorism legislation and the toughening of existing penal codes remains controversial in many Asian states. It is worth surveying the current status of increasing attempts to focus on separate and targeted counter-terrorism legislation, including the extent to which it has, in some cases, become a politically bankrupt enterprise. It must be remembered that terrorist groups exploit the gaps in criminal law as they undertake their novel methods for achieving political and religious aims.

United Nations Resolution 1373 remains extraordinary in both its scope and ambition. This counter-terrorism measure was adopted on September 28, 2001 as a direct institutional response to the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States. Its aims are to “oblige all States to criminalize assistance for terrorist activities, deny financial support and safe haven to terrorists and share information about groups planning terrorist attacks”²

The resolution was adopted under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, and is therefore binding on all UN member states. It is notable that little debate took place in the United Nations, and the aims of 1373 were applauded by all member states. If the Resolution aimed to set forth a set of guidelines for revitalizing international cooperation, legal efforts, and international judicial assistance in pursuit of international terrorism,

2 The Counter Terrorism Committee <http://www.un.org/sc/ctc/>

these goals were, at least in part, realized. The extent of candid communication to the central body the Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC) is virtually unprecedented. The intent of the resolution was that this oversight mechanism act as the functional arm for facilitating the resolution's aims. The objective of the CTC—to collate initial reports on the status of legal provisions undertaken in individual countries—was swiftly achieved. The extent to which the information has been absorbed and implemented, however, is debatable. Though the intent was serious, implementation of 1373's guidelines has been thwarted by rhetorical foot-dragging and institutional inaction. The resulting gridlock in legislative and judicial reform has prevented the arrest and interdiction of numerous terrorist suspects. In the broader dimension, the comprehensive reports to the Counter Terrorism Committee highlight both the impoverishment of responses and the desperate need for transnational innovation and cooperation.

The findings and stage one reports to the CTC highlight, in particular, a number of fundamental flaws in existing counter-terrorism architectures, all of which create valuable operational opportunities for terrorist groups:

- Though the United Nations has provided a expansive system of umbrella structures, directives and conventions for legislation addressing terrorist acts, they remain too broad to overcome the internal social and political dynamics of individual states.
- UN Resolution 1373, which was intentionally couched in a non-confrontational, generalized and non-judgmental style, succeeded in its aim of garnering broad support for its goals without triggering political sensitivities. On the functional level, however, it left too great an 'interpretative capacity' through which states could meet their domestic political requirements by ignoring what did not suit them. States were able to make cosmetic modifications to its provisions and still appear to have complied with 1373's mandate.
- The CTC has no coercive or punitive authority; if a state fails or chooses not to meet 1373's requirements it is likely to meet with only 'moral displeasure'—certainly not with sanctions of any kind.

Traditionally, security and law enforcement legislation and operations have been conducted largely in a domestic context. But, as transnational crime has emerged, the efficacy of isolated domestic responses has deteriorated dramatically. Yet, despite the

emergence of such transnational threats, which by definition necessitate broad, cooperative, multi- state responses, international integration remains anathema to many states. Cooperation is episodic, at best, and superficial or solely bilateral. This inhibits true regional and global cooperation in understanding and responding to the threat of international terrorism. Even where cooperation occurs, it can be impeded by a lack of follow-through or jurisdictional authority across sovereign boundaries. For example, the intelligence and law enforcement agencies of two states may cooperate on an investigation, but in the prosecutorial phase, those same states may lack the capacity to compel one another to assist in preparing and presenting cases in court.

In the legislative realm, two issues influence the success of any counter terrorism movement:

1. The existence and successful enforcement of an anti-terrorism law that specifically prohibits and criminalizes individual participation in terrorism. Those who object to using penal or criminal codes as a counter-terrorism tool should realize that these provide a reasonable and effective basis through which to respond to acts of terrorism.
2. Legislative responses should, however, be placed in the context of an evolving and constantly shifting threat and build in flexibility to respond to a range of possible scenarios. An illustration of the subtle differences in requirements for addressing the distinction between criminal and terrorist acts comes from the Philippines. Between 2001 and 2005, the Philippine government arrested five individuals —some from training camp arrests in Pangasinan —who were subsequently tried on the charge of commission of acts contrary to the state penal code. Their offences varied, but all were eventually released on bail on the grounds that their crimes were bailable under state law. Of those suspect who subsequently failed to return to face trial, two committed terrorist acts and another played a key role in the planning stages of a third, unrealized, attack:
 - Akmad Santos, captured in 2002, plotted the foiled bombing in Malate. He was charged with illegal possession of explosives but later released on bail. Santos was re-captured in 2005 on a variety of criminal charges.
 - Angelo Trinidad, captured in 2002 for illegal possession of explosives, was released on bail; he later perpetrated the 2005 Valentines Day bombing.

- Redento Cain Dellosa, captured in 2002 for illegal possession of explosives, was released on bail and subsequently took part in the 2002 Superferry 14 bombing.
- Mario Barrientos ,captured in 2004 for illegal possession of explosives, later planned the foiled Malate bombing plot of 2002.
- Tyron Santos, captured in mid 2005 for illegal possession of explosives, was released on bail a month after his capture.

Of course, this is not meant to imply that criminal law is obsolete and has no value in the modern world. What it does do, however, is make clear is that criminal law in specific states may be inadequate to deal with individual instances of what is a new, emerging criminal threat. The burden of proof for incarceration and criminal trial is high, requiring standards of evidence and legal procedures often neither familiar nor well-suited to the investigative activity of security services. By definition the evidence on the possible performance of terrorist acts will be gathered through surreptitious means. In many cases, the value of counter-terrorist intelligence is limited because, under existing criminal statutes, it cannot be presented at trial. For example, the prosecution of Abdul Rehman Geelani for his alleged connection to the militants who launched the 13 December 2001 suicide attack on the Indian Parliament building was seriously undermined when telephone evidence was deemed inadmissible.

The scope and time frame of potential harm in a terrorist case is often more urgent than that of regular crime and the investigative scope is completely different. Criminal investigations generally do not commence until an actual crime or pattern of criminal activity has occurred. Counter-terrorism investigations, in contrast, are by their nature proactive and preventive. The methodological differences between the two investigative styles are fundamental. Security services may be obliged to react long before a terrorist act is committed which reduces the amount of evidence collected. Beyond the prosecutorial predicaments created by the potential inadmissibility of evidence collected in counter terrorist investigations, prosecution is further complicated by the fact that physical presentation of evidence in a courtroom can compromise intelligence assets, leave individual human intelligence resources dangerously expose, and undermine further investigations.

To mitigate the effects of inadequate counter-terrorism methods and regulatory gaps, some states are compelled to function reactively. While tempting, the establishment

of procedures and statutes in response to specific incidents is highly risky to the conclusion of a successful prosecution. In Indonesia, Law No 16 authorized police, prosecutors and judges to use Indonesia's Anti-terrorism Law (Interim Law No 1 of 2002/ Law No 1 /2003) retroactively to pursue the Bali bombers, even though the Anti-terrorism Law did not exist at the time the bombings took place. This strategy was rejected as a violation of the traditional principal against retroactive application of a law in a criminal (in this case, a terrorist) trial. In most constitutional systems, laws cannot be enacted retroactively to punish an act that was not illegal at the time it was committed, however heinous the act might be.

Such loopholes undermine both the ability of states to respond to terrorist activity and the credibility of their claim to demonstrate strong political will on terrorism. This approach also traps states in a reactive mode: they act swiftly to placate public outrage but fail to address the underlying and entrenched issues which created the environment in which such acts might occur. If a state is construed as inept and unable to be proactive, it may be perceived as a favorable operational environment for future terrorist attacks. On the international level, domestic investigation and response is often not synchronized with international effort, because a state fails to understand that cooperative international approaches can mitigate the effects of terrorism even on their home soil. In theory the international legal system is overlaid with the notion of *aut dedere aut judicare*, according to which states are bound to ensure, either through prosecution or through extradition, that individuals within their national territory who are known to have committed crimes against the broader interests of the international community are brought to justice. However this may be subject to caveats when the pursuit of international justice conflicts with local laws, customs, or norms.

For example, a state may choose not to extradite a suspect who has committed an act of dual criminality —that is, a crime that involved illegal activity in two or more jurisdictions. So too, political reservations often come into play when a crime is of a ‘political’ nature and extradition would amount to a violation of an individual’s right to free speech. Such reservations can undermine the effectiveness of existing extradition agreements or, worse, give sanctuary to suspects who traverse borders into more legally favorable areas. Measures designed to mitigate such concerns, including the European Arrest Warrant, have been designed to facilitate cooperation on extradition but have met with resistance. A German court refused to extradite an al Qaeda under a European Arrest Warrant on the grounds that to do so would violate his human rights as assured by

German constitution. Such legal complications are exacerbated by the ongoing failure to arrive at an internationally agree-upon definition of terrorism. Ultimately only a mix of policy responses at the individual state and regional levels can close the gaps in legal authority; provincialism undermines effective counter-terrorism. To resolve such legislative issues in order to seal the gaps in arrest and prosecution may be challenging, but it is an indispensable end goal.

Learning is not compulsory... neither is survival

—W. Edwards Deming

Acquisition of knowledge to enhance the ability of a terrorist group to act clandestinely and achieve maximum effect in pursuit of its political and strategic goals is not a modern phenomenon, but it is a goal shared as well by more mundane criminals. Failure of particular enterprises can be instructive to terrorists as well as counter-terrorist forces since disruption of attacks exposes both deficiencies and areas of opportunity. Groups such as the LTTE and the IRA introduced rigorous after-action reviews in order to gather and process functional knowledge.³ With such a process in place, a single operational setback need not constitute a catastrophic failure but merely a tactical impasse to be overcome. Without such sustained education beyond narrow operational training, groups may be incapable of sustaining themselves after one or two operational failures. Such disruptions can bring the downfall of a group or instigate a long strategic or tactical pause as the group shifts into survival mode, unable to pursue its ambition to attack or coerce governments through physical pressure. All groups will experience strategic and operational disruption at some point, as governments succeed in minimizing the threat or pressuring personnel—most realize that these pauses are only temporary. In fact, such respites may be exploited to regroup, take stock of the current situation, and adapt tactics and approaches in response to government counter-terrorism measures. Fundamentally, in the capability- intention- opportunity matrix terrorist groups seek to maintain cohesive capabilities and intentions through internal control and discipline in order to survive and learn from systemic pressures beyond their control.

Two additional sources of operational learning are of importance to terrorist groups. First, terrorist groups can exploit the open press found in democracies through media reports on state policy and counter measures. Second, tacit or absorbed forms of

3 Aptitude for Destruction : Organizational Learning in Terrorist Groups and its implications for Combating Terrorism : Rand Report Volume 1 2005 p43

group education comprise information which enters the public domain as a result of the prosecution and trials of terrorism suspects. These can provide valuable operational knowledge as well as insight into counter-terrorism capabilities and methods.⁴ Furthermore, there is concern that terrorist suspects and their legal representatives may learn from the technicalities that previous suspects successfully employed to evade prosecution and encourage their legal representation to pursue a similar strategy.

Terrorist groups are known to exploit the processes by which western courts function. For example, lengthy appeals on the basis of improper extradition and other minor legal infringements by law enforcement were made in the Lockerbie trial. These included:

- Challenges to the legality of extradition of the two Libyan suspects
- Charges that the suspects could not get a fair trial
- Questions concerning probable cause to arrest the suspect

While they did not, in the end, block prosecution, they did result in drawn out procedural interruptions and complicated the trial. Moreover, these delaying tactics put the trial in serious jeopardy since Scottish law sets strict parameters, requiring that trials begin within 110 days following the issuance of formal charges⁵. Since most states have “speedy trial” provisions in their legal codes, such prevarication can be viewed as an attempt to “game” the system, raising the costs to and creating constitutional logjams in the legal system. Certainly terrorist groups are learning from past indictments and testimony, honing their legal strategies and avoiding repetition of past errors. The careful monitoring of trials also provides an understanding of the techniques employed by law

4 While the experience of crucial information being compromised through trial monitoring is not without precedent, it is generally the exception to the rule. For one thing, the traditional blanket of secrecy that surrounds the security services on an operational level is often continued in the justice system on the grounds that terrorist groups can glean significant knowledge from information communicated. Moreover, a New York Law School study in 2005 established that the United States Government is well practiced in the protection of secret evidence during terrorism and espionage trials. (see The Secrecy Problem in Terrorism Trials- Liberty and National Security Project 2005: Turner, Serrin and Schulhofer, Stephen www.brennancenter.org) The study identified the Classified Information Procedures Act as one mechanism by which evidence might be evaluated by a judge to determine its acceptability for release in open court proceedings. Should it be deemed too risky, then the judge may exclude the evidence or devise an appropriate method for it to be presented in court, depending on the sensitivity of the information. There are, of course, still concerns about operational and classified law enforcement and intelligence information being compromised by public release during a trial.

5 Flight to Disaster: BBC News Website 21 April 200: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/721674.stm>

enforcement and prosecution lawyers in handling witnesses. The policy of the IRA, for instance, was to plead no contest or not guilty in order to force the government to reveal vital information from the prosecution concerning its counter-terrorism methodology, modus operandi, and the identity of informers and infiltrators. During the incarceration of the leaders of the West German Baader-Meinhof Group (aka the Red Army Faction) in the 1970s, the left-wing terrorist group devised an innovative information network: Using aliases for each faction member on trial, the four prisoners were able to communicate by circulating letters with the help of their defense counsels.

Terrorist groups also draw on the climate of suspicion directed toward law enforcement in many societies as well as on the increased focus on protecting the civil rights of suspects rather than those of victims of crime. Exploiting these tensions, some terrorist groups can, through subtle maneuvering, turn the system against itself and place their rights above those of their alleged victims. In Northern Ireland, hunger strikes and protracted “dirty” protests were designed to undermine state legitimacy and earn political prisoner status for IRA inmates. Such tactics were somewhat successful in changing the agenda and scope of the British government’s prosecutions, in some cases forcing it to grant limited political status to the individuals. Terror suspects also attempt to undermine their trials by claiming that evidence against them was illegally obtained through force or coercion and was, therefore, tainted. An Al-Qaeda manual captured in the UK clearly states that any “brother” who is captured should claim in open court that torture had been employed in his interrogation. Relatives of individuals on trial have been known to make similar claims, thus providing corroborating evidence. In addition, terrorist suspects have been known to challenge state’s evidence by charging racial or religious profiling. Terrorist groups will continue to exploit the strong Western human rights culture in order to skew legal proceedings by raising questions concerning the legality of initial arrests or the legitimacy of legal processes. Efforts to shift attention to civil liberties and away from the state’s obligation to protect its citizens through all reasonable means transfers attention away from the suspect and towards the state.

This same sort of manipulation is at work within the immigration systems of some countries. If a suspect faces deportation, he or she will claim that their human rights would be violated if sent back to their home country as that home country practices torture. Often (for example, when sensitive intelligence cannot be presented as evidence in open court), a host nation will have sufficient evidence to deport a suspect but not enough to criminally convict the same person in a court of law. Again, terror suspects can

exploit this weakness in the legal system and put themselves into legal limbo —often able to stay in their new host country while simultaneously avoiding prosecution.

PROACTIVE LEARNING

What one man can invent, another can discover.

—Sherlock Holmes

Proactive learning in the context of terrorism refers to the constant and unrelenting goal of remaining ahead of the learning curve, whether in perpetrating violence, countering it, or thwarting attempts to counter it. This effort on the part of terrorists and counter-terrorist forces alike is driven by rising innovation and intensifying operational pace. It may also be undertaken by law enforcement in the attempt to improve projections and forecasting to prevent future attacks or disrupt terrorist operations underway. Terrorist groups are thoroughly aware that their activities are under constant scrutiny and that they must create a security environment for themselves that not only ensures their survival but also facilitates operational success. Security services establish a set of critical infrastructure targets and potential scenarios and overlay them with the potential threat from particular groups; terrorist groups, in turn, assess those assessment in search of potential vulnerabilities and loopholes.

Proactive learning and situational awareness also serves groups' need to maintain operational secrecy in order to survive and carry out effective attacks. IRA commander Tom Barry stressed that one core objective of that group was simply to maintain existence.⁶ To truly flourish, however, groups must constantly upgrade their ability to engage in successful attacks. Any movement is founded on a bedrock of core support and sympathizer/empathizer sponsorship; but to grow, terrorist groups must carry out high-profile, high-payoff attacks to keep themselves in the public eye, reaffirm their role and capabilities, demonstrate their operational prowess, justify their existence, and maintain legitimacy by affirming the aspirations of their core support base.

ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGY

The 'deck of cards' approach to counter terrorism (removing key leader based on their significance) is one of the kinetic responses to Al Qaeda and its associated groups.

⁶ Tom Barry quoted in Smith M. J. R. - Fighting for Ireland The Military Strategy of the Irish Republican Movement: London: Routledge Press 1995 p36

Leadership attrition can degrade the ability of a group to maintain experience, institutional memory, expertise and continuity. In order to shelter that expertise, terrorist groups maintain strict operational secrecy and compartmentalization to ensure that individual members do not possess sufficient operational knowledge to undermine or thwart an attack should they be detained and successfully interrogated.⁷

Compartmentalization is the emerging dominant means that terrorist groups employ to secure operational secrecy. In states with a fairly consolidated and effective security apparatus, strict compartmentalization is required to maintain secrecy. The IRA, with its traditionally hierarchical structure of military units mirroring that of a conventional army, suffered constant infiltration. A 1977 IRA 'Staff Report' expressed concerns that attrition was eroding the quality of the group to a precarious level. In the IRA, secrecy was reestablished through dissolution of the battalion system and adoption of a cellular structure.⁸ The Basque Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) similarly enhanced its operational secrecy along a similar model: *talde* ("groups"), were organized within specific geographical zones, synchronized by the *cúpula militar* ("military cupola"), and each conducted operations only within its assigned zone. Pakistan's Lashkar-e- Jhangvi is also structured into small cells of approximately five to eight cadres each, who operate without functional knowledge of other operations in order to reduce infiltration. Such a pattern is repeated worldwide because it has proven to be successful. Al Qaeda is clearly the epitome of an informal, loosely structured and networked organization that has evolved through a changing operational environment. Bin Laden acknowledges that the group is both an expression of and coordinated response to globalization. In general, networking improves counter-intelligence and exploitation of experience within a terrorist group and, therefore, enhances its ability to carry out uninterrupted operations.

Furthermore, without the clearly defined command and control structures, terrorist groups and cells can act on their own initiative without the need to communicate with superiors. Such groups, however, experience significant pressure in maintaining a balance between operational secrecy and effectiveness. And, as the base of expertise grows, coordination may suffer; more experienced operatives may make building an

7 Networked terrorist organizations can best be tackled by similarly structured security services. Democratic process and hierarchical accountability, however, inhibit the ability of security forces mirror such structures. While terrorist groups can reform and metastasize with great flexibility, security services are bound by legal limitations that often prevent them from reaching maximum operational effectiveness.

8 Coogan, Pat- The IRA: A History: London, Roberts Rinehart 1994 p353

agenda based upon “unity of action” more difficult⁹ When those who feel their expertise is not being honored form renegade factions, the political message of the group is diluted and the enforcement of ideological unity becomes problematic. To compensate for the “loss of central command,” Islamist terrorists in particular draw strongly on doctrinal and ideological conformity.¹⁰ When ideological doctrine replaces explicit regional demands—such as those that drive secessionist movements—security services are often forced to outsource operations and rely more heavily on transnational contacts and cooperation, which is by its nature less directly under their control.

Overall, organizational compartmentalization reduces the risk presented to terrorist attacks by the so-called ‘ticking bomb scenario’: the arrest and interrogation of one suspect that not only suspends an operation but also reveals the organizational, operational, and support structures of the group. Compartmentalized structures are resistant to infiltration as no single individual—including senior leadership—has sufficient information to bring the group down.

OPERATIONAL STRATAGEM

A hard disk recovered from Jamat-i-Islami (JI) detainee Mohamed Khalim bin Jaffar in Singapore in December 2001 contained a file entitled “Security of an Organisation” that presented a detailed explanation of why operational secrecy in terrorist groups is indispensable. According to this document, organizational errors can lead to infiltration, which can in turn deplete the high esteem held for a group among its core support base and, more broadly, its sympathizers. To remain beneath the threshold of official attention, terrorists must identify the methods by which their predecessors had been detained in the past and circumvent such measures in planning their future missions.

Central consideration in the catch/evade cycle is the role of profiling. While profiles and similar indicators may provide a set of theoretical guidelines for thwarting attacks, they are often arbitrary and self-perpetuating. If adolescent men are characteristically challenged by law enforcement, for example, innovation suggests that operatives from a different demographic should be employed. Since some states are coherent but predictable in their counter-terrorism strategy, groups may seek approaches

9 Jackson, B.A- Groups, Networks or Movements: Al Qaeda- Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 29:241-262: 2006 p248

10 Acharya, Arabinda and Desker, Barry: Countering the Global Islamist Terrorist Threat- The Korean Journal Of Defense Analysis Quarterly Journal Vol. XVII, No. 1 Spring 2006 p65

that predictably evade it. On the other hand, where states adapt and build “randomness into the application of counterterrorism strategies,” terrorist groups will be more creative in the quest for strategic surprise, for example, by using women or older operatives, who fall outside of the traditional ‘profile’. ¹¹ Groups may be able to capitalize on inert and outdated profiling. Al Qaeda members Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Ramzi Yousef traveled to the Philippines in 1994 by means which obscured their plans: planting condoms and western literature in their luggage to back up their claim to be entering the country to meet girls. Mohammad Radwan Obeid, a Jordanian by birth, married an American and converted to the Jehovah’s Witnesses all to build a cover for his terrorist activities.

All such activities to secure secrecy or a low profile are crucial strategic concerns for the group since only the minority will persist with plans if infiltration is suspected. Ex-FBI agent Michael German suggests that “[i]n almost every case, the one thing that stopped the terrorists from following through on their plans was the fear they had been compromised by an infiltrator”¹²

Ingenuity and highly sophisticated innovation will also occur alongside a return to purity and simplicity. While groups recognize the necessity for clear yet restricted communication, geographical reality often prevents them from direct human contact. Geographically specific groups are best able to converse on simple terms, through individual exchanges to transfer information or cash couriers to finance their operations. This illustrates a negligible paper trail or clear lineage in cell structure should penetration take place. South East Asian groups, for example, have sought a return to minimalism, returning to personal contacts rather than traceable cell phone communications. Rudimentary tactics are projected as a turn away from technological innovation and to confuse law enforcement since their effort are consistently focused on the highly technical and pioneering. Although the 9/11 investigations initially indicated the use high-end tactical and innovative coded communications, satellite phones and encryption software among the conspirators, in reality human to human contact through the

11 Aptitude for Destruction : Organizational Learning in Terrorist Groups and its implications for Combating Terrorism : Rand Report Volume 1 2005

12 German, Michael- Squaring the Error in Law Vs War Competing Approaches to fighting terrorism July 2005 <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB613.pdf>

promotion of strong interpersonal relationships proved to be the principal means of communication.

Counter interrogation techniques taught by terrorist groups have also deviated little from a well trodden path. In this case, terrorist groups seem inclined to overstate the extent to which violence and harm will be incorporated into law enforcement procedures. In stressing torture, threats and extensive physical harm to family, they may anticipate that suspects will consider themselves so fortunate when these activities do not occur that they may be empowered to not cooperate with counter terrorist organizations.

Robert McCartney murdered by Sinn Fein's military wing in 2003 was subject to clearly obstructive operational methods by which to hinder the police. A dedicated clean up squad, sensitive to the forensic footprints drawn upon at crime scenes, removed durable evidence. Prior to oversight in insurgent attacks in Iraq where targeting power was erratic and the size of explosives often led to discovery, insurgents developed methods to detect the exact weight of American military vehicles due to width and weight of chassis before explosion would occur.¹³ What may be judged from such examples are two insights. Firstly, that survival and profitability are ensured by remaining below the radar of law enforcement. This may be achieved through functional learning and active experience. Therefore, the debrief of released detainees, the monitoring of legal proceedings and experience gained through attacks can be absorbed and not repeated. Secondly, that the democratic procedures of states provide opportunity to exploit public sentiment in order to reduce sentencing or demoralize the counter terrorism effort so that prosecution is deemed ineffectual or cost ineffective. The tension between secrecy and remaining within the parameters of human rights and legitimacy is manipulated by groups who do not have an equal responsibility to an electorate or the rule of law. While established groups or self starting terrorist entities may cooperate on an ad hoc or needs based platform, states are subject to protracted agreements and reluctance to cooperate. A state may be forced towards lengthy permission applications to wiretap a subject while crucial information is lost. In this way many of the systems designed to interdict and prosecute are subject to huge underpinning caveats such as a lack of terrorism definition, the malfunction of agreements designed to plug gaps, and lack of dedicated cooperation. Innovation and strategic experience cannot be unconditionally prevented. Practice and knowledge gained through attacks are

¹³ Discussion with military officer February 2006

problematic though not impossible to prevent. Conversely through lethargy and weakness in responses we are prevented from gaining the advantage and contributing to terrorists' ability to remain beneath the radar.

FUNDING TERRORISM : THE CASE OF BANGLADESH

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Operationally, terrorism is about moving money and obtaining and placing strategic assets. Without large amounts of untraceable money and local sources of equipment, terrorism could not exist. In this sense, terrorism has an eerie similarity to international drug dealing and other aspects of organized crime.¹

—Douglas Hayden and Howard Feldman

INTRODUCTION

In recent times, terror funding has evoked the scholarly interest of many in different parts of the globe. The September 11, 2001, episode has clearly demonstrated that without well-organized terrorist structures and the movement of funds through the global financial system, devastation of such magnitude could not have been possible. As a result, the fight against terrorist funding now constitutes an important component of the global war on terrorism. The interest in undertaking a study on terrorist funding is generated by certain factors. *First*, empirical evidence shows that the frequency and seriousness of terrorist acts are proportionate to the amount of financing terrorists get. *Second*, funding constitutes the essential ingredient for a survival of a terrorist organization and its success in organizing acts of terrorism. The other ingredients of terrorism—motivation, recruits and sanctuary—all hinge on funding. The importance of maintaining a steady flow of funds is twofold: it helps in the recruitment and contributes to maintaining morale and motivation through the planning and execution of successful acts of terrorism.² *Third*, terrorists transmit these funds across the globe through a wide variety of alternative funding systems that range from charities to run-of-the-mill criminal activity such as trafficking in drugs and illegal arms and ammunition. In the

1 Cited from the Article 'Funding Terrorism', adopted from a Newsletter of American Association of State Compensation Insurance Funds.

2 B. Raman, 'Money Continues to Flow Into Terrorist Funds', Paper No. 540, *South Asia Analysis Group*, 31 October 2002.

process, "white money" becomes "black" and illegal, and a shadowy underground business grows up, fed by such money. Three very particular characteristics of this business model appear especially ominous at the moment:

- It is being undertaken by untraceable, dispersed networks or loose associations of individuals and groups without any centralized hierarchical organization that are, in most cases, able to operate with impunity.
- Since terrorism is well-funded from many sources, the organizations involved in it are well placed to sell their capabilities for violence. In other words, violence is now itself a business or a service that can be bought and sold.³
- Resilient funding allows terrorist organizations to reserve spare capacity for other business ventures, such as weapons smuggling, drug trafficking, and dealing in other high-value markets for commodities like diamonds and semi-precious stones. All such activities have serious negative security and economic implications for a number of countries, and lead to the result that efforts to stem the flow of money supporting terrorism is becoming increasingly difficult.

The very phrase 'terror funding' reflects the reality that terrorism has become an economic phenomenon. Countering it requires understanding the methods by which organizations and groups fund terrorist operations of various kinds and guarantee their sustainability. While there is very little study in the field, it is becoming clear that a variety of means—e.g., state sponsorship, money laundering, hawala, charitable and humanitarian organizations, diaspora networks, trafficking in drugs and small arms, smuggling, extortion, thefts, and armed robbery—are now commonly employed by a number of organizations to fund their terrorist activities. Against that background, this paper examines the various agencies, organizations and institutions that animate terrorism in Bangladesh through both financial and moral support.

To begin, it should be mentioned that the type of terrorism currently plaguing Bangladesh is mainly 'Islamic terrorism'. As a new phenomenon in the country's polity, it differs from earlier forms of terrorism in its nature, causes and consequences, and hence its funding sources. While ultra-leftist and separatist elements unleashed earlier terrorist attacks in Bangladesh with funding from well-identified internal and external

3 W A Tupman, 'The Business of Terrorism', Paper submitted for publication by the Center for Strategic and Global Studies, Moscow.

sources, the current Islamic terrorist groups are reportedly funded by myriad and often shadowy sources ranging from government, internal private groups and NGOs to various international agencies and countries. Indeed, the variety of such sources of terrorist funding in Bangladesh has blurred the exact nature of the funding itself. As a result, scholars, analysts, and observers must study the phenomenon carefully in order not to be swayed by vagueness, bias, and prejudice. This paper, endeavors to deal with a subject that is still in its embryonic form, and one that is likely provide ample scope for additional research and insights.

In addition, it is relevant to any study of terrorist funding in Bangladesh to juxtapose it against the overall pattern of terrorist funding in South Asia. Needless to say, South Asia has recently experienced a variety of terrorist activities, for example, recurring ethno-religious problems in India (Jammu and Kashmir, Northeast), Maoist insurgency in Nepal, and the Tamil ethnic crisis in Sri Lanka, each with its own set of security implications for the region and sources of funding. The region's proximity to Afghanistan, the hideout of the Taliban and elements of al-Qaeda, also must be examined in relation to terrorist financing in the region. It is important to understand the degree to which terrorist funding in Bangladesh has linkages or connectivity with similar groups in other parts of the region.

With this viewpoint in mind, the paper is divided into three sections examining first the overall issue of funding terrorism in the contemporary world, then the question of the patterns of terrorism funding in South Asia, and finally the patterns of terrorism funding specific to Bangladesh.

METHODOLOGY

The methodology of this paper is to apply empirical and analytical approaches to understanding the issue of terror funding in Bangladesh. Research materials from books, journals, newspapers, electronic media and the publications of various international organizations constitute the author's principal sources.

SECTION I: FUNDING TERRORISM IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD

In the contemporary world, the sources of terror funding are so complex and varied in nature that even the concerted efforts of Western and other intelligence agencies in identifying, controlling, and monitoring them have met with little success. This is exemplified by the international community's failure to identify even Al Qaeda's sources

of supply and funding, despite the fact that it has received more global attention in this respect than any other terrorist group. The oft-cited assumption that Osama Bin Laden's \$30 million personal fortune served as the material sinew of his terrorist machination has long since been disproved. Facts clearly show that the needs and expenses of Al Qaeda are escalating and are met from sources that range from legal business transactions to various criminal activities.⁴ In a similar fashion, considerable mystery and intrigue cloaks the financing of other terrorist organizations that have received little or no attention with respect to their funding. What is known, however, is that the sources of funding for these organizations have grown more diversified in recent times, thanks in part to the increased flow of business and commerce, the growing dominance of the private sector over state-owned companies, and liberal banking regulations. The effects of all of these factors are facilitated by the current process of globalization and enhanced by the advantages offered by communication and information technologies. The result has been more flexibility and adaptability in the current financial structures of terrorist organizations. This situation led the then U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security, Tom Ridge, to remark with considerable frustration that "[w]e [in the counter-terrorism community] operate every day with the knowledge that our enemies are changing based on how we change."⁵

How can the sources of terrorist funding be identified? While some statements concerning such sources may be generalizable and relevant across many diverse terrorist organizations, the fact remains that in most cases determining 'who gets what and out of what' will remain very organization specific.. The reasons for this are manifold. *First*, not all terrorist organizations are similar in nature. Each has its own specific origin, nature, and objectives. For example, the more a terrorist group sees the need for violence to achieve its objectives, then the pace and intensity of its terrorist acts will likely increase along with its demands for funding. Each terrorist group also has its own specific funding requirements for maintaining infrastructure, purchasing arms and explosives, carrying on field operations and above(?) ground activities, undertaking activities of a humanitarian nature, indulging in bribery, and so forth. Given the fact that

4 Terror attacks and support operations are being funded by increasingly sophisticated criminal activities. The global shadowy economy of dirty money, crime and black markets in which terrorism is operating has annual revenues of over \$2 trillion, according to United Nations estimate. Cited in David Kaplan, Bay Fang and Soni Sangwan, 'Paying for Terror' in *US News and World Report*, Vol. 139, No. 21, December 5, 2005, pp. 40-54.

5 Cited in Robert Looney, 'The Mirage of Terrorist Financing : The Case of Islamic Charities', *Strategic Insights*, Volume V, Issue 3 (March 2006)

funding requirements vary so widely among terrorist groups, the sources from which they draw funds can also be expected to vary.

Second, temporal and spatial factors also determine the extent and sources for terrorist financing. If a particular terrorist group perceived the fulfillment of its objectives as spanning across wider time and space, then its search for funding sources might be more incessant, vigorous, and broad-ranging than would that of a group with narrowly circumscribed goals. More important, the location of a terrorist operation may give it additional opportunities for developing funding sources that are very region specific. For example, *Hawala*, one of the sources of terrorist funding is mostly found in the regions like the Middle East and South Asia. Also, the institution of *Zakat*, present mostly in the Muslim societies, may act as a further funding source for a number of terrorist groups.

Third, the involvement of particular actors in a terrorist movement can shape its both the nature and source of funding. For example, the involvement of high-profile or influential actors may attract more potential contributors from among the movement's more passive sympathizers. Resolute and concerted efforts by all the supporting elements can diversify sources of funding and keep the terrorist movement successfully afloat. When states become sponsors of terrorism, the funding benefits to terrorist group can be substantial, elaborate, and long-term in nature.⁶ *Finally*, access to modern media, and especially the Internet, helps terrorist groups in diversifying their sources of funding. The more the activities and successes of a terrorist group are publicized, the more credence it receives from those, especially in the criminal world, who are inclined to sympathize or support the group's agenda. The reflected "glory" of successful attacks can draw new blood, particularly youngsters, into such organizations.

Leaving behind the complexities inherent in the network of terror funding, it is relevant to highlight the exact sources from which such funds are drawn. The sources of terrorism in the contemporary world are varied in nature, ranging from state sponsorship to various financial transactions of a legal or illegal nature. Even the profits from such seemingly harmless actions as the purchase of counterfeit products from Internet sites

⁶ With state sponsorship, terrorist can enhance their capabilities and operational capacity. Terrorist groups received otherwise unobtainable luxuries from member states such as diplomatic pouches for transport of weapons and explosives, and false identification in forms of genuine passports. They can also receive greater training opportunities through state funding. 'Terrorist Funding from State Actors', available on-line http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/resolution_2002-02-25.html, date accessed 25 February 06.

and street markets can contribute to funding terrorist organizations. The most important current sources of terrorist funding are:

- State sponsorship: Sponsorship of terrorism by member states is especially troubling. With state sponsorship, terrorists enhance their capabilities, operational capacity, training, and legitimacy. State-sponsored terrorist groups also benefit from access to diplomatic pouches for the transport of weapons and explosives, false identification in the form of genuine passports, and other state services that would otherwise be beyond their reach.
- Money Laundering: Money laundering through legitimate business enterprises is the lifeblood of terrorism. It is the process by which one disguises the existence illegally-gotten income by hiding it in the proceeds of legitimate economic activity.
- Charitable and humanitarian organizations: Charitable and humanitarian organizations have long been a preferred venue for terrorist financing, with or without the knowledge of their donors. Charities involved in terrorism fall into two groups —those specifically founded by terrorist groups as surrogates, and genuine charitable organizations that are manipulated (wittingly or unwittingly) by terrorist organizations for their own purposes.⁷
- Hawala: Hawala is the traditional system by which South Asians have transferred money from one part of the world to another outside formal banking channels. Known as underground or parallel banking, hawala provides terrorist organizations with an effective, safe, and untraceable conduit for funds transfers.
- Criminality: Criminal activity provides a consistent revenue source. Terrorist organizations generally focus on activities that carry low risks but generate large returns. Major sources of illegal income include extortion, smuggling, charities fraud, larceny, and drug trafficking.⁸

Purposes of Terrorist Financing

Terrorist organizations utilize the money earned through these various sources for the following purposes:

7 B. Raman, 'Money Continues to Flow Into Terrorist Fund', *op.. cit.*

8 See for details, *Ibid.*

- Building infrastructure, including training camps, bases and sanctuaries.
- Bribes for security forces, the judiciary, and members of government bureaucracies.
- Acquisition of arms and explosives, and the deployment of trained individuals for months or years into ‘sleeper cells’ located across the globe.
- Operational support, which can mean anything from flight-school tuition, to car rentals, to airplane tickets, to bomb-making ingredients. The more money a group has, the larger and more ambitious the attacks it can contemplate.
- Support for publicity, propaganda, psychological war, intelligence collection, and maintenance computer and telecommunication capabilities.
- Humanitarian assistance to the home communities from which terrorist groups recruit and draw their support, including payments to the cadres and to the families of the cadres killed “in the line of duty.”
- Contributions to friendly political parties and leaders who take a soft or supportive line on the question of terrorism.
- Contributions to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that lobby on issues related to terrorist groups’ underlying “grievances.”
- Contributions to *madrasas* that contribute to the motivation and ideological training of potential recruits to terrorist organizations.

Blocking Terror Funding —A Failed Strategy

Various measures have been taken at the international and national levels to control terrorist funding sources. These include: the 1999 UN Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, the Security Council Resolution 1373, INTERPOL, the G-8’s Financial Action Task Force (FATF), and various domestic legislative acts designed to stem the flow of funds. Despite these efforts, the strategy to block terror funding has met with minimal success due to several factors:

- The inherent inadequacies of global control regimes;
- The use of informal methods of moving and obtaining funds by the terrorists;
- The decentralization of terrorist structures;

- The availability of alternative methods of raising and moving money to terrorist networks;
- The agility, flexibility and adaptability of terrorist networks;
- The lack of political will on the part of national governments.

SECTION II: TERRORIST FUNDING IN SOUTH ASIA

Two particular factors make South Asia a region of chronic instability. The first, is the long simmering conflict between India and Pakistan. While the protracted animosity between India and Pakistan led to wars in 1947, 1965 and 1971, the major source of instability between the two countries remains their unresolved territorial dispute in Kashmir. Second, various contentious bilateral issues between India and her other smaller neighbors have also kept the political atmosphere charged with tension and apprehension.⁹ Beyond these two trends, South Asia's population is divided into numerous, cross-cutting and overlapping group identities based on language, religion, region, ethnicity, caste, and class. Needless to say, virtually all the countries of the region are subject to myriad inter-group conflicts; and, while the majority of these have been peacefully managed, many have spilled over into violent riots, insurgencies, and even civil war. Sri Lanka, for example, is currently undergoing a period of (unstable) peace after 20 years of civil war. India, in addition to major internal insurgencies in Kashmir, Punjab and Assam, has experienced caste riots and major anti-Muslim violence since the late 1980s. Against this backdrop, this section highlights some of the current terrorist problems in South Asia with a focus on sources of funding.

Current Problems in South Asia.

Long simmering problems like the separatist movement in Jammu and Kashmir, separatist movements in India's Northeast states, Maoist insurgency in Nepal, and the Tamil crisis in Sri Lanka have spawned terrorism in the region. Indeed, terrorism was a ubiquitous phenomenon in South Asian countries long before September 11, 2001. Without discussing all the causes behind terrorism in South Asia, a few critical variables are worthy of mention: flawed demarcation of borders and frontiers by the ex-colonial

⁹ See for details, Dr. Abul kalam Azad, 'Common Risks and Common Solutions for the Smaller States of South Asia : A Comparative Perspective' in Mohammad Humayun Kabir (ed), *Small States and Regional Stability in South Asia*, The University Press Limited, Dhaka, 2005, pp.147-185.

powers, faulty nation-building processes, failure to achieve national integration in plural societies, religious chauvinism, oppression of and discrimination against minority religious-ethnic communities, brutal suppression of human rights, historical humiliation, and socio-economic inequalities.¹⁰ In addition, the extra-regional powers have played a very important role in the rise of terrorism in South Asia.

Since terrorism in South Asia emanates from inter-state, ethnic, communal and inter-caste conflicts, the geographical compactness of the region makes all its countries vulnerable to such terrorism. In addition, many South Asian countries have themselves spawned, encouraged, aided, and abetted terrorism in neighboring countries. As a result, border areas have become familiar arenas of terrorism, and terrorist groups operating in one country often have links with ideologically similar groups active in neighboring countries.

As far as the Kashmir problem is concerned, India claims that most of the separatist militant groups are based in Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir, and that Pakistan's intelligence organization, Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI), is the main supplier of funds and arms to these groups. Pakistan, however, dismisses reports of ISI support to these groups as rubbish¹¹ and calls many of these separatist militants 'freedom fighters.' India also claims that Afghan, Egyptian, Yemeni and Bangladeshi militants are

10 Uneven socio-economic and development process has been the main feature of the political life in South Asia. In such a scenario, most of the South Asian nations have faltered on their nation building process, thereby leaving the politics of the region a hostage in perpetuity to political, economic and social chaos and confusion. At Rita Manchanda observes, "the nation building process in South Asia has been focused on forging nationalists identities based on the politics of exclusion, walling in people in a confrontationist agenda with implications for minorities within the state and for external relations". Rita Manchanda, "A South Asian Media where there is no South Asian consciousness", Paper presented at a seminar on "Towards a free, fair and vibrant media, organized by The News, 1-2 July 2004, Islamabad.

11 "The continued flow of funds from Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to the Harkat-ul-Mujahidden (HUM), the Harkat-ul-Jihaid -al-Islami (HUJI), the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) and the Jaishe-e-Mohammad (JEM) for use in their terrorist operations against India. In view of the large cash flow into Pakistan since 9/11, the ISI has been channeling more funds to these organizations than in the past. All these organizations, which are members of bin Laden's international Islamic front, have been using part of this increased flow in India and diverting part to fund the activities of the Front in other parts of the world. The Pan-Islamic and pro-Wahabi members of the Pakistani religious coalition had promised in their election manifesto that if they came to power, they would set up assistance to the Jihadis in Kashmir, Palestine, Chechnya, the Arakan areas of Myanmar and the southern Philippines. This flow, is, therefore, likely to increase in the coming months". B Raman, 'Money Continues to Flow Into Terrorist Funds', Paper No. 540, *South Asia Analysis Group*, 31 October 2002.

active in Jammu and Kashmir. The Bangladesh government, in response, has categorically denied allegations that it has supported such groups.

In case of the Tamil Crisis in Sri Lanka, India clearly provided political and material support for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) during the initial phases of the insurgency. The LTTE also garnered support for the Tamil separatist movement by lobbying foreign governments and the United Nations and by forging connections with the large Tamil diaspora communities in North America, Europe and Asia. The Tamil diaspora, in particular, has become an important source of funds and supplies for the LTTE in Sri Lanka. Information obtained since the mid-1990s indicates that some Tamil communities in Europe are also involved in narcotics smuggling.¹²

The seven states that comprise India's Northeast region have often accused New Delhi of ignoring their concerns. This has led the native peoples of these states to form insurgent movements demanding independent state status or increased regional autonomy and sovereignty. As Dipankar Sengupta and Sudhir Kumar Singh have observed: "At one level, the very existence and continuation of such insurgents is a failure of India's efforts of democratization and economic development".¹³ Because of the regions long, porous border with Bangladesh, India has often alleged that the former country is a safe haven for the insurgents of the region—a charge that has been denied by the Bangladesh government.¹⁴ India has also claimed an Islamic connection between Bangladesh and insurgents in the Northeast, as several Islamic organizations have been active in this region, including the Muslim Liberation Tigers of Assam (MLTA), Student's Islamic Movement of India (SIMI), Islamic Liberation Army (ILA), Liberation Islamic Tiger Force (LITF), Muslim Liberation Army (MLA).¹⁵ Again, the Bangladesh government denies any connection. The primary sources of terrorist/insurgent funding in the Indian

12 P N Mishra, *Transnational Terrorism in a Globalizing World*, Authors Press, New Delhi, 2003, p. 103.

13 Dipankar Sengupta and Sudhir Kumar Singh, "Insurgency in North East India : The Role of Bangladesh", Authors Press in Association with Spandan, New Delhi, 2004, p. 2.

14 According to Indian Lt Gen V. K. Nayar: "The attitude of Bangladesh towards the Northeast insurgents in respect of providing safe sanctuaries, help and facilities for training and resource mobilization is one of total benevolence ... In spite of diplomatic overtures by Bangladesh, ISI operations, with the full connivance of Bangladesh Intelligence will continue to be the cutting edge of belligerence against India with a direct fallout on the north east." See Lt Gen V K Nayar, "Insurgencies in the North East — External Environment and Ethic Sponsorship of Insurgencies", *Journal of the United Service Institution of India*, Vol. CXXX, No. 540, April-June 2000., pp. 299-312.

15 See for details, Krishan Gopal, 'Islamic Fundamentalism in Bangladesh and its Role in North-east Insurgency' in Dipanker Sengupta and Sudhir Kumar Sing (eds), *Insurgency in North East India : The Role of Bangladesh*, *op. cit.*, pp. 171-198

Northeast region are extortions from the local elites (both governmental and high profile businessmen), trafficking in arms and narcotics, kidnappings for ransom, and local collection of funds from private individuals.

Finally, with a package of demands including wide-ranging land reforms, rejection of foreign aid and assistance, and an end to the monarchy, the armed Maoist insurgents of Nepal began fighting in the mid-1990's with the aim of establishing a 'People's Republic'. In the process, people from all segments of society have been killed: Maoist guerrillas, police, alleged police informers and innocent civilians.¹⁶ Weapons are purchased on the illegal arms market. The Maoists have also succeeded in establishing links with the insurgent groups in the Indian Northeast and with the LTTE of Sri Lanka.¹⁷ The Maoists have funded themselves through bank robberies and collection of often involuntary donations. Almost every business in Kathmandu is said to pay some money to the rebels.

Profile of Terror Funding in South Asia and Bangladesh

The previous discussion reveals that the sources of terror funding in South Asia are diverse in nature, with each terror-generating insurgency having its own primary source of funding as well as a number of alternative sources. For example, in the case of terrorism associated with the insurgency in Kashmir, the main sources of funding appears to be Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence, as well as contributions from religious, fundamentalist and Pan-Islamic Jihadi organizations in Pakistan. A second tier of funding comes from charitable organizations in various Muslim countries like Saudi Arabia and the Kashmiri diaspora community.¹⁸ On the latter point, one observer has noted:

It is now an open secret that Kashmiri organizations located in places like London and New York raise resources through donations, extortions and collections in mosques. In addition, they also channel money from agencies of countries like Pakistan.¹⁹

For all of these sources, Hawala constitutes the most effective conduit of terrorist funding in Kashmir.²⁰

16 Dr. Chitra K Tiwari, 'Maoist Insurgency in Nepal : Internal Dimensions', *New Indicator*, 20 January 2001.

17 Nepal Terrorist Groups—Maoist Insurgents

18 B Raman, 'Terrorism : India's Unending War', *The Rediff. Special*, 04 April 2003.

19 N S Jamwal, 'Hawala : The Invisible Financing System of Terrorism', *Strategic Analysis*, April-Jun 2002, pp. 181-198.

In case of the Tamil terrorists, collections from the Tamil diaspora community constitutes the main source of terror funding at the moment, augmented by LTTE smuggling and trafficking in narcotics and illegal arms. In case of the terrorism in the Indian Northeast and the Maoist insurgency in Nepal, funding sources include extortion, kidnappings for ransom, drug trafficking, and voluntary or forced- contributions from the people living in these areas.

In Kashmir, Northeast India, and Sri Lanka (although not Nepal), the objective of terrorist activities is separation from the existing national polity; this expands the spectrum of terror funding sources for the terror outfits in these specified areas. Terrorist funding in Bangladesh takes a different form in view of the peculiar socio-economic and political milieu within which the terrorists operate in the country and the differing objectives of the Bangladeshi terrorists. Moreover, because of the absence of any organizational connection between the terrorist movement in Bangladesh and the ones existing in other parts of South Asia, there is no transfer of funds between and among these groups.

SECTION III: TERROR FUNDING IN BANGLADESH

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon in Bangladesh. Two distinct forms of terrorism existed earlier in the country's history. The first was the terrorism carried out by the *Shorbohara* (the have-nots) during the 1970's. The leadership in this movement was in the hands of extreme left-wing political parties that sought total political, social and economic transformation of the capitalist system into a classless society. Most of the terrorists belonging to Shorbohara group worked underground, and their main sources of funding were forced collection of tolls from farmers, robberies, looting of police stations, and other forms of petty criminal activity. The movement eventually subsided, leaving a few pockets in the southern part of Bangladesh.

20 'The Hawala route is used by Pakistan intelligence agency ISI and several other fundamentalist outfits based in countries grouped under the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) to send money to terrorist groups in J & K. Funding to militants through Hawala is done through a network of dealers which extend all the way to Delhi, Mumbai and other places in India. Pakistan and Dubai are the epicenters of Hawala operators for funding to militants in J & K. Singapore and Bangkok service insurgents in the northeast. Many of these Hawala dealers have begun genuine wholesale and retail business as fronts to divert money to the J&K militant groups. It has been reported that Kashmir carpet dealers throughout the country under-invoice their exports to Islamic countries and the balance of the under-invoiced value is diverted to the terrorist groups'. Cited in *Ibid*.

The second form of terrorism previously experienced by Bangladesh was that associated with the insurgency in Chittagong Hill Tracts during the 1980s and 1990s. This movement was essentially separatist in nature. The Tribal Chakma people launched an armed insurrection against the government of Bangladesh to press their demand for more autonomy or, in the extreme case, a separate homeland for the tribal people. In their armed struggle, funding was provided mostly by India, which also provided sanctuary for the tribal insurgents.²¹ The Indian assistance to the movement both in financial and military terms was so extensive that it became an issue of severe contention between India and Bangladesh. The insurgency was finally quelled upon the signing of a peace accord in 1997 between the government and the representatives of the tribal people.

The terrorism currently plaguing Bangladesh is generally seen as ‘Islamic terrorism’.²² The aim of the movement is to establish an Islamic State in Bangladesh on the basis of *Shariah* (laws for the Muslims as enshrined in the Holy Quran). Two Islamic groups—Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB) and Jamaatul Mujaheeden

21 Mohammad Humayun Kabir, ‘The Problem of Tribal Separatism and Constitutional Reform in Bangladesh’, in Iftekharuzzaman (ed), *Ethnicity and Constitutional Reform in South Asia*, Regional Center for Strategic Studies, Manohar, 1998, pp. 10-26

22 Several factors explain the phenomenon of Islamic terrorism in Bangladesh. They include: a failure in democratic process and presence of acrimonious politics, gross mis-governance, growing economic inequalities and rampant corruption, non-uniformity in the education system, ideology and illusion, the rise of Islamic parties, ineffective enforcement and intelligence agencies, implications of ‘Global War on Terrorism’, and trafficking in small arms through Bangladesh.

Bangladesh (JMB) —are spearheading the movement, with the latter taking the lead.²³ Both movements have engaged in bomb attacks, including recent suicide bombings.²⁴

Terrorist funding in Bangladesh drew little attention until the recent spate of bombings throughout the country in August 2005.²⁵ The bombs used in the operations were of inferior quality and made mostly of indigenous materials; nonetheless, the tightly synchronized way in which they were employed concurrently in several parts of the

23 “Jamatul Mujaheeden Bangladesh (JMB) is a terrorist group dedicated to removing the country’s secular government and imposing a Taliban inspired Islamic theocracy in its place. In addition to calling for an Islamic State based on Sharia law, JMB has denounced the American led invasion of Iraq, warning President Bush and British Prime Minister Blair to leave all Muslim countries. While JMB’s exact origins are unknown, it is thought to have been formed in the late 1990s to protest the Bangladesh government’s secular orientation. JMB perpetrated its first small scale attacks in 2002 and 2003. The group’s full time membership has swelled to around 10,000 while part time supporters figure up to another 100,000. JMB’s activity has risen concomitant with Islamic extremism as a whole in Bangladesh as have JMB’s connections to other Muslim elements in the country. One such element is Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB), a terrorist group that shares JMB’s radical philosophy. Though some suspect that JMJB and JMB are merely different aliases for a single operational group, JMB operates more widely than JMJB, which is generally confined to the country’s northwestern districts. However, the groups are closely allied, and both derive support from the hard line Islamic political party Jamaat-e-Islami, in addition to sharing some common leadership.” MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, available online <http://www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=4497>, date accessed 05 April 2006.

24 In August 2005, the JMB successfully coordinated the detonation of over 400 simultaneous explosions throughout Bangladesh. The JMB primarily targeted governmental buildings, detonating mostly non-fatal devices throughout the regional capitals of the country in addition to Dhaka, Bangladesh’s capital. The attacks killed several people and injured over 100. Aimed at spreading mass panic and fear rather than inflicting mass casualties, most devices were filled with sawdust rather than lethal ball bearings or explosives. JMB is also responsible for several other bombings since August 2005, including the assassination of two judges in November 2005. These attacks featured the use of suicide bombers, the first time the group has used this more lethal tactic. JMB attacks are often littered with leaflets espousing their grievances. One such leaflet found at a bombing site reads “...the ruler of our country is an opponent of Allah because the ... government is made by a completely non-Islamic system...”. *Ibid.* Anne Marie Oliver, a US academic has done extensive research on the phenomenon of suicide bombing. In her book entitled, “The Road to Martyrs’ Square : A Journey into the World of the Suicide Bomber, she aptly sums up her findings: “The motives are diverse: religion, nationalism, grievance, fame, glory and money, and last of all and most important of all, they have to have an entire system that supports their actions (sympathetic grounds round the world). In the context of Bangladesh, the motivation of suicide bombers stem from (a) misinterpretation of Islamic religion (b) glory and (c) money.

25 Terrorism made its presence felt across the country on 17 August 2005, with over 400 bomb blasts occurring within a span of one hour in 63 of Bangladesh’s 64 districts. Government institutions and areas of public gatherings for official interactions were the main targets. The Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) which had only recently been banned by the government took responsibility for the blasts. For details see IPCS (Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies) Special Report 16, April 2006.

country led many to recognize that a sophisticated organization with some means of financial support lay behind the bombings. Since then, three broad sets of arguments have developed with respect to the sources of terrorist funding in Bangladesh:

The first set of arguments examine the case of government support to the terrorists. The opposition party (AL-Awami League), which is at loggerheads with the party in power (Bangladesh Nationalist Party or BNP), blamed the latter for the terrorist bombings as the current government is a four party alliance of which the Islamic party Jamat-i-Islami (JI) is a major element with 18 seats in the parliament and two ministers in the cabinet of Prime Minister Khaleda Zia.²⁶ In the opinion of most of the senior AL members, the terrorists' material support could not have come from any other source other than a government one.

While this case is mainly leveled by the opposition, the general public, already exasperated by the persistent increase of criminal activities in the country, seemed to lend a certain degree of credence to the opposition's allegations due to the utter failure of the government to reduce or even contain these crimes. Moreover, the fact that the government has long ignored the terrorist threat —even before 17 August 2005 bombings, a series of bombings had rocked the country and produced many casualties — combined with government claims that concerns about terrorism are the creation of the media and those who oppose the government have all undermined public trust on this issue. The August bombings, however, put an end to the government denials of the existence of militant Islamists in the country. With the suicide bombings committed on 3 October 2005 by the followers of Jamatul Mujahideen Bangladesh and Harkatul-ul-Jihad, the government's earlier stance vis-à-vis the militancy issue in the country seemed to lose further credibility in the eyes of public opinion. A significant element of the population believed the opposition party's statements concerning the government's position with respect to the Islamic militants, unequivocally placing the responsibility for militant activities in the country at the government's doorstep. The *Newsletter*, published by the AL office, stated that under the patronage of the present ruling junta, the extremist groups have grown astronomically. Four years of the ruling junta witnessed numerous bomb and

26 'This was for the first time that JI tasted power having two ministers in the cabinet of Khaleda Zia. The inclusion of JI in the cabinet, somehow, became a bone of contention between the ruling and opposition parties. To the latter, the JI's anti-liberation stance in 1971 and its politico-religious ideology negates the ethos of Bengali nationalism', M Sakhawat Hussain, 'Political Violence in Bangladesh', *The Defence Journal*, April 2006.

grenade attacks, political assassination cases and smuggling of arms and explosives. All the attacks were directed against secular and progressive elements, AL leadership and members of minority communities. Not even by mistake a victim was a Jamat or BNP institution or individual. The government simply ignored the incidents and branded the news of violence as attempt by the opposition to tarnish 'the image of the ruling alliance'.²⁷

In regards to the sources of funding for terrorist activities in Bangladesh, the *Newsletter* pointed an accusing finger at the government, as well as several foreign sources under the patronage of Jamat-I-Islam and other Islamic political parties. The foreign sources included Saudi Arabia; a number of Middle East-base charity organizations; Islamic NGOs like Al Haramaine Islamic Institute (Saudi based), Al Fuzaira and Khairul Ansar Al Khairia (UAE based), Doulat Kuwait and Revival of Islamic Heritage Society (Kuwait), and Daulatul Bahrain (Bahrain based).²⁸ Concurrently with the information published in the *Newsletter*, there were similar reports in foreign media; in particular, regarding terrorist funding by Saudi Arabia to the tune of \$200, all done with full connivance of the government currently in power.²⁹ Such reports by the opposition party and world media that charged government involvement in terrorist activities should not be accepted uncritically, however; they require further investigation and authentication. The Bangladesh government has stated its intention to deal with the problem of terrorism seriously; whether it undertakes to do so will be a test both of its sincerity and its potential involvement in these activities.³⁰

The second set of arguments concerning the sources of funding for terrorist activities in Bangladesh looks to international Islamic groups and terrorist organizations, with latter seeking to establish safe havens on Bangladeshi soil. This set of arguments is influenced heavily by foreign media reporting, in particular those from India. Such reporting, however, has gained little or no credibility in Bangladesh public opinion., but

27 'Rise of Fanatic Extremism in Bangladesh', *Newsletter*, published by Bangladesh Awami League, Central Working Committee, 23 Bangabandhu Avenue, Dhaka 1000, Bangladesh.

28 See for details, *op. cit.*

29 News Insight, Public Affairs Magazine, available on line
<http://www.newsinsight.net/nati2.asp?recno=2735&ctg=World>, date accessed 27 April 06.

30 Earlier the government showed reluctance in diagnosing the terrorism problem in Bangladesh by terming it as an international phenomenon. In response to the donors' concerns, the Finance Minister of Bangladesh, Saifur Rahman, said, "We have told them it is more of an international phenomenon than a national one. It is difficult to contain such type of terrorism with the normal enforcement tools". *The Daily Star*, Dhaka, 24 Nov 2005.

is instead seen as a product of India's propaganda campaign against alleged Bangladesh's support to India's Northeast insurgents. Such media propaganda is augmented by reports from various Indian government intelligence establishments that claim that Bangladeshi support to the insurgents is fully coordinated with Pakistan's ISI. As Indian journalist KPS Gill, for example, states:

Bangladesh soil is increasingly being used for terrorist and for subversive activities by religious and pan-Islamist terrorist groups, and insurgents operating in India's Northeast, substantially through collusion of Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) and Bangladesh's Directorate General Intelligence (DGFI).³¹

The August 2005 bombings gave the Indian government an opportunity to heighten this propaganda campaign, with further claims about the presence of Islamic terrorists in Bangladesh linked to insurgents in India's Northeast, including the exchange of arms, explosives and money between the two groups. Officials from the Indian Cabinet Secretariat's Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) went to the extent of preparing a dossier for President Bush with evidence that Bangladesh was about to become "the next Afghanistan."³² Meanwhile, the Indian media, both print and electronic, focused on the various potential international sources of terrorist funding in Bangladesh, such as various international terrorist organizations, including organizations operating in India (Kashmir and Northeast India); Arab charities; and Islamic NGOs. The reports, lacking in evidence, quickly lost credibility within the circle of informed Bangladeshi opinion.

A third set of arguments regarding the sources of funding for terrorist activities in Bangladesh have coming mainly from government intelligence and law enforcement organizations. It is largely the result of materials seized during raids against suspected terrorist safe houses and the interrogations of detained terrorist leaders, all following the August 2005 bombings. The funding sources thus uncovered ranged across a spectrum of

31 K P S Gill, Bangladesh —A Lengthening Shadow of Terror, available on line <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/kpsgill/2003/chapter10.htm>, date accessed 07 May 06.

32 The dossier specifies direct links with Al-Qaida and with the Kashmir-based Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jaishe-e-Mohammad terrorist organizations. A senior RAW official told, "When Al Qaida's remaining militants fled Afghanistan after the US backed military operations overthrew the Taliban, several of the militants ended up in Bangladesh, where they reformed and regrouped and have now built significant operational bases and an influential political movement that preaches an openly Taliban-style program to turn Bangladesh into an Islamist state". Martin Walker, UPI Editor, 'India to warn Bush of Bangladesh terror', available on line <http://www.upi.com/International>, date accessed 23 March 06.

activities from the illegal (e.g., armed robberies, looting of NGO offices and properties, and extortion) to the legal (zakat funds, other charitable funds from abroad, and other similar sources).

According to the intelligence reports, the institution of Zakat appears as the principal source of financing for the Islamic militants in Bangladesh. Zakat, the giving of charity, is a pillar of Muslim law and tradition. As Robert Looney observes,

There is a recognized religious duty in the Muslim world to donate a set portion of one's earnings or assets to religious or charitable purposes (Zakat), and an additionally, to support charitable works through voluntary deeds or contributions (Sadaqah) ... Funds are collected by the government, local mosques or religious centers. Sadaqah contributions are made directly to established Islamic charities. Because both Zakat and Sadaqah are viewed as personal religious responsibilities, there has traditionally been little or government oversight of these activities. Donations in large measure remain anonymous. Both conditions combined with the often opaque financial and operating structure of Islamic charities provide an ideal environment for exploitation by terrorist groups.³³

The charity collected as zakat is meant to provide basic goods and services to communities in a manner deemed consistent with the values and teachings of Islam. In a country like Bangladesh, however, its beneficiaries are a handful of Islamic institutions and their patrons. Such institutions fall easy prey to Islamic militants who, in the name of Islam, expropriate funds for all manner of illegal activities.

Apart from zakat, charitable financing for the terrorist groups in Bangladesh consist of subscriptions collected for mosques and madrassas and monthly collections from activists. Other interrogated militants disclosed that *osor* (crop production), *yanat* (donation) and their own contributions sustained the particular groups.³⁴

Intelligence reports disclosed that a second set of sources of terror funding in Bangladesh is the generous flow of money from various Islamic-oriented foreign NGOs.³⁵ Thirty-four foreign Islamic non-governmental NGOs are registered with the

33 Robert Looney, 'The Mirage of Terrorist Financing : The Case of Islamic Charities', op. cit.

34 Bibhu Prasad Routray, 'Terrorist Economy', SAIR, 18 April 2006

35 "The number of Islamic NGOs in Bangladesh increased after 1991 devastating cyclone in Chittagong and other coastal areas of the country. Since then, more than a dozen leading international Islamic NGOs started operation in Bangladesh. They took part in relief operation and other charitable activities like building houses, providing pure drinking water, setting up hospitals, improving sanitation, mother

NGO Bureau in Bangladesh. Of these, 15 are very active in the country. Some of the prominent ones are the Islamic Relief Organization (IRO), Al Markajul Islami, Isrha Islamic Foundation, Ishrahul Muslimin, Al Forkan Foundations and Al Maghrib Eye Hospital.³⁶ Investigative reports have revealed that funds obtained from abroad — from Kuwait, UAE, Bahrain, Libya, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia —by the Islamic NGOs have been used not only for religious education and orphanages, but also have been invested in business sectors like transport, pharmaceuticals, financial institutions, real estate, media and education.³⁷ This, in turn, has generated more funds that are being accessed by militant organizations, not only to encourage the recruitment of younger receptive people for ‘Jihad’, but also for the operation of training camps for armed militants in the Chittagong Hill Tracts.³⁸ Various intelligence and investigation reports seem to place the Kuwait-based Revival of Islamic Heritage Society (RIHS)³⁹ at the top of the list of suspected donors of the Islamist militants in Bangladesh. With its ultraconservative Wahabi agenda, the organization is believed to have brought in enormous amounts of money to build mosques and madrasas in the country.⁴⁰ All the top Bangladeshi-based terrorists and militant kingpins (people like Galib, Abdur Rahman, Siddiqui Islam alias

and child care and establishing religious educational institutions. Islamic NGOs are also very active in the poverty stricken northwestern districts like Rangpur, Dinajpur and Rajshahi. Their activities have fuelled Islamic militancy in those areas. The banned JMB started work in Rajshahi and then in other areas. Several hundred mosques were constructed or renovated in those areas in recent past by the Saudi Arabia based Al Haramain Islamic Foundation. Islamic NGOs are also active in the rural areas of Khulna and Satkhira districts. Some Islamic NGOs get foreign funds for other activities like promoting Islamic culture by providing ‘iftar’ (food for breaking fast during the Holy month of Ramadan) to people at mosques during the fasting month of Ramadan and sacrificing animals on the occasion of Eid-ul-Azha (Muslim festival for animal sacrifice). An Islamic NGO run by militant leader, Asaadullah Al Galib, a Rajshahi University teacher of Arabic, who is now in custody, has provided over taka 12 lakh (\$20,000) for Iftar at different mosques in Rajshahi during the last Ramadan’. Anand Kumar, ‘Islamic NGOs Funding Terror in Bangladesh’, op. cit.

36 Anand Kumar, ‘Islamic NGOs Funding Terror in Bangladesh’, Paper No. 1531, *South Asia Analysis Group*, 12 September 2005.

37 Muhammad Zamir, ‘Extremism, Terrorism and Bangladesh’, Editorial, *Daily Star* (National Daily of Bangladesh, 10 September 2005).

38 *Ibid.*

39 The RIHS Pakistan and Afghanistan chapters find mention in the US Treasury Department’s ‘Specially Designated Nationals’ listing’. ‘In Bangladesh, a major portion of such funds flows have occurred with full government knowledge through what can be considered ‘legal channels throughout the period during which Bangladeshi authorities refused to acknowledge the presence of militants in the country. This ‘age of innocence’ curiously continued even beyond the proscription of the outfits in February 2005, till the August 17, 2005, country-wide blasts”.Bibhu Prasad Routray, ‘Terrorist Economy,’ op. cit.

40 Bibhu Prasad Routray, ‘Terrorist Economy’, op. cit.

Bangla Bhai) have been the beneficiaries of the largesse supplied by RIHS. Another NGO, Al-Haramain, also provides financial support to various centers of Islamic militant activities in the country, in particular to the JMB.⁴¹ Intelligence sources report that both of these NGOs fund militancy in the name of building mosques, madrasas, other educational institutions, hospitals and healthcare centers.⁴² The Islamic NGOs that currently remain under strict intelligence vigilance are Rabita Al Alam Al-Islami, Al Muntada Al-Islami, the Society of Social Reforms, the Qatar Charitable Society, the Islam Relief Agency, the Al-Fokran Foundation, the International Relief Organization, the Juwait Joint Relief Committee, the Muslim Aid Bangladesh, Ar-Rib, Dar Al-Hair, Hayatul Igachha and Taawheed-e-Noor.⁴³

Intelligence reports identify the network of local Islamic NGOs, which are loosely affiliated with the larger foreign-based NGOs, as a third source of terror funding in Bangladesh. These local NGOs are registered with the Social Welfare Department, and their number is believed to have increased in recent times, especially following the appointment of a leader of the Jamat-I-Islam party as social welfare minister.

In this regard, it is relevant to touch upon the much talked about connection between Jamat-I-Islam and the Islamic militants. While in the immediate aftermath of the August 2005 bombings, there was no proof linking terrorist activities to the Jamaat Party,⁴⁴ arrested JMB operatives have hinted at the active collusion of Jamaat members in aiding the terrorists, both morally and materially.⁴⁵ Moreover, many JMB cadres have previously been involved with the Islami Chhatra Shibir (the student wing of the Jamaat-I-Islam party). Abul Barakat, a renowned Bangladeshi economist, spent the past seven years tracing Jamaat's growing financial power. "Their central vision is to capture state power", he says adding, "the party generates almost \$200 million in annual profit." According to his analysis of Jamaat-owned businesses, these run the gamut from banks and insurance companies to technology and media concerns. "They are an economy within the economy—a state within a state", he says, with some profits used to fund

41 Bangladesh banned Al-Haramain in July 2004 at requests of the US and Saudi Arabia. All the 14 officials of Al-Haramain left Bangladesh after the ban. But four of them returned several months later and joined the RIHS secretly. *The Daily Star*, 26 November 2005.

42 *The Daily Inqilab*, 20 April 2006.

43 *The Daily Star*, 26 September 2006.

44 David Montero, 'How Extremism came to Bangladesh', *The Christian Science Monitor*, 07 September 2005.

45 Rukmani Gupta, "Bangladesh : Recent Developments (Aug 2005—March 2006), op. cit.

militant organizations.⁴⁶ As mentioned earlier, because of the presence of Jamaat-I-Islam party in the current coalition government that the opposition's charge against the government as the financier of Islamic militancy in the country has been incessant.⁴⁷

A fourth important source of terror funding in Bangladesh is the receipt of money by the terrorist organizations from foreign private individuals. Foreign Islamic delegates visiting Bangladesh as guests of various Islamic organizations often stay in the country for long periods of time.⁴⁸ This enables them to meet the local militants and leave substantial cash behind for financing terrorist activities. Funds are also raised directly from foreign lands on individual basis. A number of Bangladeshis, mostly Islamic scholars, leaders of various religiously-based political parties, and the heads of madrasa, visit Middle Eastern and Western countries for the purpose of collecting charitable donations. In the Muslim countries, individual donations are sought in the name of religious education, charitable organizations and orphanages. Such funding is not recorded, as it generally comes through unofficial channels like *hundi*. These funds are mostly used for the local Islamic NGOs and *Qawmi* madrasa which do not have government recognition.⁴⁹

46 David Montero, 'How Extremism came to Bangladesh', op. cit.

47 "By and large it is well known that these militants (terrorists) enjoy the patronage of Jamat and at one time or another they were members of Jamat cadres. Simply because Jamat is a partner in the Alliance government, the arch terrorists and planners of these attacks are shielded from investigation and prosecution. Only if BNP (Bangladesh Nationalist Party —the principal party in the current government) decides to divorce Jamat, it will be possible to uproot the militants. It all boils down to Khaleda's willingness to take risk in the vote equation, should she make an enemy of Jamat that will cost her votes in the election". Bangladesh Awami League News Letter, op. cit.

48 'Important among the foreign Islamist visitors to Bangladesh was Moulana Fazlur Rahman, leader of the Opposition in Pakistan's National Assembly. Sources indicate that, before the August country-wide blasts, four foreign nationals including two Pakistanis, one Saudi and one unidentified man had watched 'dummy runs' and training sessions by Islamist militants at a remote *char* (riverine island) of Sariakand in Bogra district. Fazlur Rahman, during his tours to the country had visited militant facilities in Jessore. There is also a disturbing pattern to visits by RIHS officials to Bangladesh, which in the recent past have taken place immediately before or after several major terrorist incidents or events linked to extremist activities. Sources also indicate that top RIHS official visits are made through diplomatic channels and they had unimpeded opportunities to leave substantial cash behind'. Bibhu Prasad Routray, op. cit.

49 'Earlier, the religious elites were the patrons of madras. But since 1990s, money has started flowing in from the rich Middle Eastern countries resulting into a mushrooming growth of these madras. This has acted as an incentive and the Qawmi madrasas have now sprung up across the country. Their total number has gone beyond 10,000. These madras are a major factor behind the rise of Islamic extremism in Bangladesh. They spend a large share of their fund for arms training as part of preparations for Jihad'. Anand Kumar, op. cit.

Some of the smaller, but nonetheless important, sources of terror funding in Bangladesh come through voluntary private donations made by locals and through extortion of locals by extremists. It is alleged that local private financiers constitute a significant source of funding for the terrorist organizations in the country. Reports in the national press indicated, in March 2006, that the government was preparing a list of 25 financiers, including high profile politicians and businessmen who provided money to JMB cadres.⁵⁰ As far as extortion is concerned, Bangladesh has long struggled with this social problem. The galloping rate of poverty, the widening gap between the rich and the poor, the failure of the government to create employment opportunities for youth and the resulting growing frustration among the younger generation, the breakdown of law and order, extreme population density and urban congestion, corruption and other vices in the society all have led youth to resort to extortion at various times in the recent past. The failure of the authorities to crack down on such crime has created a convenient space for the Islamic cadres to collect funds through massive extortion drives that sustain terrorist activities of various kinds.

Lastly, the arrest of JMB leaders in March 2006 uncovered yet another source of terror funding hitherto unknown by the authorities. The Central Bank in Bangladesh has reported that Islami Bank Bangladesh Limited (IBBL), the largest Shariah based bank in the country, has violated the Money Laundering Prevention Act of 2002.⁵¹ In this manner, the Bank allowed money to find its way into the hands of the militants of the JMB. Investigative reports mention that nearly 20 higher officials of IBBL against whom actions were ordered by the Central Bank had colluded with the militants. It is reported that IBBL is a Jamat financial institution with management that consists of employees, drawn mostly from the Jamat circle.

With the arrest of five out of the seven members of the Majlish-e-Shura —the top leadership command of JMB —the means and methods of terror funding in Bangladesh largely have been revealed. The fact remains, however, that the government has only begun what will prove to be a long and arduous effort to root out terrorism and its financing in Bangladesh. In particular, it is imperative that the investigations and

50 The names included five Jamat-i-Islami leaders and had been recovered from the SIM cards found in a JMB hideout in Sylhet on 02 March 2006.

51 It was the recovery of a cheque book issued against an account maintained in an IBBL branch, from the Sylhet hideout of the JMB Chief Abdur Rahman on March 2006 that led to the investigation against the IBBL. *The Daily Star*, 20 March 2006.

intelligence work that is now underway to uncover the sources of terror finding in Bangladesh be neutral in nature and provide substantive conclusions. Any appearance of secrecy or lack of transparency will undermine the efficacy of the government and cause damage to the reputation of both the government and the nation. In particular, the following facts must be taken into consideration with respect to the phenomenon of terror funding in Bangladesh:

- The sources of terror funding in Bangladesh are both exogenous and endogenous in nature. In case of the former, various funds donated by the Islamic oriented foreign NGOs constitute the main and steady source of funding for militant activities. In the case of local sources, Zakat is the main and steady source of funds for the terrorists, followed by donations by the local Islamic NGOs and private groups. In each case, the funds donated are meant for humanitarian activities. It is through a series of fraudulent, corrupt and immoral practices, rather than in accordance with the intentions of the donors, that such well-intentioned charitable giving ultimately reaches the pockets of terrorists.
- Sources such as robbery, extortion, and foreign donations are episodic and thus tracking them is a difficult task.
- The government's link with the terror funding is still cloaked in mystery . The statements and confessions by various arrested JMB leaders, however, referred to former connections with the Jammāt and its student wing, Shibbir. Moreover, while the Jamaat leaders currently in power deny any such linkage, the party's role in establishing Aliya Madrasa (seminaries with government recognition and support), its extensive financial holdings and its links to various financial institutions are tangible proof of its connection with the Islamic extremists. In the eyes of the public, constant denials of Jammāt's involvement in terrorist activities are called into question by Jammāt leader Motiur Rahman Nizami's remarks as early as 2004 that, "there is no one by the name of Bangla Bhai, and that he is a creation of the media".⁵² This mendacious remark was made amidst the violence and murder committed under the leadership of Siddiqul Islam alias Bangla Bhai in Rajshahi and Naogaon.⁵³ Since the confessions and backgrounds of captured JMB cadres point to a link with the Jamaat, the expectation is rising among the

⁵² The Daily Star, 9 March 2006.

⁵³ *Ibid.*

public that the government's Investigation and Intelligence departments must undertake neutral and impartial inquiries into the issue.

- Investigations and intelligence reports confirm that Islamic terrorists in Bangladesh do not receive funds of any kind from the insurgents in India. Nor are there any other connections between the two groups. But a report published recently in a National Daily of Bangladesh (The Daily Inqilab) reveals that twelve top terrorists that control the underworld criminal activities in Bangladesh now enjoy sanctuary in India.⁵⁴ Despite their physical absence from the country, they command and operate criminal activities in Bangladesh from their safe havens in India.⁵⁵
- Finally, it should be noted that there are few signs that international terrorist movements connected to Al Qaeda or Hizbollah have any financial link with the terrorist groups in Bangladesh. At present, the international connections of Islamic militants in Bangladesh remain under investigation. As Prime Minister, Khaleda Zia of Bangladesh remarks, "It is yet to be confirmed whether any international group is involved in it as the probe is still going on".⁵⁶ Moreover, current trend in terror financing demonstrate that Jihadists with no established links to Al Qaeda find it easier to raise money through criminal activities than to contact Al Qaeda for support. As Loretta Napoleoni observed, "terrorist financing is no longer transnational, but deeply rooted in individual countries."⁵⁷ The case of Bangladesh probably substantiates Napoleoni's argument that most of the sources of terror funding are indigenous in nature and reinforced by funds and assistance that come from various international humanitarian NGOs rather than from international terrorist organizations.

54 Prime Minister Khaleda Zia stated that her government had sent the list of the terrorists to the Indian authorities. The Indian government assured that it would take actions against them. But the issue of bringing back the terrorists remained undecided as no extradition treaty exists between the two countries'. *The Daily Star*, 04 May 2006.

55 On 26 December 2001, the Home Ministry of Bangladesh identified the 12 top terrorists of the country and order instruction to catch them life or dead. The government even declared a bounty for their capture amounting to \$25,000. Since then, the 12 terrorists fled from the country, and crossed over to India to take refuge there. Due to the absence of an extradition treaty between India and Bangladesh, no effort has been fruitful in getting them back from the Indian authority. See for details, *The Daily Inqilab*, 17 May 2006.

56 *The Daily Star*, 04 May 2006.

57 Loretta Napoleoni, 'Terrorist Financing : How the New Generation of Jihadists Funds itself', *RUSI Journal*, Vol. 151, No. 1, February 2006, pp. 60-65.

- At this point, there is no evidence that the Bangladeshi diaspora plays a significant role in terrorist funding.
- Finally, terror funding through normal banking channels is, in the case of Bangladesh, a relatively new development, and more information and facts are probably forthcoming.

Efforts to Control Terror Funding in Bangladesh

Since the 9/11 episode and the subsequent global war on terrorism, Bangladesh has unequivocally stood behind the international community in curbing terrorist acts of all kinds. The country has earlier acceded to eleven anti-terrorism conventions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) on December 9, 1999.⁵⁸ It has also ratified the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Convention on the Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft.⁵⁹ Bangladesh also enforces UN Security Council resolutions related to terrorism, including identification and freezing of assets of individuals and organizations designated as terrorists or supporters of terrorists.⁶⁰ The country's Foreign Minister has eloquently stated that, "Through the accession to all the international anti-terror conventions, Bangladesh has conveyed a very important message to the global community that the country is fully committed to the global war on terrorism."⁶¹ After experiencing various scattered terrorist activities of the Islamic militants in its own soil, Bangladesh has sought international help and assistance—in particular from the US, Japan, and the countries of EU—for countering terrorist activities in the country.

Several factors influence the anti-terrorism policy of Bangladesh. *First*, the country's constitution reflects the sectarian amity that has always existed within its borders. The Preamble, Articles 2A and 11 highlight respect for fundamental freedoms.⁶² They mirror the spirit of tolerance and understanding evident in the country's art, music, poetry, drama and other forms of literary expression. Thus, from a psycho-sociological

⁵⁸ News from Bangladesh, Daily News Monitoring Service, 31 August 2005.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰ *The Daily Star*, 30 April 2006.

⁶¹ *The New Nation*(A National Daily of Bangladesh) , 31 August 2005.

⁶² *The Daily Star*, 10 September, 2005.

standpoint, Bangladesh's liberal and tolerant cultural history acts as a natural antidote to the growth of terrorism on its soil. Admittedly, Bangladesh is a nation with a majority Muslim population, and some of its political parties have explicitly religious agendas. But so far, the Islamist political parties have had very little influence on national politics. This may perhaps be due to the fact that the Muslims of Bangladesh fought a war of independence against Pakistan (an openly Islamic State), with a vision of a secular, tolerant and democratic polity.

Second, it has become imperative for Bangladesh to overcome the impression made by the international media that the country as a safe haven for the terrorists. The debate as to whether Bangladesh has indeed become a base for international terrorist networks in collusion with Al Qaeda started in 2002 with two publications—*Time* magazine and the *Far Eastern Economic Review*.⁶³ The debate deepened and spread, however, with the frequent recovery of arms and explosives, incidents of explosions, and reports of terrorist mobilization in different parts of the country.

Third, terrorist acts on Bangladeshi soil have far-reaching security implications for the country and the region. At the national level, loss of life, damage to property, and the impact on innocent victims of terrorism raise questions as to the government's ability to guarantee basic security for its people. At the regional level, the India factor enters the calculus. Because of Bangladesh's geographical contiguity with India, acts of terrorism committed in one country are considered a threat to the security of the other. Much of India's threat perception is colored by a (so far unfounded) fear that Bangladesh is nursing militancy in collusion with Pakistan's ISI with a goal of destabilizing India. Needless to say, allegations of this type have been rejected by the Bangladeshi authorities as fictitious in nature and without proof or substantial evidence of any type.

Fourth, terrorist activities have negative repercussions for the country's economy in terms of the flow of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), donors' commitments, business investment, and other sources of international capital. Terrorists also adversely affect development by imposing heavy costs on the country's economy, not to mention the direct costs resulting from destruction of infrastructure and general disruption of economic activity. Indirect costs vary and arise from loss of confidence in the economy

63 Bertil Linter published a report entitled 'Bangladesh : A Cocoon of Terror' in the *Far Eastern Economic Review* on 04 April 2002. Then Alex Perry gave another report entitled 'Deadly Cargo' in the *Weekly Time* on 21 October 2002. The government of Bangladesh challenged the veracity of the reports and termed these as inimical propaganda by conspirators to tarnish the image of the country.

and the consequent inability to attract foreign investment, the “brain drain”, enhanced military expenditures, high transaction costs, and various other economic distortions.

Finally, for every nation-state, the policy for combating terrorism is, in fact, an off-shoot of the on-going global war on terrorism, and, in this sense, Bangladesh’s situation is no exception.

Bangladesh’s strategy of fighting terrorism has attained a new dimension with the firm determination and political will of the authorities to identify, control and finally put an end to the sources of terror funding in the country. Needless to say, such an awakening was accelerated by the August 17, 2005 bombing incident. As mentioned earlier, without some sort of financial support, such a series of countrywide, synchronized, and simultaneous bomb blasts could not have been possible. The case is somewhat analogous to the 9/11 episode, which generated similar interest in terror funding due the massive amount of funds involved in carrying out the operation.

According to government legislation, the following defines the fight against terror financing in Bangladesh:

Terrorist financing means knowingly or unknowingly providing or collecting funds or properties with the intention that such funds or properties be used, with or without the knowledge that such funds or properties are to be used, in full or in part, in order to carry out a terrorist act within the meaning of Section 190 A of Chapter X-A of the Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860).⁶⁴

As far as legal and institutional measures against terror funding are concerned, Bangladesh’s record is quite poor. The country delayed its accession to the International Convention for Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism because of its reservation about some of the clauses in the convention. The Money Laundering Prevention Act of 2002 also proved to be flawed. Moreover, the government has done little to solicit outside help in checking terror financing.

Some of the recent efforts with respect to control of terror funding, however, attest to Bangladesh’s new commitment to preventing and curtailing terrorist financing. In this respect, the government’s decision to accede to the International Convention for Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism is significant. Accession to the convention will pave the way for the government to examine bank accounts and monitor fund

⁶⁴ New Age (A National Daily of Bangladesh). 23 January 2006.

transactions to detect terrorism financing. It will also prevent illegal money transfers through banking channels and enable Bangladesh to seek international cooperation in this regard.⁶⁵ However, the government needs to amend its domestic legislation in line with the contents of the conventions in order to gain greater benefits. One positive outcome of Bangladesh's decision to accede to the International Convention for Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism has been the enthusiastic offers by many developed countries (e.g., the US, Japan, Australia, and the EU) to engage in capacity-building through training and technical assistance, including the transfer of highly developed software. This is expected to enhance Bangladesh's intelligence skills for tracking down terrorist funding. With US technical assistance, Bangladesh in 2005 drafted a new comprehensive Anti-Money Laundering Law, designed to replace the earlier Money Laundering Act of 2002. The new law will deal with the financial and economic crimes on the one hand, and sources of any clandestine funding or transaction by any terrorist group abroad on the other.⁶⁶ Bangladesh also is working with the US to strengthen controls on land, sea, and airports of entry.

The most significant step towards combating terror funding may be the new Anti-Terror Act. Intended as a tough law to handle the growing religiously based militancy, the Act (which includes capital punishment) is expected to pass in Parliament in June 2006. Law and Parliamentary Minister of Bangladesh, Moudud Ahmed states that, "The proposed law will deal with prevention of all offences relating to terrorism and militancy including patronization, financing, supplying arms and explosives and giving shelter to terrorists and militants".⁶⁷ The new law envisages the following:

- The law provides for cross-border enforcement to identify links with clandestine funding or transactions, training or patronization support of shelter provided by foreign terrorist groups and to bring the offenders to book.
- The law contains detailed definitions of terrorism, militancy, and all other offences relating to terrorism including terror financing and terrorist organizations; and it proposes punishments, including the death penalty and prison terms ranging from seven years to life.

⁶⁵ News from Bangladesh, op. cit.

⁶⁶ *New Age*, 23 January 2006.

⁶⁷ *The Daily Star*, 18 May 2006.

- The law will empower district magistrates to order preventative detention for 30 days of any person suspected of involvement with terrorism or militancy.⁶⁸
- The proposed law forbids any organization from accepting funds from a foreign organization or group without prior approval of the government.
- To prevent terror financing, the bill proposes that the Bangladesh Bank be vested with special powers to examine any account of any bank based within the country to ascertain suspicious transactions.

CONCLUSION

Terrorism, whether of domestic or international nature, is now a reality in the Bangladeshi polity. With the arrest of five out of the seven members of the JMB's leaders, this particular terrorist organization may be left beleaguered, but it is certainly not completely defanged. It is imperative, at present, to cut off all the routes of financing for extremist groups in the country. Absent financial wherewithal, no extremist organization—whatever its ideology—can effectively operate or even survive. Towards this end, all investigations and inquiries into terrorist funding by the government must be impartial, transparent, neutral, and timely. Furthermore, any successful effort to wipe out terrorist funding network needs a political strategy, effective application of laws, and deep and widespread commitment on the part of the government.

More important is a government commitment to measures, both short and long term, that address the grievances of those who are now involved in terrorist acts. The causes of terrorism in Bangladesh seem to be deeply political, social and economic in nature, and all require complex solutions. In particular, relative deprivation and inequality should be addressed through a comprehensive development program. Finally, it should be said that the recent bombing attacks have proven beyond doubt that

68 According to the new law:

1. The magistrate will have to send the government all documents and information that led the order for preventive detention. It also proposes similar provisions of advisory board, as provided in the Special Power Act, for scrutiny of the grounds for a preventive detention.
2. The grounds if every detention order shall have to be referred to the advisory board within 120 days from the date of the detention and no person will be detained for more than six months unless the board, upon scrutiny, orders so, proposes the bill.
- 3.. The bill proposes tougher provisions regarding bail for an accused under the law.
- 4.. According to the bill, the cases under the proposed law will be prosecuted before a regular sessions' court or before a special tribunal to be set up by the government.

Bangladesh is now a terror-prone country. This is a great psychological setback for a country that has so long been known as a moderate and tolerant Muslim country. There is the need, consequently, to rebuilt the image of Bangladesh in many fora—national, regional and international. While the task lies primarily with the government, academics, civil society, private groups, religious leaders, NGOs and other agencies also must play positive roles in helping the government fight terrorism in all its forms.

MANAGEMENT OF THE TAMIL DIASPORA —LTTE’S PRIMARY FUNCTION ABROAD

Vipula Wanigasekera

There are over 35,000 Pakistanis live in Norway. When the attack on the Twin Towers was all over news, I took a taxi to go to Lysaker and on the way, the Muslim taxi driver of Pakistani origin said to me ‘Yes we expected something like this to happen’. He didn’t elaborate. It was a few weeks later the intelligence sources revealed that there has been regular collection of funds from the Pakistani diaspora by a (terrorist?) cover organization in Oslo and this explained what exactly the driver meant.’¹

Above, I have described a simple connection between a donation in one country and an event with major impact thousands of miles away that took over 2,000 civilian lives. This study is an attempt to provide insight into diaspora funding to terrorist organizations through a case study on the practices of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)

INTRODUCTION

LTTE maintains a variety of commercial ventures spread across the globe, ranging from kiosks, restaurants, grocery stores to a commercial shipping fleet. In addition, evidence exists of a nexus between the LTTE and narcotics cartels and other militant groups involved in narco-terrorism².

The Tamil diaspora community has also become a major source of funding for the LTTE. Ascertaining the level and nature of diaspora support for terrorist funding, however, is difficult as little information has been collected concerning the management and exploitation of the Tamil community overseas by the LTTE.

1 Writer’s experience during a long stay from 1999 –2004 in Norway

2 Thanuka: Suppression of Terrorist Financing and the Unique Tamil Diaspora

Fund raising event in Geneva 25 Feb 2006



As a result of the initiatives of the global counter-terrorism coalition as well as the diplomatic initiatives of the Sri Lankan government, the LTTE has finally been listed as a terrorist organisation by many countries, including India, United States, Britain, Australia, Canada and South Africa. As a result, contributions to the LTTE are considered a criminal offence and fund raising is not allowed in these countries, at least in theory.³ Sinhalese expatriates (Sinhalese are the majority community in Sri Lanka) have also become active in lobbying their respective host countries to enact stricter government sanctions against the LTTE and its financial networks. All these measures are effecting, to a limited extent, external financial flows to the Tigers. However, the LTTE's continuing success in garnering economic support and procuring weapons abroad indicate that these counter-measures are not yet adequate.

This paper uses the phrase "Management of diaspora" because LTTE's relationship with the Tamil diaspora community is much more than a simple outreach program designed to raise funds. It is actually a total management of the diaspora community, with programs in more than 60 countries and with a prime objective of deriving maximum funding for the LTTE. The LTTE pioneered the systematic organization of its expatriate community, and today earns well over 10 million USD per

3 The UN Security Council, via Resolutions 1269 (19 October 1999), 1368 (12 September 2001) and 1373 (28 September 2001), has called upon all States to cooperate in curtailing support to terrorist groups, including financial support.

month from this. “Managing the Tamil diaspora” is an art that the LTTE has clearly mastered and one which other terrorist groups are likely to emulate sooner or later. The LTTE’s successful management of the Tamil diaspora is a valuable case study of the general phenomenon of the impact of diaspora communities on terrorist movements.

The purpose of this paper is to describe how LTTE reaches out to the Tamil diaspora, runs its propaganda machine, collects regular funds, and remits funds for various purposes. Finally, it describes the overall implications of Tamil diaspora management. The LTTE’s methods of managing the diaspora are worthy of study particularly because their pioneering techniques have proven helpful to similar groups in the past and are even more likely to do so in the future.

In general three factors have limited the ability of governments to curtail the funding of terrorist groups by diaspora communities. First, fundraising is allowed for so-called legitimate causes and there are no agreed upon definitions of these “legitimate causes” or, conversely, of “illegitimate causes.” Second, the effective monitoring activities within diaspora communities is extremely difficult, especially for “outsiders.” Third, the lack of understanding regarding the factors influencing diaspora motivations for donating funds to terrorist groups even when they know that their contributions will lead to death and devastation in their “homeland.” This paper will attempt to examine, in particular, this last factor —the diaspora community’s motivations for funding movements engaged in terrorist activities.

COMPOSITION OF TAMIL DIASPORA

The Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora is composed of three main groups, with a total population approaching one million. The oldest of these communities consists of Tamils whose parents and grandparents migrated to Singapore and Malaysia beginning in the 1930s. Now numbering nearly 75,000 in Malaysia, Singapore and Mauritius, this highly successful emigrant community comprises professionals, intellectuals, and other influential individuals.⁴ The unique feature of this community is that most of them have never visited their “homeland” in Sri Lanka.

The second oldest community consists of the Tamils who migrated to Europe, America, Canada, Australia to work as skilled professionals. This community had

⁴ Sivasupramaniam V : Diaspora <http://murugan.org>

reached nearly 60,000 before the 1983 communal riots in Sri Lanka, and has continued to rise since then. Like the first group, these Tamil migrants have successfully earned and maintained respected status within their adopted societies.

The third major group contains Tamils who left Sri Lanka as refugees in the wake of the 1983 riots. In most cases, these immigrants were joined abroad by their families only years later. Unlike the previous two groups, this group consists largely low-skilled, less-educated Tamils desperate to escape the violence of their homeland.



Demos

The Tamil diaspora community has directly contributed to the development the LTTE's military capabilities. It has been a major factor in transforming the LTTE from an ill-equipped, rag-tag guerilla force armed with locally-made explosives into a sophisticated, globally-armed paramilitary capability of conducting one of the world's deadliest insurgencies.

While the LTTE's fund raising has become a focus of analysis of the Tamil diaspora's role in supporting political violence at home, other factors have not been as closely examined, including the diaspora community's sense of togetherness rooted in ethnic identity, rich language and literature, and a vibrant culture. Also important is the unforgiving mentality rooted in memories of fear and physical exhaustion experienced by many, especially after 1983, fleeing their homeland. The initially difficult circumstances many endured until they established themselves in their new countries, added fuel to the fire of vengeance.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TAMIL DIASPORA

The Tamil diaspora is best viewed as a community in isolation. Both at home and abroad, Tamils are a closed and conservative society with customs, lifestyles, rules, and norms that differ from those around it, even those of the Sinhalese in Sri Lanka. The degree of integration of Tamils into the majority societies in which they reside generally has been quite low.

Oivind Fuglerud argues that in the Sri Lanka-Tamil diaspora one finds two different conceptions of Tamil culture: the “traditional” view describing a space-time relationship that is nomadic and grounded in heritage; and the “revolutionary” view expressing a space-time relationship that is sedentary and historicist.⁵ The revolutionary model of culture serves as the basis of the Tamil separatism of the LTTE, and has fuelled the nationalism of the Sinhalese majority in Sri Lanka.

LTTE’S ACCESSIBILITY TO TAMIL DIASPORA

The LTTE was one of several armed Tamil groups (others included the PLOTE, EPDP, TELO and EROS, EPRLF) that had emerged in Sri Lanka by the late 1970s. Of these, only the LTTE contemplated reaching out to the Tamil community abroad. Early on, the LTTE established agents in many countries containing Tamil expatriates and started selling their ideology that Tamils must establish a separate state through armed struggle. When the riots broke out in 1983, the LTTE was best positioned to organize the diaspora to support its propaganda and fund raising activities. In addition to the dissemination of propaganda through the Internet, telephone hotlines, community libraries, mailings, Tamil television (the LTTE’s launched its own channel recently), and radio broadcasts, LTTE regularly organizes political, cultural, and social gatherings coordinated with auspicious dates such as LTTE leader Prabhakaran’s birthday, Martyrs’ Day, and Black Tigers’ Day. Thousands of resident Tamils gather at these events, at which the chief guests are usually prominent politicians of the host country.⁶

5 Fuglarud, Øivind : Life on the Outside : Tamil Diaspora and Long distance Nationalism: Pluto Press , London , 1988

6 Kalansooriya, Ranga : A Case study on the Liberation tigers of Tamil Eelam : at Seminar in Malaysia April 18 2005

The LTTE has maintained systematic records of all diaspora community members, including addresses, telephone numbers, email addresses, and even bank account numbers. These databases are linked to the LTTE head offices in Sri Lanka.

APPROACH OF THE LTTE IS WINNING OVER THE TAMIL DIASPORA

Simply having a record of the Tamil diaspora community, however, is not sufficient for LTTE to collect optimum funds from the members. LTTE has developed and perfected the following methodologies to turn diaspora members into active LTTE supporters or sympathizers.

Communication



Eelam Map and Current Positioning

Red : Controlled Areas :Brown : LTTE Occupies in Various Pockets

Communication is a key area of the LTTE's overseas operation. The LTTE, as a separatist movement fighting to carve out a homeland (see the figure above), has carefully positioned its armed struggle in national and international opinion. The diaspora is constantly exposed to propaganda through the Internet, telephone hotlines, community libraries, mailings, Tamil television, and radio broadcasts. The task of the LTTE communication team is to ensure that the mind set of the Tamil diaspora is conditioned to maintain a steady, high level of support.

Propaganda

- <http://www.news.tamilcanadian.com>
- <http://www.tamilaustralian.com>
- <http://www.sangam.org>
- <http://www.lteps.org>
- <http://www.eelamnation.com>
- <http://www.123tamil.com>
- <http://www.eelam.com>
- <http://www.infoeelam.com>
- <http://www.tamilar.org>
- <http://www.tamileelam.dk>
- <http://www.tamilvalai.com>
- <http://www.naatham.net>
- <http://www.maalaimalar.com>
- <http://www.worldtamilnews.com>
- <http://www.tamilonline.net>
- <http://www.tamil.com>
- <http://www.sltma.com>
- <http://www.tamilworld.com>
- <http://www.tamilinfo.com>
- <http://tamillinks.net>
- <http://www.tamileelamnews.com/>

Tamil Canadian
TAMILS' TRUE VOICE

TamilNet

Tamil Eelam
homepage

Tamil Eelam

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NTT/Tamil Net , Websites —These Are Popular Communication Modes

Once its ideology is defined, anyone who does not support the LTTE cause is branded a traitor who will pay the price for disloyalty. Over time, this effective campaign has convinced the diaspora community that the LTTE is effective and committed to pursuing its final objective.

Cultural Activities

The LTTE pays special attention to promoting Tamil art and culture through “soft” influence events such dance, drama, music, theatre, art and literature, and food festivals; religious functions; cultural and social evenings; and recreational and leisure events. Knowing the attachment of the Tamil community to its culture, the LTTE has attempted to exploit this situation by infiltrating and taking over non-LTTE religious and cultural organizations. As a result, most of the temples of worship, Tamil language schools, and institutes offering classical music and dance now belong to the LTTE. In this manner, the LTTE has largely succeeded in assuring the diaspora that it is the LTTE which is genuinely interested in defending and sustaining their religious and cultural norms and traditions⁷.

7 Thanuka : Give Art & Culture a chance in peace efforts ; Mirror 19 Oct 2005

Cultural performances in Europe



Performance Back at Home

The LTTE needs to prove to its diaspora community from time to time that the funds it collects are efficiently and effectively applied in pursuit of their ultimate goal. This is a critical requirement for any terrorist organization seeking continued diaspora funding: it must establish its worth to the donors through high profile tactical “successes” at regular intervals.

Since 1994, LTTE has lost only one battle, costing it the control of the capital of North Jaffna, Jaffna city.⁸ Following this defeat, however, the LTTE has overrun 14 military bases and recaptured much of the area. It has been observed that every time the LTTE overruns a military base, its diaspora funding increases by several fold. For example, the Airport attack in 2001, which destroyed many aircraft belonging to the government without a single civilian casualty, triggered a series of successful fund-raising events in Europe.

⁸ The LTTE withdrew to the Wanni area when government troops moved into Jaffna city and engaged the LTTE in intense combat. An attempt to retake Jaffna failed when the Sri Lankan Army enjoyed a last minute reprieve, receiving a shipment of multiple-barrel rocket launchers. The LTTE was, at the time, just 14 kilometers away from Jaffna city and the Indian government was about to send ships to evacuate the government troops from the Jaffna peninsula.

LTTE Administrative Structure



Administration -LTTE's Judiciary, Customs, Income Tax Department, Central Bank, the Police, Official Media and So On

LTTE Military Structure



Military Structure Is Known and the Latest Addition Is the Tigers Airwing

On other hand, opinion and support for the LTTE could quickly turn negative, if its bases were overrun by the Army and/or the LTTE looked to be on its way to extinction. In such circumstances, its supporters in the diaspora community might gradually lose faith in the movement and their funding would subsequently diminish. In

other words, there is a direct correlation between ‘performance’ of a terrorist group and the diaspora support.

But, beyond its military successes, the LTTE has steadily establishing an administrative structure mirroring the structures of Sri Lankan government, including a judiciary system, police department, and revenue and customs services. Establishing this structure enhances the impression among the diaspora community that the LTTE is well on its way to establishing a separate state.

Within the diaspora itself, LTTE cadres abroad assist new arrived immigrant by providing them food, shelter and clothing. LTTE representatives may help migrant Tamils find suitable employment, often on the black market where their income is untaxed. These types of earnings readily expand terrorist coffers as well because they leave no paper trail. In Western democracies, the LTTE also lobby host countries on behalf of Tamil immigrants, emphasizing to major political parties the importance of the Tamil voting block. All of these activities are undertaken to convince Tamil expatriates that the LTTE is interested in their future outside their homeland.

LTTE’s Political Work Abroad

Yogarajah Balasingham



Yogarajah Balasingham —Elected to Oslo Municipal Council

The LTTE encourages its supporters to participate in politics in the expatriates' new countries. In Norway, for example, a local LTTE leader was elected to the Oslo Municipal council. There is, of course, no fundamental problem with an ethnic minority participating in politics, unless the individual in question is, as in this case, also a member of the LTTE military cadre suspected of involvement with clandestine, terrorist-related activities in Sri Lanka before fleeing the country in 1992⁹.

LTTE delegations in Belgium, Ireland, Germany, Holland



In the past LTTE has taken advantage of the peace talks held in Europe to meet with politicians and government officials from various countries. Again, there is no problem with these meetings in principle. However, when independent, moderate Tamil organizations seek similar appointments, they often either see lower ranking officials or are put “on hold” in hopes that they will give up. This unintentionally sends the message to the diaspora community that the LTTE wields greater respect than other Tamil organizations and justifies, in some way, the idea that “terrorism works.” In Sri Lanka, they say, launching attacks from time to time is the only language that Sri Lankan governments understand.

9 Intelligence consultations, France, October 2005

FUND RAISING TECHNIQUES

Broadly, the methods of collecting funds from the diaspora community include:

- Regular monthly contributions by individuals and families.
- Cash collections from participants during political events.
- Collections from participants during social and cultural events and through ticket sales to these events.
- Special events connected to venerated dates, such as hero's days, which often include speeches from special invitees from Sri Lanka
- Gatherings during periods of intense activity in Sri Lanka (e.g., after the airport attack in 2001)
- Door-to-door collections, usually carried out over weekends and considered an addition to regular monthly payments.
- Collections by representatives of the Black Tigers, Women Cadres, and various other brigades.
- Sales of promotional material such as DVDs, Audios, Videos, books, and magazines in LTTE or other Tamil shops.
- "Easy" loan schemes with high interest rates offered by LTTE-linked shops
- Fees from money exchanges at LTTE-owned shops, which are a much faster means for transferring cash than banking institutions.
- Joint management and profit-sharing of business entities through LTTE-provided loans for investment with LTTE activists in travel agencies, money exchanges, restaurants, grocery stores, printing presses, housing companies, import-export houses, music shops, communication parlors, etc.

Charity Organisations



TRO : TEEDOR —Charity Organizations

The method of regular monthly contributions from individuals or families is particularly interesting. The LTTE establishes a fixed contribution for each Tamil expatriate family based on their income. It can vary from 50 to 500 USD per month. Most Tamil families abroad have standing orders with their banks to make regular payments to an LTTE cover organization. Other families simply pay cash. While the contribution is ostensibly voluntarily, there is explicit and implicit coercion involved. Those who fail to make their regular contribution get a polite call from the LTTE two days after the deadline, a follow-up reminder in a week's time, and finally, a visit to their homes after two weeks. Bankruptcy is the only way to avoid these payments.

Money is usually routed through donations given to pro-LTTE Tamil cultural, human rights, or humanitarian agencies in order to evade legal and political counter-measures being taken by the international community. Major front organizations —such as the World Tamil Movement, Federation of Associations of Canadian Tamils, World Tamil Association, United Tamils Organisation, Tamil Eelam Economic Development Organisation —have sophisticated systems for collecting funds. The LTTE media abroad is also used extensively for this purpose. The LTTE International Secretariats based in European countries are responsible for the overall global coordination of collection and transfer of funds. The main problem in stopping such financial flows into terrorist organizations is the challenge of proving that the funds collected are being used for terrorist activities¹⁰.

¹⁰ Gunaratne, Rohan : Sri Lanka's ethnic crisis & National Security (Colombo Vijitha Y 1998)

HOW IS THE DIASPORA MONEY TRANSFERRED

Some of the main practices applied by the LTTE are:

- Tying the collection to Charity organizations that are legally registered
- Remitting funds through individual personal accounts —Banks generally check remittances of large sums. Get 20 individuals to remit money to an account outside. Since bank check only transactions above certain levels, these remittances go unnoticed.
- Tying collections to Business transactions —Like over-invoicing for goods and services received from outside.

Today liberalized financial transactions, Internet banking, credit card transfers make the remittances much easier and faster.

IMPLICATIONS AND SECURITY ISSUES¹¹

Money laundering, the process whereby illegally earned funds are concealed by channelling them into the financial system, is a major issue for law enforcement and financial regulators. Diaspora involvement facilitates the process thanks to the huge number of financial transactions individuals in diaspora community undertake.


Physical intimidation of members of diaspora community by rebels is something that has drawn attention of local authorities. There are many such cases, but intimidation of citizens in the host country has rarely been publicly acknowledged. There have even been occasions where police officers have sought transfers due to indirect intimidation, such as threatening telephone calls to their spouses. In at least one case, a police chief resigned, probably as a result of such intimidation, although again this has not been disclosed to public.¹²

11 Brynen Rex. Diaspora Populations and Security Issues in Host Countries. McGill University : rex.brynen@mcgill.ca

12 Intelligence Consultations 2000 Oslo Norway

Sivarajah Rajasingham Ny Tid article (February 17-23 issue):

In the claws of the Tigers



Rajasingham — EX PLOTE member was threatened at gun point in Oslo for giving interviews to newspapers against the LTTE.

Indirect extortion of members of the diaspora community by the LTTE, has also occurred; for example, through a “visa process” for expatriate Tamils visiting relatives in the homeland. Today, most members of the diaspora must obtain a special identity card from the LTTE if they wish to travel to their homeland areas in Sri Lanka during holidays.

Emergence of diaspora links to organized crime is another serious security issue. Such crime ranges from trade in illegal goods to election fraud and tampering. When Yogarajah contested for local government elections in Oslo, the LTTE got members of the diaspora community monitoring the elections and with access to the paper ballots to make a faint “x” next to his name with a pencil. The scanning machine conducting the vote counting would subsequently count a vote in favour of Yogaraj on all the ballots that bore the tiny pencil mark. The investigation of this alleged voter fraud was not pursued, however, due to the potential embarrassment it would cause the local government.

The diaspora offers terrorist organizations safe houses for such activities as weapons procurement, narcotics trafficking, gunrunning, and human smuggling. Terrorist operators traveling abroad can frequently blend into diaspora communities: Interpol has

stated that their inability to apprehend Kumaran Padmanatha, LTTE procurement chief, stems from his ability to hide in plain sight among the diaspora whenever he travels abroad¹³.

The lack of intelligence cooperation between Sri Lanka and other countries has led to additional difficulties. Sri Lankan intelligence officers, for example, have often found their attempts to infiltrate elements of the diaspora community thwarted following complaints lodged with the local police.

Lobbying efforts by LTTE-backed diaspora groups directed at host governments may influence the policies of those governments towards Sri Lanka. Western countries, including US and Britain, took many years to brand the LTTE as a terrorist organization due to the pro-LTTE lobbying against such actions by local Tamil diaspora.

Tough immigration procedures may create additional strains on the relationship between the host countries and Sri Lanka. For instance, legitimate travelers and business people from Sri Lanka traveling abroad may be adversely affected when the security measures in a host country are applied equally and indiscriminately to all Sri Lankans.

CONCLUSION

This study suggests that diaspora funding to terrorist groups is increasing and will continue to be a major funding source for these organizations. The LTTE's case has been presented as a model in view of its advanced methods of overseas operations. As terrorist groups have shown a propensity to copy one another, many of the techniques successfully employed by the LTTE will likely proliferate to other groups in the future.

Legal instruments can certainly play a role in curbing this funding source, provided they are properly designated and seriously implemented. They have many limitations, however, and authorities have a responsibility to look into other ways and means of curtailing diaspora funding. One alternative is through winning the support of the diaspora community itself for curbing such activities. One way of gaining support, as in the Sri Lankan case, is for governments to be seen as sincerely attempting to work towards political solutions to the grievances animating the diaspora community. Another important, though less obvious, means for gaining diaspora support is through art and

¹³ Thanuka : Mastermind of LTTE's procurement system : Mirror 19 July 2005

culture, both powerful communication tools for reaching out and winning over this community.

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PART IV

BUILDING A CATR RESEARCH AGENDA

BUILDING A CATR RESEARCH AGENDA

One of the founding principles of the Council for Asian Terrorism Research (CATR) is the need to bring the collective expertise of its member nations and institutions together to promote regional analyses and facilitate regional responses to the threat of terrorism and political violence. The commitment to produce collaborative research will enable CATR to produce products of unique value to academia, policymakers, law enforcement, and military forces across and outside South and Southeast Asia. Furthermore, such collaborative and comparative studies will expand the influence of CATR on counterterrorism policies and approaches and attract a broader base of institutional and government participation in and support for CATR's important work.

The nature of the threat from terrorism and political violence also demands a collaborative, interdisciplinary, and multilateral approach. The organizations and ideologies that threaten the South and Southeast Asia regions do not respect national or even regional boundaries. Their structures are complex and constantly evolve in response to pressure from local and regional counterterrorism efforts. In short, terrorism and political violence is a constantly moving and shifting target that can best be understood and countered through creative and cooperative approaches. In the area of counterterrorism research, CATR is rooted in the idea that the sum of the expertise of its member institutions can, if properly and thoughtfully mobilized, be much greater than the sum of its individual parts.

In its first biannual symposium in October 2005, the CATR Board of Governor's agreed to make the creation of a common CATR research agenda a priority in its next two symposia. The idea was to bring CATR members and participants together to identify and prioritize their most pressing research and analytical concerns. In particular, the goal of the research agenda was to identify those areas in which collaborative and comparative research programs could bring the biggest payoff in terms of new insights and understanding in the following categories:

1. Why do terrorist movements start?

2. How does terrorism spread between and within communities, nations, and regions?
3. How do terrorist movements do business and sustain themselves?
4. How can states link the causes and cultural contexts of terrorism to develop more effective responses?
5. What opportunities and necessities exist for building regional cooperation in countering terrorism and other violent political movements?

At this second biannual symposium, CATR members and participants met in a series of working groups to discuss the first three of these topics: how do terrorist movements start, how do they spread, and how do they do business and sustain themselves? (The last two questions dealing with state responses will be addressed at the third biannual CATR meeting.) Over 3 days, the conference participants broke up into three small groups to discuss what they saw as the most important topics and issues at hand and develop a working list of candidate research projects. The working groups were asked to pay particular attention to those areas in which comparative and collaborative research projects might be of particular analytical value. After each of the working group sessions, the conference reconvened in a plenary session to share small group deliberations and recommendations and merge the working group outputs into a comprehensive draft research agenda.

The goal of the working group process was to give every participant the chance to have an input in designing the CATR Research Agenda. The ultimate success of the process, however, will depend on CATR's commitment, as a group, to give every member institution the opportunity to participate in implementing the research agenda for the common benefit of all the member institutions and nations. The underlying assumption is that the entire CATR membership, and the regions it serves, will benefit from drawing on the full expertise of the CATR community. The hope was, as well, that the working group process would encourage CATR members to discuss the agenda among themselves during and after the symposium with an eye toward forging a habit of cooperative research projects and approaches.

Working Group One: Why Do Terrorist Movements Start?

One major point of agreement arose in each of the small groups related to the origins of terrorism: CATR must test what we think we know about the origins of terrorism. There has been a great deal of research on the origins and motivations behind the rise of terrorist groups, but the empirical data for virtually all of this literature comes

from Europe (in the 1970s and 1980s) and the Arab world (in the 1990s to the present). A number of conclusions have emerged from these studies that many treat as “conventional wisdom,” such as:

- Poverty does not cause terrorism.
- Democracy is an inoculant against the spread of terrorist ideologies because it gives the discontented a legitimate outlet.
- Al-Qaida is responsible for the spread of “the new terrorism.”
- Religious education is the source of radicalization.
- Suicide terrorists are “dead-enders.”

As we learn more about the rise and spread of terrorism in Southeast and South Asia, however, these conclusions are called into question. It is possible, indeed likely, that the patterns in these regions will prove to be different. For example, we know very little about the origins and motives of suicide bombers in Southeast Asia because suicide bombing is such a relatively new phenomenon in the region. Similarly, it seems likely that poverty and economic deprivation are major contributors to terrorism in these regions, while religious education seems not to be.

The working groups highlighted the need to develop a common lexicon for CATR that establishes working definitions for key terms like terrorism, political violence, and radicalism. The methodology of future CATR research should, as much as possible, focus on field research and comparative studies. There should also be a common research framework so that CATR-sponsored studies build a synergy that will enable them to provide unique insights across countries and regions. In general, the working groups recommended a two-phased approach to implementing the research agenda. Phase One would focus on country-by-country studies that focus on field research related to specific groups and movements. Phase Two would build on those case studies by using them to conduct inter-regional and cross-regional studies to find comparisons, contrasts, and trends in such factors as: the root causes of terrorism, the role of civil society in generating and fostering radical ideologies and terrorist groups, the role and shared characteristics of successful terrorist leaders, and the relative importance of outside ideologies in generating radicalism.

In the plenary session, the group focused on two high-priority research agenda items. First, CATR needs to develop a comprehensive geneology of terrorist movements in South and Southeast Asia. This geneology should trace the historical roots of

individual groups and identify their internal and external links and alliances (including family and business ties, for example), the structure of leadership, and the sources of group identities. Taken together, the individual group genealogies can enable CATR to compile a “terrorism family tree.” This effort should include a fairly in-depth chronology of the rise of these groups to facilitate the identification of patterns, trends, and phases in the development of terrorist movements.

The second important research agenda item would be studies that compare terrorist and violent political groups with nonviolent groups and groups in transition from violence to nonviolence. By looking at groups that resort to terror and comparing them with groups that seek political change through peaceful means and groups that back away from violence and move toward the political mainstream, it might be possible to identify some factors that predispose groups toward one extreme or the other. These comparisons should focus on such factors as democratization, civil society, socioeconomic factors, and the psychology of group leaders as possible factors that account for why one group turns to violence to achieve its ends and another does not.

Working Group Two: How Do Radical Ideologies Spread?

The working group identified a number of dimensions to the question “How do radical ideologies spread?” that future CATR research should identify and measure. It is important to track the course of ideological spread, but it is also important to watch how technology and tactics spread, since they are often shared between groups with very different ideological focuses. It is also important to understand the dynamics of both horizontal spread—of ideologies from one group, state, or region to another—and vertical spread—how groups and their supporters move from discontent, to radicalization, to violence. Much of the focus of research in this area has, to this point, focused on behavioral elements, but CATR should broaden its focus to include the processes that contribute to the spread of radical ideologies: what processes cause the transformation from passive sympathizers to supporters to active terrorists? More importantly, CATR must ask, “Can those processes be reversed?” Is there a formula for reversing the spread of an ideology? What makes groups and radical ideologies disappear or undertake to transform from violent resistance to peaceful political participation?

Before CATR can make serious progress in understanding the dynamics of the spread of radical ideologies, it must identify its metrics. Similar to the approach to be adopted in examining the origins of terrorist groups, CATR’s research agenda should

emphasize the collection of empirical field data on such issues as membership in radical and terrorist organizations, finances, the scope and scale of involvement, the presence of groups on the Internet, and the levels of violence. In measuring ideological spread, it will be important to identify those measurable and observable factors that can reliably be regarded as indicators of how, where, and to what extent radical ideologies are spreading within and between societies. In this way, it will, over time, be possible to identify the “ideological viruses”—those elements of radical ideologies and techniques that spread most quickly and readily and are thus deserving of particular attention by counterterrorist researchers, policymakers, and operators.

The plenary session identified three key areas for research focus related to the spread of radical ideologies. The first is the need to map the typical “life cycle” of terrorist groups, including the stages of radicalization; its pace and tempo; the identification of “points of no return,” where groups shift inexorably toward violence; the effect of various types of interventions to halt the radicalization process; and, in particular, the effect of democratization on the spread of radical ideologies. Is democracy, as some have argued, a sure-fire inoculant against the rise of violent radical movements by providing a potential channel for the settlement of grievances and by steering all political extremes toward the center, or can it, in some cases, harden ideological lines? This, like the issues related to the roots of terrorism, is an area in which most research to date has focused on European and Arab groups. CATR can make an important contribution by identifying the stages of development of terrorist groups in the particular cultural and historical contexts of South and Southeast Asia. Groups exist in the region at all stages of development: some, like those participating in the Muslim unrest in Thailand, have not yet gelled into full-fledged radical movements; others, like JI, the Abu Sayyaf Group, and the LTTE, have already passed the tipping point into terrorist or insurgent violence; and a few, like Laskar Jihad in Indonesia, have actually disbanded. What accounts for the movement from one phase to the next? Can CATR identify key turning points at which state intervention might prevent a group from reaching the point of no return?

A second important area for CATR research is the role of charismatic leadership in the spread of radicalization. Some attention has been paid to the psychological characteristics of individual charismatic leaders, but less analytical effort has gone into understanding the nature of the links between charismatic terrorist leaders and their followers. Can a charismatic leader alone make the difference in spreading a radical

ideology? And what are the shared characteristics and leadership styles of the most successful and venerated of terrorist movement leaders?

The third research priority should be careful study of how terrorist movements use existing social structures and institutions to spread their ideologies. The role of religious education, especially in South Asia, has received a great deal of attention. There is still room, however, for research in how radical groups and movements exploit other aspects of secular and religious education, including student social and professional organizations. Another extremely important area is the role of civil society in the spread or prevention of radical ideologies. A number of civil society elements deserve attention including unions and professional organizations, social organizations, humanitarian and charitable organizations, and local opinion elites. The final, and perhaps most challenging, area of research is terrorist use of the media to spread its ideologies. Of particular interest is the use of the Internet to indoctrinate potential supporters and recruits who might otherwise be beyond the reach of radical movements.

Working Group Three: How Do Radical Groups Do Business?

The focus of the third working group session was on developing research priorities for understanding how terrorist organizations sustain themselves and do business. The working groups identified what they see as the key business activities upon which CATR should focus its attention. These were:

- How do terrorist groups raise money, through both legitimate business activities and illegal pursuits such as drug and weapons trafficking, money laundering, and other criminal activities? How do radical organizations store their wealth now that the international counterterrorism effort has begun to crack down on the traditional system of international financial institutions?
- How do terrorist groups “sell” their ideas? What are the ideological “marketing strategies” that groups use to attract support, legitimize their agendas, and recruit new foot soldiers?
- How do terrorist groups plan and carry out violence? What are the command and control structures, and how do those change in response to arrests and pressure from counterterrorism forces?
- How do terrorist groups mobilize their support structure? How do they infiltrate or coopt NGOs and charitable organizations? How do they mobilize support in diaspora communities both as a means of radicalization and as a source of funding?

- What is the terrorist “lessons learned” process? How do they learn from operational experience, both successful and unsuccessful? How do terrorists learn about the counterterrorism strategies of individual states?

The plenary group agreed that the challenge in building the CATR research agenda will be in defining sufficiently focused studies that will lead to unique insights. For this reason, the consensus was that the research approach should be country-by-country studies on carefully defined and limited sectors conducted according to a common research framework. Such studies would provide the opportunity to look across groups, countries, and regions to identify similarities and differences. Finally, such comparative studies could enable CATR to identify the important trends in how terrorist organizations evolve in response to the operational and business environment over time.

TOWARD A CATR WEBSITE

**CATR Meeting, Sri Lanka
1-3 March 2006**



Towards a CATR Website?



Professor Clive Williams MG
Centre for Policing, Intelligence and
Counter-Terrorism (PICT)

The role of CATR..

CATR is a symposium of government, academic, and research institutions dedicated to providing systematic ways of promoting and sharing regional research on terrorism and counter-terrorism.

Its goal is to draw on the unique strengths and perspectives of each of its member institutions and countries to enhance both understanding of and responses to the rise of terrorism and political violence.

The role of CATR..

CATR is founded upon the principle that by promoting and sharing research, it is possible to draw upon the diverse expertise and perspectives that exist across the region to develop new approaches, enhance existing capabilities, and build integrated and cooperative efforts to counter terrorism in the Asia-Pacific region and other regions that directly affect its security.

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The role of CATR..

CATR fulfils a number of important functions:

- **It provides formal and informal mechanisms for promoting an open dialogue among scholars, officials, and law enforcement professionals**
- **It encourages information sharing as a means to improve the effectiveness of both national and international counterterrorism activities**
- **It promotes research on topics relating to terrorism and counterterrorism for use in policymaking, planning, and training**

4

The role of CATR

- It establishes links with institutions and organizations in other regions for the purpose of information exchange and scholarly dialogue.

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
The case for a CATR website..

- A web site would be a virtual “institution” that could accommodate robust dialogue and discussion, professional exchanges, and provide a space for views/commissioned articles/short papers/research memos etc.
- In CATR’s case, of course, the content would have a regional terrorism/counterterrorism focus.
- There is not a comparable website currently available for those conducting Asia-specific terrorism research.

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The case for a CATR website..

- It is also a way of bridging cultures



Indian yoga



Scottish yoga

The case for a CATR website

- All major or significant organisations have one
- It is a good way of connecting with a much larger group of people than you could reach in any other way



Potential advantages of a website..

- CATR would take a lead position as a regional counterterrorism institution, with clearly defined goals and programs which could be articulated on the website.
- A website could provide an ongoing cost-effective forum for bilateral and multilateral discussion/chat between regional terrorism experts. (The experts could be based in the region or outside of it.)

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Potential advantages of a website..

- Future CATR conferences could cut costs by not commissioning conference papers; papers could instead appear on the website and be read in advance of CATR meetings.
- CATR conferences would become professional meetings focusing on an exchange of ideas on strategic and critical issues, rather than devoting large amounts of time listening to presenters reading their papers.

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Potential advantages of a website..


- Access to the website would be free to the public, but there could be provision for a members' password protected area for issues that we do not want to put in the public (or terrorist!) domain.
- It may be appropriate to have a level of prestige associated with membership/access, based on voting-in new members at CATR meetings.
- Hot links could be included on the website with institutions and organizations in other regions for the purpose of information exchange and scholarly dialogue.

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
Potential advantages of a website


- Examples of existing websites include:
<http://www.aseansec.org/>; www.cfr.org;
www.brookings.edu; www.iiss.org;
www.jamestown.org; <http://www.terrorism.com/>;
<http://www.pict.mq.edu.au/>; <http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/intrel/research/cstpv/>;
<http://terrint.org/>;
- (These could be viewed as potential models for a CATR website.)


12











Potential disadvantages of a website..

- Someone will have to take responsibility for it
- There will need to be a point of contact for updating data, providing papers etc
- There will need to be a webmaster who is actively engaged in maintaining the site
- There will be some ongoing costs

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Potential disadvantages of a website

- A poorly designed website reflects adversely on the organisation - a professional job requires the engagement of a professional website designer.



What could be in an open area?

- Information about CATR
- Public records of past meetings
- Papers
- Links to other sites
- A general program about future events?



What could be in a closed area?

- A list of members, with contact details
- Details about future meetings
- Papers that are not for public dissemination
- A chat or discussion forum for members

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Website design

- Should be kept as simple as possible
- Should reflect the nature of the organisation
- Should be done professionally
- Indicative costs:
 - Design US\$1,000
 - Hosting per year US\$150
 - Maintenance US\$65 per hour

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Issues that need to be addressed by delegates

- Discussion of the website concept
- The cost of developing a robust website - and how might it be funded?
- Who would maintain it? Should it be a rotating responsibility?
- Do we need a closed members' area?
- Is there scope for making membership of CATR a prestigious qualification - MCATR?
- Design of the website

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**The
Terrorism Intelligence Centre**

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SARAH JAIME BURNELL is a Research Analyst with the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research at the Institute for Defence and Strategic Studies in Singapore. She has been responsible for the formulation of one of the largest databases on terrorism legislation and national counter terrorism strategies as head of a strategic project in the centre. She has worked with Rohan Gunaratna to advise the ASEAN Secretariat and prepared a background paper to inform ASEAN member states the need for a comprehensive regional convention on counter terrorism.

She is currently working with police to ascertain the deficient gaps in the powers available to them and possible provisions for the future. She has also worked on developing terrorist strategies in South East Asia and beyond through case studies and direct law enforcement contact. Prior to her work in Singapore she was employed by the Independent Police Complaints Commission in London, the independent body tasked with ongoing review of police conduct in the United Kingdom which includes reference to their implementation of the national criminal and counter terrorism law. She received her BA in political science from Nottingham University and a MSc in International Politics and Asian Government from the School of Oriental and African Studies in London.

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